


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Guidelines

Police Capacity-Building and Development

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DPKO/DFS GUIDELINES ON Police Capacity-Building and Development

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A. PURPOSE

- 1. This Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) Guidelines on Police Capacity-Building and Development (hereafter referred to as 'the Guidelines') spell out the fundamental principles and approaches to police capacity-building and development in post-conflict countries and other crisis situations.
 - 2. The Guidelines are designed to assist police components in furthering the rule of law and the provision of public safety by providing clearer understanding of what Police Capacity-Building and Development entails and will allow United Nations police (UNPOL) to be more professional in how they design, implement, monitor and evaluate police capacity-building and development projects and programmes in order to fulfil mandates of peacekeeping operations and special political missions. They can also serve as a basis for other United Nations and regional entities providing technical assistance in the area of policing in post-conflict and crisis situations.
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B. SCOPE

- 3. The Guidelines shall form the first set of subsidiary guidance below the DPKO/DFS Policy on Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions and provide the context for future guidance development of Manuals, Standard Operating Procedures and Training Materials on Police Capacity-Building and Development.
- 4. These Guidelines shall apply to all staff of the United Nations police components in missions led by DPKO, as well as in special political missions (SPMs) led by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). They shall also apply in potential future roles as

mission environments and needs evolve, e.g. deployments in the context of the Global Focal Point for the Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post-conflict and other Crisis Situations (GFP).

C. RATIONALE

5. Since 2003, almost all new peacekeeping mission mandates have included capacity-building and development (often referred to as 'reform, restructuring and rebuilding'). The Police Division has produced a series of policies and guidelines to direct the United Nations police components in their capacity-building and development efforts. This body of guidance has however remained un-systematised and a series of gaps have been identified by the Police Division in the existing policy framework. Given the salience of capacity-building and police development for the delivery of police-related mandates and the unique skillsets required to carry out these functions, the Secretary-General called upon the United Nations police to come up with a comprehensive body of policy and technical guidance in order to ensure good practice and consistency of approach between missions¹.
6. By defining fundamental principles and core elements of Police Capacity-Building and Development, the Guidelines shall serve to guide assessment and planning processes and inform other mission components as to how United Nations police are to approach the implementation of their Police Capacity-Building and Development mandated tasks. In the same way, the Guidelines shall inform Member States on the understanding and approaches of United Nations police to Police Capacity-Building and Development so that they could contribute appropriately skilled officers to United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions in accordance with Security Council Resolution 2185 (2014) on the role of police in peacekeeping.
7. These Guidelines are based on the assumption that the host State government is committed to the objective of good and democratic governance, including the establishment of a responsive, representative and accountable police service, that civil society is open and willing to contribute to the reform process and that the United Nations police component has the capabilities and capacity to assist the host State in the fulfilment of its goals.

D. GUIDELINES

D6.1 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

8. **Win multi-party, cross-societal consensus on police reform.** Police reform is as much a political as a technical matter. In a polarised post-conflict society, it has to acknowledge social, political or factional (such as tribal) divisions and rivalries. Successful police reform is a key precondition for successful reconciliation after conflict. It is therefore imperative that in assisting the design of the reform process the United Nations Missions reach out beyond police and other law enforcement actors to a variety of political, religious, ethnic, gender-based and other associations, parliamentarians, criminal justice system actors, traditional justice and security providers, national human rights institutions (NHRI), civil society organizations, media and other relevant groups. Involving the host State society in police reform and, more generally, educating the general public about policing will make the police reform a nationally owned project.

¹ Report of the Secretary-General "United Nations Police" (A/66/615, 15 December 2011).

9. **Put the host State government and police in the lead.** The Missions and, particularly, the Special Representatives/ Envoys need to strongly encourage the host State to formulate its vision for the police in a National Police Development Plan and sign a binding agreement with the United Nations, committing the host State to the plan. To fulfil this plan and produce any important organizational change, sustained and committed leadership by the host-state government, especially the most senior executive, is required. Reform requires widespread acceptance, commitment and participation across ranks and assignments. Reformers both inside and outside police organizations should be careful not to denigrate the motivation, knowledge, or skill of the people whose behaviour and conduct they are trying to change.
10. **Address behaviours, build a culture of accountability.** Police culture and behaviour cannot be changed simply by formal reorganization within the police or by restructuring. Police officers will be more likely to change their professional behaviour when they see improvements to effectiveness and the commitment of their management supported by effective accountability mechanisms. Issuing clear statements of organizational policy accompanied by appropriate rewards and sanctions, the coherent enforcement of disciplinary systems together with systematic inclusion of UN values into training, is a powerful way to change police culture and the behaviour of individual police officers, even in situations of high stress and urgency. Effective and transparent internal and external accountability mechanisms will support this agenda. This needs to be coupled with a sense of value given to police officers, including through material and social benefits in line with the resources of the country.
11. **Broaden reform beyond police: justice and corrections.** Police reform efforts have to take place in concert with improvements in the broader criminal justice areas to ensure sustainability of international rule of law support. A responsive, representative and accountable police contributes little if courts or prisons are dysfunctional. Any confidence in the rule of law will be quickly lost if perpetrators return to the streets or if suspects are detained for prolonged periods of time without trial and due process. Regular interaction with the host State criminal justice system positions the United Nations police to work in coordination and partnership to notice and bring them to the attention of the Mission leadership, the deficiencies in the justice and corrections areas. In general, greater police effectiveness will likely necessitate increased resourcing of "downstream" activities in the justice system.
12. **Insist on standards and benchmarks.** United Nations police do not compromise on international human rights and criminal justice standards. Compliance with these standards shall be the point of departure, strategic objective and benchmark of success in any interactions with the host State counterparts. In any dialogue with host State counterparts, United Nations police need to advise the local counterparts of UNPOL's principled stance on advancing human rights and criminal justice standards irrespective of local political or cultural context. In supporting the host State police capacity building and development, the United Nations police must at all times be guided by international human rights standards and policies, including the principles of the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy and the observance of the steps to be taken by UN entities providing support to non-UN security forces. Any support provided must be consistent with the UN Charter and international human rights and humanitarian law. Not least, sustainable reform will not be likely without the commitment to a comprehensive anti-corruption policy across all sectors of governance, to a sector-specific national strategy and to the establishment of independent anti-corruption bodies.
13. **Comprehensive integration of women's rights and gender equality commitments.** United Nations police support should aim to a) facilitate the participation of women and girls in police reform decision-making, planning, implementation and oversight; b) ensure

that the police and its policies respond to the different rights, perspectives and needs of women, girls, men and boys, and in particular provide effective human rights protection, including protection from and response to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); and c) complying with the standards of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and other international human rights instruments, the mandates set forth in UNSCRs 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010) among other UNSC resolutions, as well as the basic principles for a UN approach to security sector reform (SSR) as outlined in the Secretary-General's report on the role of the UN in supporting SSR of January 2008 (S/2008/39).

14. **Praise and encourage but do not shy away from critical feedback.** United Nations police often have to build confidence and rapport with the host State police to attain the level of trust required for effective mentoring and advice while reacting to and recording inefficiencies and wrongdoings, including human rights violations, by the host State counterparts which they witness and/or which are brought to their attention. The Head of the United Nations police component and all officers involved in operational support and capacity-building need to advise and communicate to the host State police at the very start of their relationship and in a polite and respectful way, of UNPOL's duty to provide both positive and also critical feedback, thereby offering a candid solution to address identified issues in partnership.

D6.2 SETTING THE STAGE FOR POLICE CAPACITY-BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT

15. **Secure support for police reform in peace talks and agreement.** Police reform involves shifting power centres and access over key institutions of the state. Control over police enhances power and influence, for those both outside and within the police organisation. Simply put, no effective police assistance can be rendered unless there is common ground between all relevant domestic actors on the basis of a nationally owned reform blueprint. This is why the police reform should feature on the agenda of peace talks. The most sensitive elements of the police reform (obtaining police personnel records, census and identification, vetting, establishment of oversight bodies, enhancing the representation of women and minorities, commitment to reform the entire criminal justice system in a holistic way) need to be enshrined in an agreement for the entire effort to stand a greater chance of success.
16. **Base assistance programme design on a thorough assessment and consultations.** All United Nations police activities in the area of capacity-building and police development need to be based on a thorough assessment of existing host State capacities and resources, their absorption capacity; current and future security trends; policing and protection needs; relevant stakeholders (including non-state); the human rights record of the host State police; political context; and a strong understanding of the extent to which the population trusts the host State police as a legitimate entity of the state. The ability of United Nations police to work effectively in such delicate situations is dependent on their understanding of the cultural, social and political contexts of the mission. Programme design should aim to restore trust and address weaknesses and inequalities that existed pre-conflict, to ensure that the United Nations does not assist a return of un-reformed state authority that the population does not support.
17. **How to assess and what to assess?** Initial assessments need to be conducted together with the Global Focal Point partners with relevant expertise (UNDP, OHCHR, UNODC, UN Women, UNICEF), the World Bank and other relevant bilateral and regional partners in order to arrive at a joint understanding of the reform needs and to avoid duplication and forum shopping by the national counterparts, paving the way for joint assistance delivery. The point of departure in any assessment is the host State police's past history and role in conflict. In conducting assessments, monitoring and evaluation,

United Nations police need to focus on five broad areas:

- a) Police professionalism and integrity: knowledge and skills to deliver policing services, including command and control issues, and to use public resources as effectively and efficiently as possible;
- b) Administrative systems (human resources, logistics, budgets, etc.) to support the delivery of policing services;
- c) Legal and policy framework for the host State police;
- d) Accountability mechanisms for the misuse of public resources and to ensure integrity, good performance and to address misconduct;
- e) Engagement of stakeholders in delivery of policing services.

A more detailed list of host State police capacities to be assessed is to be found in ANNEX I to these Guidelines.

Preliminary personnel inventory: Police census and identification

18. Critical aspect for planning and abuse prevention. As recognised in DPKO/DFS policy framework, the organizational structure of police and other law enforcement agencies in conflict and post-conflict situations is frequently in disarray, i.e. personnel records are incomplete or destroyed, the number and functions of personnel are unknown, and personnel informally join and depart from such agencies, creating an environment for arbitrary exercise of state powers outside the institutional control of the State. Census and identification process serves two primary purposes:

- a) Permits the public to identify who is authorized to exercise policing powers, such as searches, arrests and detentions and who illegally impersonates law enforcement officials and should be sanctioned, thereby building the populations' confidence in the host State police;
- b) Provides reliable indicators on police personnel that allow domestic and international decision makers to identify needs and to develop tailor-made and effective programmes.
- c) Operationally, it helps facilitate resource planning, budgeting and deployment.

19. UNPOL's role in census and identification. United Nations police involvement in the process will be determined by the mandate. In executive mandate missions, UNPOL will be directly responsible for the process while in other contexts it will act in support of the host State authorities. Census and identification programmes are highly sensitive, affecting access to and distribution of State security power and access to resources, and individuals who risk losing power and income through a census and identification programme may resist its implementation. Census and identification programmes are also operationally complex, time-consuming and resource-intensive. The effectiveness of a census and identification programme significantly depends on a firm political commitment and on an adequate provision of resources. The Special Representatives/ Special Envoys of the Secretary-General need to champion census and identification in their political engagement. The host State government and the Mission need to sign a legal instrument defining the criteria, structure, timeline, funding plan and process for census and identification as well as for subsequent vetting and certification. It is also advisable to cost this process, i.e. how many person-hours does it take to run, thereby ensuring that the process is appropriately resourced or designed to fit within likely resource envelopes.

20. Census and identification programmes must be quick. A census and identification programme pursues one fundamental and simple objective of identifying the boundaries in terms of personnel for the police or other law enforcement agency in question. While it

does collect some information on individuals, its primary purpose is to assess membership, not individuals, based on an objective and easily verifiable standard of recognised membership of the police or other law enforcement agency determined in advance. The programme needs to be quick and as inclusive as possible in order to reduce the potential for contention and streamline the process, be based on a broad political consensus and a comprehensive and inclusive personnel list that is compiled and endorsed by the relevant national authorities and other partners providing assistance and support. As a result of the census and identification programme, confirmed members of the law enforcement agency need to receive a provisional identification card.

21. **How to structure the process?** Relevant information collected in the course of a census and identification programme includes both baseline data at the individual level (such as identity, physical aptitude, education, competence, professional experience and career assignments) and at the institutional level (such as total number, gender and ethnic composition, organizational structure and geographic distribution). In setting up a census and identification programme, United Nations police must be guided by the DPKO/DFS Policy on Census and Identification of Law Enforcement Officials (2006.12).

Capacity and Integrity assessment: Vetting

22. **Vetting as a precondition to restoring trust and preventing further abuse.** Vetting processes aim at excluding from public service persons with serious capacity and integrity deficits in order to (re-)establish civic trust and (re-)legitimize public institutions. Vetting also plays a key role in preventing the occurrence or recurrence of abuses. Vetting is always context-specific and may cover:

- a) senior-level officials;
- b) units or individuals with a publicly known record of human rights violations;
- c) units or individuals with a particular vulnerability to corruption, including those responsible for procurement, organized crime and drug trafficking investigations, corruption investigations, etc.
- d) all members of the police service/ law enforcement agency;
- e) new applicants; and
- f) candidates for service with the police or the police service's civilian personnel.

The exact determination on the scope of the vetting will be based on the resources and time available as well as the agreement of the host State authorities and the discussions with the mission's human rights component. This kind of assessment needs to occur regularly throughout the career of an officer, not just something that happens at point of entry. As with the census, it is advisable to cost this process.

23. **Secure a strong legal foundation for both vetting and UNPOL involvement therein.**

The basis for exclusion or prohibition from service of personnel should be based on vetting criteria as set forth in the applicable law. Exclusion criteria should normally be based on criminal records, credible allegations of human rights violations and disciplinary records for acts of serious misconduct, including sexual and gender-based violence, or corrupt or unethical behaviour. For UNPOL involvement to be successful, a vetting programme needs to be firmly enshrined in an agreement and/or international mandate that set out the general framework of the programme design. The text of such an agreement or mandate should outline three elements:

- a) the objectives of the programme;
- b) the standards for, and specification of, vetting criteria and the general management structure of the vetting programme (including a description of the

- various bodies and their terms of reference, composition and appointment process); and
- c) a general timeline and funding plan.

24. **Assess individual, avoid collective punishment, foresee remedies.** Vetting processes should be based on assessments of individual capacity and conduct, including within an organizational unit. Purges and other large-scale removals on the sole basis of group or party affiliation tend to cast the net too wide and to remove public employees of integrity who bear no individual responsibility for past abuses. Basic due process principles must also be respected, including the right to have access to the dossier and contest adverse allegations or information, the opportunity to provide additional information, the right to a hearing, and to appeal an adverse decision to a court or other independent body.
25. **Integrate vetting outcomes into subsequent reform.** The vetting process needs to ensure sustainable outcomes. Sustainability is achieved by integrating the results of vetting within broader personnel reforms, in particular merit-based appointment procedures and effective internal disciplinary and external accountability mechanisms. DPKO/DFS Policy on Support for Vetting of Police and other Law Enforcement Personnel (2008.3) and OHCHR's "Vetting: an operational framework" (Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States Series, 2006) provide comprehensive advice on how to design and implement the vetting process.
26. **Design and implement vetting with the Mission's human rights staff.** United Nations police should work alongside the human rights component in conducting or supporting national vetting processes. This is a mandatory obligation under the DPKO/DFS/DPA/OHCHR Policy on Human Rights in United Nations Peace Operations and Political Missions (2011.20). Human rights component staff members usually have superior access to human rights NGOs, defenders and victims and their families and can provide valuable information and advice on individuals' records. Vetting armed and security forces shall take into account information about past involvement in human rights violations, including rape and other forms of sexual violence in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) on Women and Peace and Security.

Further Reading:

- DPKO/DFS Policy on Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (2014.01);
- DPKO Policy on Census and Identification of Law Enforcement Officials (2006.12);
- DPKO Policy on Support for Vetting of Police and other Law Enforcement Personnel (2008.3);
- Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit (UNODC, 2006);
- Vetting: an operational framework. Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States Series (OHCHR, 2006).
- Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice (OECD, 2007);
- Toolkit on Police Integrity (DCAF, 2012);
- Policy Briefing Paper on Gender-Sensitive Police Reform in Post-Conflict Societies (UNIFEM and UNDP 2007);
- Progress of the World's Women: In Pursuit of Justice (UN Women, 2011).

D6.3 CORE ELEMENT I: SUPPORT TO POLICE POLICY FORMULATION

27. **Act fast and include new rules and regulations in basic, specialised and in-service training.** There is sometimes a tendency in police reform processes to delay work on legislative changes and policies. It is regarded as an afterthought which may be dealt with once infrastructure has been put in place and basic police training has been conducted. United Nations Mission and UNPOL leadership need to avoid such approaches and assist the host State's policy formulation efforts from the start of their deployment. A strong legislative and normative base for the activities of the host State police will put all training on a solid regulatory foundation, based on international human rights and criminal justice standards, and help achieve early gains in accountability. The

Head of the United Nations police component should spare no effort to take advantage of the 'golden hour' when commitment to the reform process is usually at its strongest. For example, gender-sensitive policies and mainstreaming should be initiated immediately to sensitize the reform culture, requiring strong and consistent normative advocacy. If rules or regulations do not exist, it is not possible to hold the police organization or individual officers accountable for their performance and conduct.

28. Sign a legally binding agreement between the United Nations and the host State.

Building on the relevant provisions of the peace plan or political settlement (if they exist), United Nations police need to encourage the host State to express its support for the police reform at the highest governmental level by endorsing a National Police Development Plan and to provide funding for the reform process. The Plan, premised on plausible resource envelopes and enshrined in a legally binding Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the host State government, needs to establish target dates for completion of various activities, expected outcomes and performance indicators and to ensure that the roles and mutual responsibilities of the host State and the Mission toward the implementation of the reform plan be clearly defined in the following areas, with a specific focus on gender perspectives in all areas:

- a) Review and, if necessary, reform of the legal and policy framework for the host State police;
- b) Support to enabling services (administrative, procurement, budgetary, human resources and policy aspects of financing);
- c) Support to policing services (basic training, training of trainers, specialised and leadership training, training infrastructure development, certification);
- d) Accountability (development of police performance indicators and development targets, establishment of internal oversight mechanisms and external accountability structures);
- e) Engagement with stakeholders (roles, rights and responsibilities of relevant stakeholders).

29. Set up a Reform Steering Board. United Nations police and host State counterparts need a mechanism to a) monitor, evaluate and, if necessary, adjust the reform plans; and b) coordinate donor support to the host State police to avoid duplication and ensure the allocation of resources to the priorities identified in the National Police Development Plan. The Board needs to meet regularly as required (at least monthly or bi-monthly) and be responsible for taking all strategic decisions related to the host State police reform process. The Reform Steering Board needs to be headed by a senior Government official from the office of the Head of State or Government and involve a spectrum of relevant governmental officials (Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice) as well as the host State police leadership, police unions (if applicable) and donor representatives. United Nations police also need to recommend to the host State to include 2-3 civil society representatives on the Board, e.g. human rights NGOs, women's or minority associations, to be selected by civil society organizations in a transparent and inclusive way. Special attention also needs to be paid to the gender balance in the composition of the Board. The host State and United Nations police need to invite bilateral and multi-lateral donors to take part in the Board work and to seek their commitment to a unified assistance approach.

Formulating policies

30. Map the legal landscape. At the start, United Nations police – in co-operation with the Mission's legal, human rights and justice sections and other partners – needs to examine the host State's existing legal and normative framework, focussing on the criminal and

criminal procedure codes, the Police Act (or police powers act) internal police policies and guidelines, and laws and regulations on budgeting procedures and procurement activities. Particular attention should be paid to the procedures governing the use of force, detention, stop and search, asset seizure, confiscation and recovery, handling of police complaints, disciplinary rules and procedures, police oversight bodies, policing peaceful assemblies and police action in support of electoral processes. The assessment needs to identify existing legal and regulatory gaps and to propose solutions to address them to the executive branch, legislature and/or the host State police leadership.

31. **Draft co-operatively, engage stakeholders.** Once the gaps have been recognised and accepted, the United Nations police needs to take the lead in assisting the host State police in addressing the gaps. The process will benefit from engagement with relevant local actors, including MPs from parliamentary committees dealing with police issues, relevant governmental agencies, civil society organizations, bar associations, etc. The resultant documents will enjoy a greater degree of public legitimacy provided they are developed with the involvement of all interested parties. Depending on the country context, it may merit to form a working group specifically dedicated to assessing and developing policy documents on policing and consisting of all relevant actors. United Nations police need to caution all actors against unrealistic assumptions about likely resources. It is also crucial that all consultative processes be accessible in relevant local languages and all final products be available in these languages.
32. **Incorporate international standards.** As per the DPKO/DFS policy, United Nations police must actively promote international human rights and criminal justice standards in their dialogue on legislature and policies with the host State counterparts. Relevant international standards are to be found in three UN publications: Compendium of United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (UNODC, 2006), United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for United Nations Police (UNODC, 2009) and Human Rights Standards and Practice for the Police (OHCHR, 2004).
33. **Ensure wide dissemination, training and compliance.** A solid legal and policy framework is an important step towards responsive, representative and accountable police but it must be matched by the rigorous enforcement of these policies. Accountability will be achieved by wide dissemination and consistent enforcement of the key rules and regulations, e.g. a pocket book for all police personnel, integration of legal provisions and policies in basic and specialist training, monitoring of compliance (recognition of compliance and sanction for non-compliance), investigation of serious misconduct cases and exemplary conduct by senior police managers, serving as role models.

What specific areas to prioritise?

34. **Police powers.** Excessive use of police powers, e.g. the use of force, detention, stop and search, is often at the core of the distrust between the host State police and local population. Tackling such abusive behaviour from the beginning of the assistance programme will demonstrate early benefits of the police reform project to the population and build confidence of the public. The use of police powers must be based on international human rights and criminal justice standards and must be incorporated in all training programmes that United Nations police deliver or assist the host State police in delivering. United Nations police may take advantage of the Model Criminal Code, Model Code of Criminal Procedure and Model Detention Act in their work on regulation and policies governing the use of police powers.
35. **Code of ethics.** While legislation and policies regulate behaviour, codes of ethics set out the general ethical principles on which good professional policing is based. Reforming

police and law enforcement agencies in post-conflict environments involves forming a new organizational culture of the host State police. A code of ethics serves as a powerful 'new beginning' statement by the host State police. It reflects the organization's commitment to a new model of behaviour and the values which it seeks to enforce. It reminds the officers and their leaders about what is expected of them, on and off duty, and serves as inspiration to them, setting high ethical standards. The code of ethics needs to part of the core curricula in the initial training and in-service training at the academy. The development of a Code of Ethics should be a consultative process involving different ranks and units of the host State police to ensure ownership. It should be led by the senior management of the host Police. Note that code of ethics and code of conduct do not always refer to the same thing. The code of ethics may need to be supplemented by a code of conduct which is more specific and is aimed at actual behaviour. The code of conduct can include disciplinary measures in case of breach.

36. **Women, minorities, children, vulnerable groups (including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender communities).** These groups may have had negative experiences of policing as a result of discrimination and conflict, including sexual and gender-based violence. Adopting policy statements and/or codes of conduct to address police misbehaviour towards or disregard for these groups may signal a change of the organization's behaviour and its desire to do away with its oppressive practices of the past. More specifically, a gender policy document should be produced by management to guarantee career progression and effective leadership of women at every level of the police system. The development of these codes will offer support and encouragement to the host State police officers in serving the groups which they may have little experience of interacting with and little understanding of. United Nations police are encouraged to work with the mission's human rights component in this area.
37. **Victims and witnesses.** Victim and witness protection is often rudimentary or non-existent in post-conflict societies. Victims should be treated with humanity and respect for their dignity and human rights, and appropriate measures should be taken to ensure their safety, physical and psychological well-being and privacy, as well as those of their families. Redress, reparation and compensation for victims are indeed an essential component of national reconciliation and justice processes. Witnesses play a key role in ending impunity – past, present and future – and making transitional justice processes meaningful. Failure to properly protect victims and witnesses not only undermines national reconciliation processes but also makes people less willing to report crimes, fearing for their and their families' safety. Simply put, no rule of law can be achieved without effective witness protection. United Nations police together with partners should assess the existing legislative and policy framework for victim and witness protection and offer advice to the host State counterparts on how to enhance the system. All host State police officers have to be aware of how to handle confidential information and protect victims' and witnesses' identity. United Nations model witness protection bill, Manual on Human Rights Monitoring (OHCHR, 2011), and the handbook on Good Practices for the Protection of Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings Involving Organized Crime (UNODC, 2008) offer a wealth of advice on how to set up an effective and independent witness protection system. The mission's human rights component is well placed to work with United Nations police in developing a witness protection framework and coordinating the mission's response should it need to intervene to protect specific witnesses and victims.
38. **Reporting persons ('whistle-blowers').** The protection of persons reporting alleged police officer misconduct and/or crimes is equally essential for ensuring accountability. Often the lack of reporting is due to the fact that people do not believe in an effective follow-up and response. Therefore, effective policies and mechanisms (hotlines, confidential networks, etc.) need to be put in place to encourage people to report their feedback on police activities, to ensure and report on follow-up and to protect their

identity.

Further Reading:

- DPKO/DFS Policy on Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (2014.01);
- Compendium of United Nations Standards and Norms in Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (UNODC, 2006);
- United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for United Nations Police (UNODC, 2009);
- Human Rights Standards and Practice for the Police (OHCHR, 2004);
- United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979);
- European Code of Police Ethics (2001);
- IACP Law Enforcement Code of Ethics (1991);
- Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit (UNODC, 2006);
- Handbook and Training Curriculum on Effective police responses to violence against women (UNODC, 2010);
- Strengthening Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Responses to Violence against Women (UNODC, 2014);
- Good practices for the protection of witnesses in criminal proceedings involving organized crime (UNODC, 2008);
- United Nations Integrated Technical Guidance Note on Gender-Responsive SSR (Forthcoming);
- SSR Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, Gender Responsive SSR, Inter-Agency SSR Task Force, (2012);
- Gender-Sensitive Police Reform in Post Conflict Societies and Case Studies in Rwanda and Timor-Leste (UN Women, 2010) available at http://www.unifem.org/materials/item_detail.php?ProductID=186;
- Model Codes for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice (USIP Press, 2007);
- OHCHR Manual on Human Rights Monitoring; Chapter 14. Protection of victims, witnesses and other cooperating persons (OHCHR, 2011);
- Handbook on Early access to legal aid in criminal justice processes English (UNODC, UNDP, 2014);
- Handbook for Professionals and Policymakers on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime;
- Guide for policy makers on the Implementation of the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims and Abuse of Power;
- Handbook on Justice for Victims on the use and application of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims and Abuse of Power (currently being updated).

D6.4 CORE ELEMENT II: STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

39. **Engage stakeholders throughout the reform process.** Stakeholder engagement is vital throughout the entire reform process. It must become the norm rather than an ad hoc and sporadic activity. Societal opinion on policing needs to be sought during the assessment and reform design stage and during the implementation phase. Once an important milestone in the police reform process (or the implementation of the police development plan) has been achieved, it is necessary to organize a lessons learned exercise with broad participation of various societal actors, looking at achievements and shortcomings in the reform process.
40. **Reach out to women, minorities, youth, vulnerable groups.** Women, indigenous people, persons belonging to minorities and youth are often the most marginalised sectors of the public. Many of them have experienced or continue to experience police abuse. Engaging these societal strata in the police reform process will be a critical success factor in the reform process. Such engagement may take the form of regular direct meetings with representatives of these groups or can be facilitated by civil society organizations that have access to and credibility with these communities.
41. **Encourage plurality in the Reform Steering Board.** United Nations police needs to encourage the host State authorities to make the Reform Steering Board a true reflection of the society. The Board will exercise quality oversight of the reform process if it is representative and reflects all societal actors with interest in the police reform. Members of the Board representing various interests will be in a position to deliver grass-roots reform expectations and to provide monitoring of the reform implementation. If the host State authorities, for one reason or another, refuse to set up an all-inclusive Board, the

United Nations Mission leadership and the Head of the United Nations police component need to keep civil society partners abreast of the Board activities through regular briefings and meetings.

Outreach to specific groups

42. **Government.** As noted above, police reform is not a technical exercise. It requires understanding and commitment of policy makers. Political leaders need to make clear statements of support for the police reform and emphasize its importance for the overall post-conflict rebuilding effort. More specifically, United Nations police need to encourage the Government to be represented at a senior level on the Reform Steering Board and to regularly chair and inject momentum in the Board discussions. Regional and local authorities may be invited to join too. United Nations police also needs to advise the Government to involve the Ministry of Finance (Treasury) representative in all Board meetings on a permanent basis. The Government is also responsible for ensuring sufficient and timely budgetary allocation for the police reform activities and for testing the costs and benefits of allocating resources to police reform rather than to other pressing priorities. Frequent change of police leadership has been shown to have a negative impact on the reform process. United Nations may seek an informal commitment of the Government to ensure leadership continuity (minimum tenure) throughout the reform process.
43. **Legislature.** Parliamentarians play a key role in the reform process. The Head of the United Nations police component – in co-operation with the Mission's political section – needs to identify a committee/ committees entrusted with criminal justice issues and to build a relationship with MPs from these committees. United Nations police may also recommend that the Parliament establish a special ad hoc committee on police reform to provide continuous oversight of the process. Such ad hoc Committee has the potential to become an important constituency of support for the overall reform process. The Parliament is also the body responsible for reforming the legislative base for the police activities, including penal and criminal procedure codes, police act and other legislative documents, as well as for setting up external oversight mechanisms. Continuous dialogue with parliamentarians is a must for United Nations police in order to ensure that these documents meet international criminal justice and human rights standards. Not least, the Parliament approves the police budget so parliamentary involvement in the police reform process will help MPs take an informed decision on the matter and to be fully aware of the police development needs. Women's parliamentary commissions or caucuses can be useful forums for promoting gender-sensitive oversight of the policy and should be engaged.
44. **National human rights institutions.** NHRIs (Ombudsman, Human Rights Commission, etc.) are State bodies with a constitutional and/or legislative mandate to protect and promote human rights. They are part of the State apparatus and are funded by the State. However, they operate and function independently from government. While their specific mandate may vary, core functions of NHRIs include complaint handling, investigations, human rights education and making recommendations on law reform. The NHRI is a key ally in the police reform process, enjoying access to police stations and pre-trial detention facilities and able to document and act on allegations of abuse. In close co-ordination with the mission's human rights component, United Nations police need to establish a lasting and productive relationship with the NHRI, providing it with information on allegations of violations and, if necessary, leveraging their mandate to push for legislative and policy changes, and utilizing their expertise to train and sensitize the police on human rights. United Nations police need to encourage the NHRI to dedicate a section of their annual report to the police achievements and shortcomings. The NHRI

also needs to be invited to participate in the host State police training activities.

45. **Public prosecutors and courts.** These two groups provide judicial oversight of the police and take action in case of police abuse. The timeliness of this action can have a fundamental influence on the police reform. If prosecutors and judiciary take up and proceed with cases of police abuse, the credibility of the entire criminal justice system will be considerably enhanced. United Nations police need to work with the Mission's justice and human rights components to educate prosecutors and judges on their responsibilities vis-à-vis the police service. Given the significance of the police reform process, United Nations police, justice and human rights components may appeal to the courts to give priority to high-profile cases, e.g. gross police misconduct, corruption or excessive use of force. Judicial action on these cases will reinforce the legitimacy of the justice system. Defence lawyers, the Bar Association, and other legal aid providers interact with the police on a daily basis and can provide insights into some of the systematic failures to respect basic standards.
46. **Professional police associations.** These groups – if they exist – can offer a wealth of knowledge on the local policing model, crime situation and successes and failures of the past reform experiences. United Nations police need to consult such groups and, if necessary and appropriate, involve them in the reform design, implementation and monitoring. More generally, labour unions outside of policing also need to be actively engaged whenever they exist.
47. **Associations of entrepreneurs.** These may not exist in post-conflict environments or be seriously undermined by the conflict but business people – both domestic and foreign – can be powerful and committed supporters of the police reform effort. Entrepreneurs crave a favourable business climate which can guarantee the security of their investments and a growing consumer base for their products. They are naturally interested in a strong and effective police service to serve and protect the communities in which they operate their businesses. United Nations police needs to establish and maintain contact with business associations and to invite them to join the Reform Steering Board, with the agreement of the host State authorities.
48. **Media.** Media play an essential role in documenting allegations of violations by the police and advocating for its reform. Journalists often have a detailed and intimate knowledge of the host State and its socio-economic and political context and can be a valuable resource during the initial assessment and design of the police reform programme. Once the reform has been launched, media organizations, both public and private, can have an important role in the implementation, reporting on achievements and exposing shortcomings. United Nations police needs to reach out to the journalists to seek their views before, during and after the assistance programme completion and to encourage the journalists to regularly report on police issues.
49. **Civil society organizations (CSO).** Human rights NGOs, women's groups, minority and youth associations, religious congregations and vulnerable groups may serve as a source of information throughout the reform process. Typically, the mission's human rights component will have developed a strong partnership with these groups. Some of these groups may have experienced discrimination or other forms of oppression at the hands of the state in the past, including at the hands of the police, and may therefore continue to bear a strong sense of distrust towards police. Civil society organizations may therefore act as an interface between the new, reformed police service and these groups. They can help the police reach out effectively to and gain confidence of the groups in question. In close co-operation with the human rights component, United Nations police needs to build a strong relationship of trust and co-operation with CSOs, seeking their assistance with information on alleged police abuses, raising awareness of and support for police reform, encouraging the public to report crimes and to articulate

their public safety needs. CSO activism on the police reform issues is to be welcomed. It is a fundamental guarantee for the long-term sustainability of the reform drive and the public's engagement. In particular, women's civil society organizations could be supported to play a crucial "watchdog" role in ensuring police are responding to women's rights, perspectives and needs.

Managing donor relationships

50. **Put host State police in the driver's seat.** United Nations police are rarely given programmatic funds to support the host State police reform process. The management of the donor relationship is therefore of paramount importance for the achievement of the UNPOL mandates. Regional organizations or bilateral donors may have different agendas, funding modalities or resources but it is vital that all of them work for the achievement of the police reform objectives identified in the National Police Development Plan, synchronizing strategies, programs, investments, and public financial management standards. The Police Development Plan, designed and agreed upon by the host State authorities with UNPOL assistance, needs to serve as a common framework of reference for all actors involved in the police reform effort. United Nations police need to encourage the host State police to insist on setting up a donor committee under the host State police chairmanship as a forum to co-ordinate all donor contributions to the police reform and to avoid duplication.
51. **Make strategic alliances.** Important developments have taken place at United Nations Secretariat level over the past few years which have introduced greater coherence into the UN system when it comes to the rule of law activities. The establishment of the DPKO-UNDP Global Focal Point (GFP) arrangement has ushered in an era of unprecedented co-ordination between the two entities in the design and delivery of police, justice and corrections assistance and fundraising. In a number of contexts, the GFP arrangement has been mirrored in the field. United Nations police should be prepared to increasingly work in close collaboration with UNDP and other partners (OHCHR, UNODC, UN Women). Similarly, the World Bank and DPKO have cooperated closely in the development of the knowledge tool "Public Expenditure Review for Policing" and are increasingly in dialogue on a range of policing matters. The European Union has adopted an action plan in support of UN peacekeeping. United Nations police should capitalise on all these advances at HQ and to forge close partnerships with these institutions in the field, making them key allies in the police reform and involving them in all stages of the process, including planning, programme design, fundraising, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
52. **Flag donor 'unilateralism' to HQ.** There will inevitably be instances when key bilateral donors prefer – for whatever reason – to pursue police assistance outside the National Police Development plan and co-ordination structures set up by the host State police and United Nations police. The host State police may be unable to refuse these donor advances. If the Head of the United Nations police component believes that such assistance duplicates existing activities and runs counter to policing priorities identified at the reform design stage, she/he needs to bring the case to the attention of the Mission's political leadership, Reform Steering Board and DPKO. Within the context of the GFP establishment, DPKO and UNDP have been repeatedly reassured by bilateral donors that their assistance will be channelled through co-ordination mechanisms established by the host State and co-chaired by the United Nations.

Further Reading:

- DPKO/DFS Policy on Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (2014.01);
- Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in Multi-Dimensional UN Peacekeeping (DPKO, 2013);

- Criminal justice reform in post-conflict States: A guide for practitioners (UNODC, 2011);
- Reporting on Corruption: A Resource Tool for Governments and Journalists (UNODC, 2014);
- Public Expenditure Review in Policing (World Bank, forthcoming).

D6.5 CORE ELEMENT III: SUPPORT TO POLICING SERVICES

- 53. Conduct training on the basis of an assessment and comprehensive plan.** All training activities shall be undertaken on the basis of the 2014 DPKO-DFS Guidelines on the Development, Delivery and Evaluation of Training. It is recommended to start with a performance gaps analysis to be followed – in required – by the Training Needs Assessment (TNA) and a Comprehensive Strategic Training Plan supported by training action plans to be developed on the basis of the TNA. TNA describes the current capacity levels and identifies performance gaps with the help of surveys, interviews within and outside the police service, observation, secondary sources and data and targeted seminars, and information on human rights violations committed by the host State police. TNA further identifies what training gaps exist and how to reach the desired state. The Comprehensive Strategic Training Plan, divided into short-, medium- and long-term activities and supported by a training action plan that contains a list of concrete activities, timelines and required resources, is an inseparable part of the National Police Development Plan. It needs to be costed, be linked with the objectives of the National Police Development Plan and contribute to the achievement thereof.
- 54. Do not stay in classrooms all the time, make training practical.** Experience of police reform suggests that classroom training, while enhancing knowledge, tends to have little influence on skills improvements or behaviour changes. Dissemination of manuals and guidelines is also of little benefit if done in isolation. A blended delivery method, combining classroom training with e-learning, individual mentoring and practical exercises outside the classroom, where officers are tested on their reactions and behaviours in real-life situations, has been shown to be effective. Training combined with tackling a concrete issue or situation, e.g. organizing a police-women or police-minority forum, together with an experienced mentor has also been shown to have benefits.
- 55. Make a trainee profile.** The profile will help identify problems related to learning, including post-stress syndrome, inadequate intellectual capacity due to lack of school attendance during the war, fear of weapons and authorities, negative reminders from the post-war conflict or neglecting developing of profounder manual skills, especially during their childhood and adolescence.
- 56. Mainstream human rights, gender and anti-corruption into training.** United Nations police are under the obligation to mainstream human rights and gender throughout the whole training cycle. Human rights training should address standards as well as their concrete and operational application in functions such as investigations, arrest, detention and the use of force. When talking about a national human rights institution, it may be beneficial to invite its representative to take part in the training and to work together with police cadets on a concrete training scenario. Training on gender aspects of policing should be oriented to target male personnel with a focus on attitudinal change, ensure adequate representation of female participants and would benefit from discussions with women's organizations. Training on minority rights would also benefit from the presence of representatives of minority associations. Human rights training will also benefit from involving the mission's human rights component, which could provide scenarios based on real-life situation in which elements of the host State police may have been involved in violations of human rights.

57. **Avoid overwhelming host State colleagues.** As has been shown in a number of conflict-affected societies, the capacity to absorb training is often very limited. United Nations police trainers should start with basic policing skills training and an articulation of the vision and strategic objectives for the host State police. As the host State police capacity improves, more sophisticated capacity-building tasks can be undertaken aimed at achieving strategic objectives.

What police service are we building?

58. **Two mutually reinforcing philosophies.** DPKO/DFS Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions obligates United Nations police to embrace community-oriented and intelligence-led policing as its two mutually reinforcing policing philosophies. Improved community relations result in better information supply by the community, more informed decision-making by the police and, ultimately, increased safety and crime prevention in the community concerned. In post-conflict environments with often low levels of police legitimacy, United Nations police need to encourage the host State police to adopt a community-oriented policing philosophy. Post-conflict environments are also characterised by resource scarcity with few police officers and underdeveloped or non-existent infrastructure. Better decision-making about the use of limited police resources is a central tenet of intelligence-led policing. It is therefore an equally important philosophy to be adopted by the host State police as a decision-making model.

59. **Restoring police legitimacy.** Post-conflict environments suffer from weak police legitimacy. Consent is an indispensable element of policing. Community-oriented policing helps the police to reconnect with the public by increasing the legitimacy of formal governance and improving community satisfaction in policing services. It is a philosophy of policing which encourages the public to become partners with the police in controlling and preventing crime. It does this by demonstrating to the public that police are prepared to respond to their security concerns, value their advice, and will act in a fair, honest, and impartial manner. In exchange, police ask the public to assist them by providing information about crime, criminals, and circumstances that create crime, and by contributing their time, resources, and moral support for crime prevention programs. Community-oriented policing views public co-operation as essential to successful crime control and develops programs for obtaining willing public assistance.


60. **Assist in developing a local community-oriented policing model.** Community-oriented policing is a vision which needs to be translated into daily police practice. Implementation tactics will be context-dependent and need to be agreed upon between the host State police and the public. While implementation will differ, the four essential strategies to translate vision into reality will entail:

- a) Responding to communities (willingness and ability to respond to the security needs of individuals and groups in communities and to give priority to these needs);
- b) Consulting with communities (regular solicitation of input from communities about crime, disorder, and activities that generate fear);
- c) Mobilizing communities (helping the community organise itself in preventing crime);
- d) Solving recurring problems (police and communities working preventively to change conditions that lead to crime rather than responding over and over again to individual incidents).

61. **Intelligence-led policing works in tandem with community-oriented policing.** It re-imagines how police can be smarter in the exercise of their unique authority and capacities by helping them more effectively decide on priorities, resource allocations and

crime reduction strategies. Intelligence-led policing is a philosophy of policing where processed information, i.e. data analysis and criminal intelligence, is pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders. Intelligence-led policing treats analysis as a foundation for decision making. Police operational strategy does not solely focus on retrospective crime investigations but is also concerned with pre-emptive operations based on analysed intelligence. It targets active and prolific offenders, specific activities or crime spots in an effort to predict emerging areas of criminality and insecurity, and prioritise enforcement actions.

62. **Is intelligence-led policing feasible in post-conflict environment?** Intelligence-led policing relies on a number of information categories, including covert information from surveillance, offender interviews, confidential human sources (Informants), crime patterns, police data sources, socio-demographic data and other non-police sources. While some of this information may be limited in post-conflict societies, a substantial information infrastructure may still be available as a result of regular exercise of police duties and can enable the host State police to obtain, store and catalogue information on crime patterns and prolific offenders. Once acquired, information has to be analysed focussing on patterns in the crime data and on connecting events or evidence to potential offenders and groups. This analysis should form the basis for decision making and prioritization, resulting in the selection of criminal events that should be addressed most immediately. In the next stages, decisions are acted on, e.g. increased patrols directed in street-corner hot spots of crime or the proactive targeting of serious repeat offenders, and finally evaluated.



63. **Long-term effects.** While the effect of policing on crime may be limited (See Para. 101 below), community-oriented and intelligence-led policing may help the host State authorities in long-term crime reduction. Enhanced collection and analysis of information by the police – assisted by its rising legitimacy in the eyes of the public – makes them “gatekeepers” to a sizable proportion of crime information. This information supplied by the police will, in turn, enable local authorities, aid agencies and health and education assistance programmes to have a greater potential to impact on a wider range of crime causal factors. Increased sharing of intelligence beyond the limits of law enforcement may see a more substantial reduction in crime.

Short-term training objectives

64. **Do not delay leadership training.** Police reform is difficult in all environments. In post-conflict contexts, able and transformational police leadership holds the key to the reform

success. Host State police management will need to set the 'tone from the top,' outlining the vision and strategy for its police service, articulating policies and procedures and ensuring their correct implementation and interpretation. They also need to have the skills to effectively intervene in cases of police misconduct and to support internal oversight. Local police leaders will require coaching on outreach to stakeholders (both domestic and foreign) and on how to be transparent and co-operative with external oversight bodies and the media. As soon as the mission deploys, United Nations police need to start developing the capacity of senior and mid-level management in the host State police service, including basic mandatory gender equality training. Leadership training should also focus on the strategic management of resources to increase police effectiveness and efficiency, as well as transparency and accountability in the use of resources.

65. **Basic police training.** Putting in place a basic police training programme will assist in the achievement of a key short-term objective, i.e. reaching a critical mass of the host State police officers ready to take over the entire spectrum of law enforcement tasks. Basic police training should primarily cover new police recruits. It may however be beneficial and even necessary to offer refresher training to serving police officers with a particular focus on human rights and gender aspects of policing. United Nations police should require a minimum presence of women (i.e. 30 per cent) in any training activities. Special training opportunities for women can be used to bridge the literacy gap in some cases. The curriculum will consist of

- a) general policing topics (legal literacy, i.e. Police Act, Penal Code), use of force, arrest and detention, code of ethics, codes of conduct and procedures, use of administrative resources, basic public order management, basic traffic management, basic investigations, human rights issues including sexual- and gender-based violence, crime and witness assistance and protection);
- b) firearms training
- c) physical training;
- d) operational training (self-defence, body search, handcuffing, police search, operational procedures with violent criminals, radio communications, police patrols, self-protection procedures, etc.);
- e) multidisciplinary sensitization training for male and female police officers on equality between men and women and the elimination of stereotypes;
- f) STI/HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention training as part of induction training;
- g) on-the-job training and mentoring with an experienced police officer who discusses a police activity with the trainee, demonstrates how it is properly executed, allows the trainee to perform the activity, evaluates the trainee's performance, and develops with the trainee a plan for improving this activity in the future. This phase is to be implemented only when the previous ones have been successfully completed.

66. **Prepare a cadre of specialist trainers and field training staff.** Basic police training will soon have to be supplemented with training in specialised police subjects. To deliver this training in a sustainable way, the United Nations police needs to identify a pool of qualified local police and/or civilians with good pedagogical skills to become home-grown trainers by delivering training of trainers. Depending on the size of the country, it may be non-practical to transport police officers to one centralised training hub. In such situations, special consideration should be given to the preparation of trainers based in key regions of the host State and able to deliver training on the spot. While priority subjects should be based on crime intelligence and analysis of the host State crime picture together with a TNA on proficiency and performance gaps, the experience suggests that the following areas are to be considered for specialised training:


- a) criminal intelligence and threat assessment;
- b) criminal investigations, including evidence collection and crime scene management;
- c) forensics;
- d) public order management;
- e) traffic management;
- f) treatment of children in conflict with the law and relevant legislation ;
- g) preventing and investigating sexual and gender-based violence,
- h) countering transnational organised crime and terrorism;
- i) financial investigations.

67. **On what basis does one offer specialist training?** It has been a recurrent complaint by the host State police colleagues that the United Nations police offers no standardised training. Frequent UNPOL rotations, it has been argued, lead to a new policing approach recommended with the arrival of each new UNPOL mentor. The development of the Strategic Guidance Framework is addressing and will continue to address this criticism. Standardised curriculum already exists or is being finalised in some areas, including public order management and prevention and investigation of sexual and gender-based violence. Several relevant courses have been developed by UNODC, e.g. criminal intelligence, counter-terrorism and domestic violence. In other areas, the police component needs to develop standardised training together with the host State police on the basis of the country's legal system and policing philosophy and to apply this training consistently while a specialist training is being developed by DPKO. It may merit establishing a joint UNPOL-host State police Board to review and approve all training programmes, materials, and curricula.

Medium- and long-term training objectives

68. **Help establish host State police training architecture.** Once basic and specialist training has been put in place, United Nations police need to work with the host State police and donors to establish a training architecture, including a police academy for senior police ranks (commissioned officers), a police school for basic police ranks (non-commissioned officers), in-service training centres for aspiring managers and for specialised training as well as a police research capacity.

69. **Police training system.** While a police training system is dependent on the local context and an assessment of the host State training gaps and needs, the following structure may be considered as a template for the host State police training architecture:



70. **Plan on a continuous basis.** Training needs and gaps are not static. As the host State police develops and strengthens, new training needs will emerge. The number of students, the ratio of ethnic or religious groups, gender balance, specialised skill needs or other considerations may come to the fore. It is therefore essential to have a planning and strategic development capacity in both the police training institutions and inside the host State police Commissioner's office, ensuring that the host State police service receives human resources it needs.

Final personnel inventory: Certification

71. **Exact police numbers become known.** Certification formally confirms the successful completion by a law enforcement official of both the vetting and training programmes (separate from each other) and validates that the official meets the required legal and administrative standards of competence and integrity for service with the concerned police or other law enforcement agency. At the end of the certification process, the host State authorities will know the exact number of their law enforcement personnel as well as their individual characteristics. Certification is an indispensable planning tool for further police reform.

72. **What groups to prioritise for certification?** On the strategic level, a certification programme should generally prioritize officials with management and personnel reform responsibilities, in particular officials in leadership positions, officials with responsibilities for personnel, discipline and training, and officials with dedicated reform responsibilities. This strategic focus will contribute to achieving two primary objectives of an overall

reform process: a) to enable the concerned agency to function effectively and fulfil its mandated responsibilities, in particular provide public law and order in accordance with international norms and standards (self-management) and b) to enable the agency to take full responsibility for its own reform (self-reform). A certification programme should also prioritize units with negative human rights records to remove officials that are not qualified for service.

73. What are certification criteria? In order to be certified, the host State police officer must pass through the following processes: a) registration following a census and identification programme; b) passing the vetting programme; c) the successful completion of the training programme; and d) fulfilling all other conditions for service as set forth under the applicable law of the country. Material verification that an official meets the required competence and integrity criteria takes place in the vetting and training programmes, not during the certification programme. Further information on how to design and implement certification programmes is to be found in DPKO/DFS Policy on Support for Certification of Police and other Law Enforcement Officials (2008.14).

Further Reading:

- DPKO/DFS Policy on Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (2014.01);
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Support for Certification of Police and other Law Enforcement Officials (2008.14);
- Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit (UNODC, 2006);
- OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 5 on Human Rights and Law Enforcement: manual, trainer's guide and expanded pocket book on human rights for the police (OHCHR, 2004);
- Policing the Context: Principles and Guidance to Inform International Policing Assistance - What Works Series (UK Stabilisation Unit, 2014);
- Criminal Intelligence Manual for Analysts (UNODC, 2011);
- Criminal Intelligence Manual for Front-line Law Enforcement (UNODC, 2010);
- Criminal Intelligence Manual for Managers (UNODC, 2011);
- Intelligence-led Policing by Jerry H. Ratcliffe (Willan, 2008);
- European Union Comprehensive Concept for ESDP Police Strengthening Missions: Interface with Broader Rule of Law (Brussels, 26 October 2009);
- Guidance on the use and preparation of serious organized crime threat assessments (UNODC, 2010);
- Handbook and Training Curriculum on Effective police responses to violence against women (UNODC, 2010);
- Handbook on Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism (UNODC, 2010);
- Strengthening Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Responses to Violence against Women (UNODC, 2014);
- United Nations Counter-kidnapping Manual (UNODC, 2006).
- United Nations Due Diligence Policy (2011).

D6.6 CORE ELEMENT IV: SUPPORT TO ENABLING SERVICES

74. Principles of Budgeting. Policing is subject to the same public financial management requirements applicable to all public institutions. From the very start of the deployment, United Nations police need to assist the host State authorities in determining what police service they can afford and how the funds available for policing are going to fluctuate over the 3-5 year period and with the eventual departure of the Mission. Enhanced clarity on the medium- and long-term availability of funding will ensure effective transition planning and help the host State understand what policing expenditures it will incur with the departure of the Mission and, possibly, reduced commitment of other donors.

- a) Budgets have to be realistic, affordable and sustainable;
- b) Budgets are to be gender-responsive, ensuring state commitment and adequate expenditure towards gender mainstreaming in police reform;
- c) Allocations have to be consistent with and prioritized against national policies, plans and strategies;
- d) Funds have to be used efficiently and effectively through transparent and competitive procurement processes;

- e) Expenditure has to be transparent and accountable: payment systems have to be reliable and accounting systems must provide appropriate information to managers and police leadership, particularly those accountable for resources.
75. **Get human resources issues right: two basic questions.** Policing budgets are dominated by personnel expenses which on average account for 70-80 per cent of police budgets. This has to do with the labour-intensive nature of policing. The World Bank advice is unambiguous: *it is possible to implement poorly a well-formulated budget but it is not possible to implement well a badly formulated budget.* In the light of the personnel expenditure preponderance in the police budgets, it is essential that human resources issues are properly regulated from the beginning. In general, the critical policy questions revolve around how many police officers are to be employed and at what levels of remuneration (and benefits), and in what type of rank structure, with the affordability and sustainability principles (see Para. 71 above) being the critical constraints framing these decisions. These factors will determine the average cost of policing.
76. **Assist the host State in removing incentives and opportunities for corruption.** United Nations police must work with the host State authorities to strengthen integrity and accountability of the host State police and the implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, reducing the incentive to engage in corrupt practices. Severe sentences for police corruption as well as unequivocal police management commitment to internal and external oversight mechanisms will serve as a powerful deterrent. This includes the consideration of procedures during the investigation of alleged corrupt conduct of a police officer and upon conviction. In parallel, United Nations police needs to encourage their host State counterparts to come up with clear policies and procedures in those areas where opportunities for corruption exist (hiring, promotions, procurement, payment of salaries and allowances, overtime payments, equipment use, management of proceeds of asset forfeiture management, etc.). Training on policies and procedures, wide dissemination of standards and rigorous enforcement of policies and procedures have the potential to significantly suppress opportunities for corruption as does effective whistle-blower and witness protection.
77. **Work with the World Bank Country Office.** The World Bank's publication on public expenditure reviews for policing (forthcoming, 2014), to which DPKO and UNDP have contributed, is a pioneering knowledge tool to guide international assistance when it comes to police budgeting. United Nations police needs to work closely with the World Bank country offices to assist the host State authorities in creating a sound budgetary framework for the police service. The World Bank has permitted to reproduce sections of its publication in these Guidelines. Nevertheless, all United Nations police staff assisting the host State in budgetary and human resources aspects of policing need to familiarise with the full text of the World Bank publication and use it in their work. A World Bank-developed questionnaire on sustainable police budgeting which United Nations police components are encouraged to use is to be found in ANNEX III to these Guidelines.

Human Resources: Policy Aspects

78. **How many police officers to employ?** The answer to this question will be influenced by several factors, most notably, the public safety requirements of the host State. However, these requirements also need to be assessed against the principles of affordability and sustainability as mentioned above. The police numbers will also be impacted by the availability of aspiring and qualified candidates. The simplicity and speed of the vetting and certification processes as well as the capacity of the training institution(-s) also influence police numbers. Constrained supply associated with the vetting and qualification requirements and training will most likely be of the temporary nature and, in

the medium and long run, the pool of candidates for police jobs will be seldom supply constrained.

The 2010 Secretary-General's Report "State of crime and criminal justice worldwide" indicates that rates of police officers per population vary significantly among countries although a median of approximately 300 police officers per 100,000 inhabitants was observed worldwide for 2006. These results are said to imply that there is a minimum number of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants that is necessary in any country although in post-conflict societies these numbers may be an ambitious goal.

79. **Help police numbers rise & keep costs down: recruit more civilians.** Onerous vetting and certification procedures as well as delays in training may stymie the growth of police numbers which is often required in the aftermath of armed conflict. One strategy that may help address this problem while also lowering the unit personnel costs of police organizations is 'civilianization'. This approach is premised on the existence of a presumed differential between the costs of employing police officers and those of employing civilians, either because of differences in pay structure or because it is more costly to train police officers than it is to train civilians who may play only a narrow set of administrative roles in the police organization. Where such a differential exists, expanding personnel budgets may be better spent on recruiting civilians to play organizational roles that do not require the skills and legal authority of trained police officers in order to free up police officers for police functions. Such roles might include a variety of back-office functions, as well as some administrative functions associated with serving members of the public.
80. **Appointment procedures must be open, fair, gender sensitive and transparent** to recruits with the highest professional qualifications and ethical standards. As part of the process of recruiting new personnel, selection procedures and policies are important elements of police reform. Inadequate screening criteria for candidates can result in police officers lacking the skills or incentives to comply with high standards of integrity. Recruitment should be based on merit and clear and objective minimum standards should exist and be known to the applicants. This is often not the case. Selection is often overly politicized or discriminatory. It may also be affected by corruption or nepotism. Undue politicization of senior positions can result in costly and unnecessarily high levels of staff turnover and a lack of managerial continuity. This would tend to have adverse effects on the quality of budget and performance management.
81. **Recruit and retain women and minorities.** The composition of the police at all levels should reflect the diversity of the population. In cases of women and minorities being underrepresented, United Nations police needs to recommend that the host State polices set statistical targets for increasing the representativeness of the police, and monitoring of the composition of the police should be introduced in order to measure progress. Public information initiatives, e.g. active promotion of the police as a representative body, may help increase recruitment of underrepresented groups. United Nations police may also suggest special measures to encourage female and minority applicants and to assist them to achieve the required standards, together with actions to remove any direct or indirect discriminatory barriers. Measures such as legislative changes, new or updated human resources policies, and public campaigns addressing long-held stereotypes will also need to be introduced to ensure that female and minority police officers are accepted and treated equally inside the police organization, which should provide a neutral working environment, and have equal opportunities for progression in their careers. A strict and enforceable Code of Conduct that penalizes sexual harassment against men and women will make police institutions less hostile work environment. The establishment of professional associations for female police could help provide a support network for women recruits. Infrastructure reform may also be required to adapt to the

presence of women in police stations.

82. It is important to establish a **transparent and merit based promotion system**, based on fairness, openness, ability and performance, leading to a sustainable rank pyramid that corresponds to policing needs and which is affordable given likely resource constraints. Promotions processes are generally a key route to higher salaries for individual police officers. Ideally, promotions policies should reward merit and performance, but they are often dominated by considerations of service-related seniority. In many police organizations, promotions are more or less 'automatic' at the start of a career and reflective of increasing length of service (together with growing experience), while promotions to higher ranks depending on the availability of vacant posts. In these cases, the 'automatic' promotions of low-ranked officers might be thought of as recognition of "on-the-job training" and the accumulation of productivity-enhancing experience, which would imply that officers are to be thought of as fully-trained only after they have completed a certain number of years of service. Promotions to higher ranks, by contrast, may be dependent on the acquisition of additional training and qualifications.
83. **Appointments and promotions: a source of corruption in police.** Since human resources expenditure forms the core of police budgets, appointments and promotions are often the easiest and readily available opportunity for corruption, i.e. persons being appointed to and promoted within police services on the basis of personal contacts, family relationships or bribes. Such practices adversely affect police performance and police officer morale and should be tackled by the development of clearly pre-defined and merit-based appointment criteria and promotion procedures known to all members of the public and inside the police organization.
84. **Overtime abuse and misuse of police resources.** Overtime is often needed in policing since some aspects of police work are not easily confined to standard working hours and cannot always be completed during office hours. The payment of overtime may be a legal necessity in these instances, but it also creates some perverse incentives for police officers who, by virtue of the nature of their work, can often determine its pace and timing. Clear rules should exist governing the payment of supplementary remuneration which should be subject to internal oversight investigation when fraud is suspected. Similarly, police officers are a prized asset and must not be used in wasteful ways or in ways that do not constitute an optimal allocation of police capacity. Examples of this might be excessive allocations of personnel to VIP protection or to functions that are largely ceremonial or symbolic.

Human Resources: Budgetary and Financial Aspects

85. **Structure of personnel expenditures.** The average cost of employing police officers is determined by:
- a) Remuneration policies, including basic pay, overtime policies, pension contributions, non-salary benefits (such as subsidized health insurance, housing allowances, deployment allowances; maternity benefits; etc.);
 - b) The distribution of officers by rank/pay-grade;
 - c) Promotions and retirement policies (which govern how quickly police officers rise through the ranks and retire); and
 - d) The extent to which relatively expensive officers can be substituted by less expensive personnel.

Other costs – uniforms, equipment, etc. – are also heavily dependent on personnel numbers. For this reason it is quite possible to cost what a fully-equipped and appropriately-resourced police officer ought to cost a particular police service. The key

variables being the costs of salaries and benefits and the equipment each police officer must have access to in order to perform adequately. Given this, it is in principle possible to determine how many police officers can be employed for any given budget.

86. **How much to pay a police officer?** Many believe raising salaries is the answer to police corruption but it is not enough on its own. However, there is no doubt that low salaries and poor benefits (e.g. healthcare and pension) provide negative incentives to police officers, therefore, salaries should be commensurate with the skills required for the assigned task and should be paid regularly and reliably. The conditions of employment of police officers must be governed by a clear legal framework. Special consideration should be given to the degree to which police officers' conditions of service match those of other civil servants, and the basis on which the former depart from the latter. Any differences that exist may be the source of resentment or a privilege to be jealously guarded depending on circumstances, and may affect the dynamics of salary negotiations in the police and/or in the civil service generally.

In some systems, police services have no autonomy in determining pay scales, and must adopt policies identical with those in other civil service institutions, while in others, the police have some autonomy in determining remuneration policies. Where police services follow the norms and standards of the rest of the civil service, police ranks must be graded against ranks in the rest of the civil service. Where the police have no autonomy in determining remuneration levels, across the board pay rises that are not accompanied by increases to personnel budgets will almost always have to result in staffing cuts. On the other hand, when police agencies have a larger degree of autonomy in determining remuneration, care must be taken to ensure that police managers' incentives are appropriately designed as they are often sympathetic to rank-and-file officers' claims of financial hardship.

87. **How to adjust police budgets?** There will be times in the host State when the government will need to adjust its expenditure on policing with the United Nations police requested to advise the host State authorities on the available options. Since police budgets are dominated by personnel expenditure, police budgets can be best adjusted by either reducing/increasing police numbers or by reducing/increasing salaries and benefits. The number of police is the most flexible tool that the host State policy makers have to increase or decrease annual police budgets. When it comes to salaries and benefits, the margin of appreciation to regulate these expenditures may be limited because salary and benefit conditions may be spelt out in laws and may be politically costly to renegotiate. The only exceptions the salary and benefits category are overtime pay and bonuses (paid for merit, long service, hardship postings or for other reasons) and some aspects of non-salary remuneration (e.g. healthcare benefits), expenditure on which might be increased/ reduced through policy interventions that increase/ limit those benefits.

88. **Payments: pay on time and regularly and avoid cash if possible.** The fact that police officers, for example, may be deployed in areas with limited payments infrastructure means that getting officers paid and ensuring that such systems are deliver payments correctly, creates the potential for administrative failure and corruption. Given that police officers are generally armed, the political implications of this are serious, as are the implications for civilians in those areas. In post-conflict states, ensuring full and regular payment of security personnel may be one of the most critical practical reforms needed to secure peace and create the conditions for state-building. The host State may continue to rely on cash-based manual systems for processing accounting transactions. In partnership with the World Bank, UNDP and other relevant actors, United Nations police need to advise the host State authorities on accrual-based accounting systems which make use of computerized financial management information systems (FMIS) that

not only process accounting data but are linked through interfaces to financial systems for payroll, procurement, debt management, revenue collection, etc. Cashless payments may help tackle the problem of 'ghost employees' and demands for payments of kick-backs.

89. **Policy decisions have budget implications.** In the short-term, the critical questions facing both policy-makers and operational managers generally revolve around how and where to deploy police personnel, and what services those personnel are expected to deliver. The most significant budget constraint on policy-makers and operational commanders is the number of person-hours of police officers available for deployment, qualified by the profile of skills and equipment available to him or her. Over the medium and long-term, how policy-makers and operational managers want to deliver security services can have very important implications for the budget. This is because different approaches to patrol work, for example, could necessitate different numbers of patrol officers per square kilometre, different sets of skills (and, therefore, training), different sets of complementary inputs such as vehicles, horses, radios, etc. United Nations police need to advise the host State policy makers or police leadership on budgetary implications of any policy course and/or decisions may want to take. The host State police need to project the periodical and budgetary implication of a new policy or modification in a policy. Such projections should form an integral part of policy document.

Non-personnel expenditure (Asset Management)

90. **Buy what you can afford, use and maintain.** The same principles of affordability and sustainability apply to the infrastructure and assets (transportation, equipment) which the host State, either on its own or with the donor assistance, intends to build, repair and procure. The equipment procured, e.g. IT systems, has to be commensurate with the skill level of the host State police officers since its effective utilization typically requires officers with appropriate skills and, where the IT is newly-introduced, a degree of organizational change may be required if the productivity benefits are to accrue. The host State police should also have the required resources and expertise to maintain the infrastructure and equipment once the Mission and/or donors reduce their engagement or withdraw. The host State police need to project the recurrent expenses on moveable and immoveable assets during their life cycle as well as on the donor funded capital projects.
91. **What are equipment categories?** Equipment needs in police organizations are varied, but include:
- a) Information technology of varying levels of sophistication;
 - b) Communications systems (radios and telephones);
 - c) Office equipment and consumables (fuel); and
 - d) Uniforms, non-lethal/compliance weapons, firearms and other personal equipment for individual officers.
92. **Transport.** As a general rule, the transport needs of police organizations are relatively straightforward and will consist largely of soft-skinned and hard-skinned vehicles of various kinds (the decision being, in principle at least, a matter of strategy and risk management), motorbikes, horses, and bicycles. Practice varies considerably with the ratio of police officers to vehicles. Some police agencies will also use helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for various functions. Fleet management requirements, vehicles workshop procedures and spare parts also need to be considered.
93. **How to spend it: infrastructure vs. transportation?** Depending on the organization's strategy, population density, the density of police officers per kilometre, the location of

police stations and the spatial distribution of crime will determine the kinds of transportation that is needed. In many jurisdictions, however, resources may be best deployed in making the police more accessible to members of the community. At the most local level, this might be done by ensuring that police stations have the equipment necessary to ensure that officers can patrol in their area of responsibility with reasonable continuity and density, though in some circumstances considerations of officer safety may militate against the deployment of police officers singly, in pairs, or even in relatively small groups. Linked to this issue is the question of the location of police stations and the degree to which these can be accessed by members of the public – whether physically or telephonically. Building police infrastructure in under-serviced areas is often a critical component of a strategy aimed at improving police performance and legitimacy since the lack of service to areas – particularly when those areas often tend to be areas most in need of policing – is one of the key reasons why some police agencies are unable to reduce insecurity to large proportions of a population.

94. **Procurement processes.** The fact that a large proportion of assets and consumables typically procured by police agencies are standardized commodities ought to make procurement and contract management less vulnerable than might be the case in other public functions. As in other public functions, however, vulnerabilities are greatest for large, non-standard, one-off procurements. Examples might include bulk orders for uniforms, costs of physical infrastructure and IT, the deployment of new communications systems, lease agreements for accommodation, and the like. The United Nations police task is to assist the host State authorities and police in preventing procurement irregularities by establishing or strengthening the police procurement system on the basis of UNODC's Good practices in ensuring compliance with article 9 of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and OECD Principles for Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement, including transparency, good management, prevention of misconduct, compliance and monitoring as well as accountability and control. Use of temporarily seized property (especially of the transport) by police should be prohibited, or at least regulated.
95. **Heightened security items procurement.** Some aspects of police procurement processes may require heightened levels of classification, especially goods and service contracts which concern the fundamental interests of the country's security. Thus, while there may be no particular reason why police organizations' transportation and equipment purchases might require heightened secrecy, it is possible to envisage exceptions to this rule where keeping the nature of the equipment and its deployment secret might help achieve legitimate public policy goals. In addition, there are some aspects of policing for which a plausible case can be made that they do require some additional secrecy and security. Examples of this might include:
- a) The purchase of some kinds of equipment (e.g. specialized surveillance equipment), knowledge of the existence of which would provide the targets of such equipment with forewarning about police capabilities (though systems in which trials are conducted in open court can seldom keep these kinds of capabilities secret for long);
 - b) The establishment of facilities, such as safe houses for witnesses in need of protection, premises from which to conduct sensitive investigations for which there might be a legitimate reason for maintaining secrecy; and
 - c) The procurement of information from informers whose identity, the nature of the information they provide, and the price paid (or reward offered) for this must usually be kept secret.

Non-transparent procurement is sometimes unavoidable. One has to seek to mitigate the risks associated with the procurement of such items, e.g. the establishment of specific body to conduct confidential audits of such procurement. Precisely how these

procedures should operate, the role of police managers and civilian overseers within them, and the authority of the audit institutions to assess them, must be aligned with the rules of budget management and oversight of the organization as a whole. In general, however, sound rules would include:

- a) Ensuring that the proportion of the overall budget subject to heightened security is as small as possible given the organization's strategic priorities and threat assessment;
- b) Centralizing the administration of these funds under the command of an officer with the highest possible security clearance; and
- c) The enactment of rules and regulations governing the use of secret funds to ensure transparency and accountability so that investigations into suspicions about the misuse of these funds is facilitated (e.g. through the requirement that officers undergo lie-detector tests and may be subjected to life-style audits).

96. Gender-sensitive infrastructure development and procurement. Whatever a police organization buys or builds, it needs to give consideration to gender aspects, e.g. bullet-proof vest sizes, motorbike weight, etc. Some motorbikes or firearms may be too heavy and bullet-proof vests too large for female police officers, resulting in their automatic disqualification from operational police jobs. Similarly, the absence of gender-appropriate uniforms or dedicated women's toilets in police stations has resulted in the unwillingness of women to join the police. These issues must be thought of in infrastructure development and procurement processes. Some good practices may be found in UNPOL's Standardized Best Practices Toolkit on Gender and Policing in Peacekeeping Operations.

Further Reading:

- DPKO/DFS Policy on Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (2014.01);
- Public Expenditure Review in Policing (World Bank, forthcoming);
- Handbook on police accountability, oversight and integrity (UNODC, 2010);
- Guidebook on anti-corruption in public procurement and the management of public finances (UNODC, 2013);
- Toolkit on Police Integrity (DCAF, 2012).

D6.7 CORE ELEMENT V: SUPPORT TO ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

97. Accountability refers to performance and conduct. Accountability is a key principle of policing enshrined inter alia in the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. Fundamentally, police are accountable in two ways: (a) they are accountable for their performance and the use of public funds allocated to them; (b) they are accountable for the way in which they exercise coercive powers entrusted to them by the law. Police are required to inform – regularly and on demand – the institutions of the State (Interior Ministry, Parliamentary Committees, Commissions of Inquiry, public prosecutors, courts, national human rights institutions, communities they serve) how they are doing their job and how the funds allocated to them are being spent. Police leaders must also monitor the conduct of their subordinates and take action in case of allegations of abuse.

98. Genuine accountability is a pathway to legitimacy. Assisting the host State police, public institutions and society at large in establishing or strengthening police accountability mechanisms must be an integral part of the United Nations police mandate. In post-conflict societies, restoring police legitimacy in the eyes of the public is arguably the most important task of police reform. This task will be undermined if police are seen as acting with impunity, embezzling public funds or taking bribes and failing to deliver on their mission to prevent, detect and investigate crime, protect persons and property and maintain public order and safety. Conversely, an effective and credible

accountability regime will serve as a deterrent against police misuse of power and/or funds.

99. Empower and educate local officials and civil society to exercise oversight. United Nations police experiences in post-conflict states suggest that the notion of police accountability may simply be absent in the host State society. The role of the United Nations police is not only to assist the host State in establishing strong and independent internal and external accountability mechanisms. Equally important is to (a) empower elected and governmental officials – both at the capital level and in the regions – to set police priorities and effectively monitor police performance and conduct and (b) educate local communities on public safety issues so that they can better articulate policing priorities in their neighbourhoods. In some contexts, some more basic education is useful, i.e. asking the community not to pay police for ‘services’ or ‘protection.’ Empowerment will ensure that accountability becomes a nationally owned concept, rooted in local governance practices.

100. Start outreach early and aim for quick wins to enhance credibility. In post-conflict environments, levels of trust in the police and other law enforcement agencies may be low. Moreover, the population or some groups (women, minorities) may have experienced discrimination or other forms of abuse at the hands of the police, and may therefore continue to exhibit a considerable sense of distrust towards police. Outreach to these groups and a public and tangible demonstration of the new accountability mechanisms at work will help overcome distrust of the police amongst these groups and the population at large. United Nations police mentors and advisers need to encourage their host State police counterparts to establish or strengthen accountability mechanisms early in the reform process and to showcase its work to the population in order to achieve quick wins in public perception of the police accountability.

101. Support host-state police to be human rights compliant and accountable. UNPOL personnel involved in establishing, training, assessing needs and advising a host-state police service shall ensure that human rights standards and issues are incorporated in all these activities. The human rights component works alongside the UNPOL component to undertake human rights training and support national vetting processes for new or integrated police and/or other law enforcement services. Allegations received or observed by the police component in their work that may amount to human rights violations shall be promptly recorded and shared with the human rights component for verification, investigation and follow-up as appropriate. All police personnel shall be able to recognise a human rights violation and be prepared to intervene according to the peace operation’s directives on the use of force and mandate, as well as their specific roles, responsibilities and limits of their competence and capacity.

Police Performance Measurement

102. Collect baseline data. Any police performance measurement is dependent on reliable statistics. Data will enable informed decision-making on the police reform direction and help establish the baseline against which United Nations police can measure the host State police performance. The host State data collection institution(-s) need to be legally empowered and be given knowledge tools, equipment and skilled personnel to generate at least some basic data on the criminal justice system, including police and other law enforcement agencies. United Nations Statistics Division recommends that the following four broad categories of information should be accorded

the highest priority in the determination of the content of a national criminal justice statistics programme:

- a) **Crime data** that indicate the incidence of victimization in society by type of victimization; crimes reported and not reported, including sexual violence to the authorities and reasons for not reporting; and the level of fear of crime;
- b) **Caseload data**, which indicate the number and types of cases handled by the different components of the criminal justice system (police, prosecutors, courts, corrections); and the characteristics of persons processed through the system, such as age, sex, education, language and marital status;
- c) **Resource data** regarding the numbers of persons employed in the criminal justice services; expenditures; and the distribution of services;
- d) **Qualitative descriptions** of the justice services, outlining organizational structures, responsibilities and jurisdictions, and programmes operated.

103. **What if no data are available?** It is not unusual to find the host State statistics institution(-s) dysfunctional or non-existent following an armed conflict. If this is the case, United Nations police need to take the lead in advocating for the speedy establishment/ re-establishment of a national statistics system. This issue may be elevated to the highest level of the Mission leadership and also be discussed by the Reform Steering Board overseeing the police reform programme. The Manual for the Development of a System of Criminal Justice Statistics offers a variety of options for the justice statistics system, suited for both a decentralised and centralised systems of governance, and discussed pros and cons of each option. In the meantime, United Nations police can assist their local counterparts in collecting some of the important baseline data using methodologies described in the United Nations Rule of Law Indicators publication.

104. **Should the host State police collect crime data?** The World Bank argues that, even in the best-resourced and best-managed police agencies, crime levels as recorded by the police, usually understate the level of victimization in a community. The reasons for this are the under-reporting of crime by victims and/or under-recording or mis-recording of crime by police officers and their organization. The police reform process in the host State offers an opportunity to set up a system which stifles possibilities for manipulation. Making the statistical system independent of the criminal justice system may be beneficial in terms of increasing impartiality. For example, establishing a criminal justice statistics agency independent of any other criminal justice agency (police, prosecutors, courts and corrections) increases its autonomy, independence and, ultimately, its impartiality.

105. **Traditional police performance measures.** Crime rates, arrests and citations (fines), detection rates (clearances) and response times have generally become enshrined as the key measures to evaluate police performance. Experience however suggests that police organizations attaining good results in these four categories may still be poor performers when it comes to relationship with communities, corruption, public disorder or use of force. This is considerable evidence to suggest that crime levels are affected by socio-economic factors rather than police performance or lack thereof. Measuring police performance solely by traditional measures ignores issues of integrity, fear reduction, citizen satisfaction, etc. In some instances, relying on crime detection rates for police performance measurement actually produced a reverse effect, i.e. it resulted in police abuses and extraction of convictions under torture to boost the crime detection rates.

106. **Towards a comprehensive suite of performance measures.** There is an emerging consensus amongst both police practitioners and researchers that traditional police performance measures need to be complemented by other methods. United Nations police need to explain the multidimensional nature of police performance measurement and the limitations of the traditional performance measures to their host State counterparts as well as to policy makers and the general public. United Nations police also needs to offer a menu of options to the host State police, depending on the local context and public safety situation, and to suggest that these performance indicators be included in the National Police Development Plan or its equivalent. These include community surveys (learning about crime, fear of crime, victimization experiences and overall perceptions), employee surveys (measuring morale and integrity), direct observation by external professionals (including the United Nations police and the mission's human rights component). Other valuable recommendations are contained in the World Bank's Public Expenditure Review in Policing. A non-exhaustive list of police performance measures is annexed to these Guidelines (Annex II).
107. **Monitor and evaluate.** Whatever police performance measurement tools the host State police chooses, it is recommended that the Reform Steering Board regularly (at least twice a year) discuss progress against set targets and make adjustments if necessary. A United Nations police officer with experience in monitoring and evaluation may be collocated with the host State police commissioner's office to help the local counterparts track progress against set targets and expenditure of funds. The Head of the Police Component also needs to inform all UNPOL advisers and mentors on the set targets and commit them to gathering data required for monitoring and evaluations. As the mission's human rights component may have decided to focus its human rights monitoring on aspects of the host State police's work, co-ordination between the two components is required.

Internal Oversight Bodies

108. **Do you need internal police oversight?** The authority to reward good behaviour and to sanction wrongdoing is an inherent and highly effective management technique. Deprived of this prerogative, police executives will be harder to bring to account for the misbehaviour of their subordinates and for failure to promote a culture of accountability within their organizations. Some form of internal oversight will therefore exist and is necessary in most police organizations. External and internal accountability mechanisms play complimentary and mutually reinforcing roles. The most successful accountability mechanisms will have adequate powers to carry out comprehensive investigations, will be sufficiently independent from the police and government, will be adequately resourced, will operate transparently and report regularly, and will involve civil society in its work.
109. **At what level should internal oversight bodies be established?** There is a diversity of internal oversight systems in the world of policing, depending on the country's history, size and police circumstances. Some may be managed by a branch of the central command structure or by a regional department. They may be entirely separate from the command hierarchy, or they may report directly to it. Often there will be a different set of procedures for minor procedural or administrative misconduct on the one hand and serious malfeasance or criminal behaviour on the other. The former may remain at an internal local level whilst the latter will be dealt with by formal tribunals and prosecution. In essence, the main attribute for successful oversight needs to be one of independence so that the process is isolated from political influence and free from undue pressure.

110. **Achieving independence of internal oversight bodies.** Internal oversight bodies need to be adequately staffed to deal with the anticipated amount of cases. Police budgets should contain a separate expenditure item for internal oversight bodies to be managed by the head of the internal oversight body. Internal oversight employees need to be of an appropriately high rank and educational background and to have wide policing experience in two or more parts of the country. They need to hold long-term contracts, providing job security to the officers if confronted with situations of threats and pressure. Any threats to and pressure on internal oversight investigators should be immediately reported to the Police Commissioner and thwarted. The host State police leadership needs to be encouraged to make an unequivocal public statement of support for internal oversight bodies and to act and to be seen to act on the findings of their investigations. It is the direct responsibility of the Head of the United Nations police component to persuade the host State police leadership to set up a meaningful and credible internal oversight mechanism with sufficient human resources and financing.

111. **What control do internal oversight bodies exercise?** As noted above, the terms of reference for internal oversight bodies will differ. In some jurisdictions, they will be primarily charged with investigations of alleged criminal misconduct by police officers. In other countries, their mandate will include a broad spectrum of issues ranging from police performance and use of police resources to the consideration of complaints against individual officers. Based on the assessment of the host State policing situation, available resources and recurrent police misconduct issues, United Nations police will advise the host State authorities on the terms of reference for the internal oversight body. A typology of internal oversight functions is presented below. Annex IV also contains some advice on how to set up a successful internal oversight mechanism. Important insights are to be found in UNODC's Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit.

General control functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highlight discrepancies between a goal and a result, or between an individual's behaviour and an organisation's values and norms. • Measure performance. • Assess an organisation or a part of it. • Facilitate corrective measures. • Provide data for benchmarking or training purposes.
Management and operations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whether the objectives of the service, a specific unit or a particular operation have been achieved. • Whether resources are being used efficiently and effectively in terms of the achieved results.
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Necessary precautions have been taken by the organisation to avoid hiring or keeping dubious personnel. • Sensitive data and information are protected. • Important areas and locations are secured.
Legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whether measures taken are legal and have been proportional. • Whether agreed procedures have been respected. • Whether there is accountability of the service and its personnel for their actions. • Whether temporarily seized property is being safely kept.
Ethics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The equality of treatment for all personnel, and of those subject to actions of the police. • The respect for the values, norms and ethical rules set up by

	<p>the service.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corruption prevention.
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112. **Internal oversight system must be more than an expression of intent.** Any system must be readily accessible to members of the public, including women, minorities and persons with disabilities, and be user friendly. It must protect complainants against negative consequences and offer a responsible, professional and timely resolution. Without such qualities, the public will soon label the complaints system as a waste of time and will not support it. The host State police website and posters prominently displayed in a police station should explain the right to complain and how to make a complaint. Uniformed police officers should be required to wear name tags while plain-clothes officers must display their police identification to a member of the public on demand. It should also be possible to make complaints anonymously, e.g. through anonymous police hotlines. All complaints should be registered and acknowledged with a final determination communicated to the complainant (if known) within a reasonable time period. Results of all investigations should be made public to demonstrate to the population that internal oversight bodies function properly.

113. **Internal oversight systems – an important management tool.** Effective and credible internal oversight systems carry a number of benefits, serving as a deterrent against officer misconduct and misuse of police resources and enhancing police legitimacy. Not least, the data collected by internal oversight bodies is an important analytical tool in the hands of capable police management. Recurrent patterns of officer misconduct may indicate a training gap or a lack of policies and guidance in that particular area. Internal oversight may also help identify officers who routinely abuse their power and whose misconduct regularly generates reputational and financial risks to the organization. Such systems force line managers to pay attention to ‘problem’ officers and help police managers mitigate risks of misconduct and reputational and financial liabilities.

External Oversight Bodies

114. **External oversight is an integral and indispensable part of policing.** For the reasons outlined above, the public may be sceptical about the ability or/and willingness of the police to monitor its performance and to investigate allegations of misconduct. The right to complain about alleged police misconduct and to have the complaint investigated in a prompt and impartial way is also enshrined in international human rights instruments (ICCPR, CAT). External accountability actor – organizationally separate from the police service of the host State – are concerned with both police performance and the use of funds through on-going monitoring and evaluation as well as with reviewing allegations which may amount to human rights violations, corruptions and other types of police misconduct. They also study the performance of internal oversight bodies and advocate for their independence, proper resources and effective functioning.

115. **Who exercises external police oversight?** There is considerable diversity in the actors involved in overseeing the police work and/or investigating misconduct. These include relevant ministries (Interior, Justice), parliamentarians from national and local legislatures, public prosecutors, courts, national human rights institutions (‘ombudsman’), anti-corruption agencies, police complaints boards/ commissions, commissions of inquiry, supreme audit institutions, media and civil society organizations with equal participation of men and women in these oversight bodies. More information on UNPOL’s

engagement with these actors on accountability and other issues is to be found in Section "Engagement with Stakeholders."

116. **External police oversight is UNPOL's business.** The functioning of external oversight bodies may seem remote from the nuts and bolts of the United Nations police mandate but it is directly related to the eventual success or failure of the mission. If national actors are empowered and educated to demand the policing they need and to effectively investigate and adjudicate misconduct complaints, police reform process will be nationally owned and sustainable in the long run. The establishment or strengthening of external oversight bodies should be a part of the United Nations assistance from the very start of the mission. Police components need to work closely with the mission's human rights, political affairs, justice, corrections, SSR and civil affairs teams to educate the host State's policy makers and public about policing and opportunities for them to exercise external oversight over the police work. The early establishment of an effective external oversight mechanism has the potential to improve police image and to lay the groundwork for its increased legitimacy. Advocacy in favour of setting up or strengthening of external accountability mechanisms has to be pursued at the highest political level by the Head of Police Component and, if necessary, the Head of Mission.
117. **What are the required attributes of external oversight bodies?** In cases of difficult history of police-community relations and wide-spread corruption or/and excessive use of force, the host State must be encouraged to set up a specialised police oversight/ anti-corruption body. These bodies are required to have the necessary independence to be able to carry out their functions effectively and free from any undue influence. Additionally, external oversight may be considered to monitor the use of investigative techniques that interfere with fundamental rights of citizens, such as the appropriate authorisation of intrusive surveillance. Within the framework of its mandate, the United Nations police component needs to support the host State authorities in designing the external oversight body and assisting in its operationalization. In this work, UNPOL need to be guided by the following considerations:
- a) The mechanism needs to be gender-balanced and have democratically appointed membership with fixed-term tenures which would prevent arbitrary dismissal with clearly articulated and limited grounds for termination of appointment.
 - b) The body should also be given necessary material resources and specialized staff, as well as the training that staff may require to carry out their functions. Ideally, the body's budget should be decided upon by the Parliament. One may expect an instant flow of complaints to the body and it has to prove that it has the resources and will to investigate them promptly.
 - c) The body needs to have the power to access police records and to open disciplinary or criminal investigations, including temporary suspension of alleged perpetrators.
 - d) The credibility of police oversight bodies will hinge on whether it is accessible and publicises the results of its work through ad hoc and regular reporting. This is particularly true for high-profile cases which it deals with.
 - e) The bodies should be able to protect witnesses against intimidation as a consequence of their complaint or any evidence given.
118. **Accountability starts at local level.** The work of external oversight bodies is important but these institutions may be weak or nascent to effectively perform their task. Experience of police assistance programmes in post-conflict environments suggests that strengthening the bottom-up demand for improved police performance by 'customers'

often delivers more immediate results. UNPOL regional commands need to team up with Civil Affairs and human rights staff to collect local perceptions on police performance, conduct and public safety priorities. Tools for collection local perceptions may include individual interviews, public meetings, focus groups (women, minorities), media monitoring, perception surveys, etc. The involvement of local communities in monitoring police work and behaviour is the best long-term guarantee for the restoration of confidence in the police-community relationship.

Further Reading:

- DPKO/DFS Policy on Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions (2014.01);
- Public Expenditure Review in Policing (World Bank, forthcoming);
- Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit (UNODC, 2006);
- Handbook on police accountability, oversight and integrity (UNODC, 2010);
- Toolkit on Police Integrity (DCAF, 2012);
- SSR Integrated Technical Guidance Notes, Democratic Governance of the Security Sector, Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (2012)
- Manual for the Development of a System of Criminal Justice Statistics (United Nations Statistics Division/ DESA, 2003);
- Understanding and Integrating Local Perceptions in Multi-Dimensional UN Peacekeeping (DPKO, 2013);
- United Nations Rule of Law Indicators (DPKO/OHCHR, 2011);
- Policing the Context: Principles and Guidance to Inform International Policing Assistance. What Works Series (UK Stabilisation Unit, 2014);
- An Audit of Police Oversight in Africa (African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum, 2008);
- "Selected International Best Practices in Police Performance Measurement" by Robert C. Davis (RAND, 2012);
- Study on police oversight mechanisms by United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, (UN doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.8, 2010).

E. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Capacity:	Aptitudes, resources, relationships and facilitating conditions necessary to act effectively to achieve some intended purpose.
Capacity-building:	Efforts to strengthen the above components of capacity. Capacity-building targets individuals, institutions and their enabling environment.
Formed Police Unit (FPU):	Cohesive mobile police units, providing support to United Nations operations and ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and missions, primarily in public order management.
Gender mainstreaming:	Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.
Gender equality	(Equality between women and men): Gender equality refers to the equal enjoyment of human rights, responsibilities and

opportunities of women and men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same but that rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether a person is born male or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, recognizing the diversity of different groups of women and men. Gender equality is not a women's issue, but should concern and fully engage men as well as women. Equality between women and men is seen both as a human rights issue and as a precondition for, and indicator of, sustainable people-centred development.

Individual Police Officer (IPO):	Police or other law enforcement personnel assigned to serve with the United Nations on secondment by Governments of Member States at the request of the Secretary-General.
Institution-building:	Part of capacity-building, see above.
Law enforcement official:	All officers of the law, whether appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest or detention. In countries where police powers are exercised by military authorities, whether uniformed or not, or by State security forces, the definition of law enforcement officials shall be regarded as including officers of such services.
Police and other law enforcement agencies:	Includes police, gendarmerie, customs, immigration and border services, as well as related oversight bodies, such as ministries of the interior.
Police component:	All United Nations police officers in a given mission, i.e. individual police officers (IPOs), Specialised Police Teams (SPTs) and/or Formed Police Units (FPUs).
Police development:	Efforts to strengthen a host State police service through reform and restructuring, as part of capacity-building.
Public order management:	Police actions aimed at facilitating the population's exercise of their fundamental rights without any disturbance or unjustified hindrance and preventing assemblies from threatening or actually harming public safety.
Public safety:	Day-to-day security that allows full freedom of movement, virtual absence of crime and disturbances.
Rule of Law:	Principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforce and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. (SG Report, S/2004/616)

Specialised Police Team:	A group of experts in a particular police specialism assigned to serve with the United Nations on secondment by an individual country or a group of Member States at the request of the Secretary-General.
United Nations police:	Includes both Headquarters staff in the United Nations Police Division (inclusive of the Standing Police Capacity) and mission staff in United Nations police components.
United Nations police component:	United Nations police organised within a peace operation.

F. REFERENCES

Normative or Superior References

- Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ("Brahimi Report"), A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.
- The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616, 23 August 2004.
- Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform, Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659-S/2008/39, 23 January 2008.
- Securing states and societies: strengthening the United Nations comprehensive support to security sector reform, Report of the Secretary-General, A/67/970-S/2013/480
- Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance, 1 April 2008.
- Secretary-General's bulletin on the Organization of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ST/SGB/2010/1, 5 February 2010.
- Report of the Secretary-General on United Nations police, A/66/615, 15 December 2011.

Related Policies

- DPKO Policy on Census and Identification of Law Enforcement Officials, 23 June 2006, Ref. 2006.12.
- DPKO Policy on Support for the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of police and law enforcement agencies, 18 December 2006, Ref. 2006.30.
- DPKO Policy on Support for Vetting of Police and other Law Enforcement Personnel, 12 February 2008, Ref. 2008.03.
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 15 February 2008, Ref. 2008.04.
- DPKO/DFS ISOP on Detention in United Nations Peace Operations, 25 January 2010, DPKO/DFS Ref. 2010.06.
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC), 01 March 2015, 2015.03.
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMAC), 01 March 2015, 2015.04.
- DPKO/DFS Policy (revised) on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 01 March 2010, Ref. 2009.32.
- DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, 09 April 2010.

- United Nations Policy on Human Rights Due Diligence on UN Support to non-UN Security Forces (2011).
- OHCHR/DPKO/DPA/DFS Policy on Human Rights in UN Peace Operations and Political Missions, 01 September 2011, 2011.20
- United Nations Policy on Human Rights Screening of United Nations Personnel (2012)
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Internal Evaluations and Inspections of United Nations Police, 01 October 2012, Ref. 2012.13
- United Nations Policy on Human Rights Screening of United Nations Personnel, 11 December 2012.
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Functions and Organization of the Standing Police Capacity (SPC), 01 January 2013, Ref. 2012.12.
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Defence Sector Reform, (2011)
- DPKO/DFS Policy on Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), 21 January 2013, Ref. 2012.21.
- United Nations Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal, 04 February 2013
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines on United Nations Police Support to the Provision of Security in Electoral Processes, 15 February 2013, Ref. 2013.03
- United Nations Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning, 09 April 2013.
- DPKO/DFS Policy on United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions, 1 February 2014, Ref. 2014.01
- DPKO/DFS Guidelines on Design Delivery and Evaluation of Training (Training Cycle), 1 August 2014, Ref. 2014.13

G. MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE

The Police Adviser to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Director of the Police Division shall monitor compliance with this document.

H. CONTACT

Chief of the Strategic Policy and Development Section, Police Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, Department of Peacekeeping Operations.


I. HISTORY

APPROVAL SIGNATURE:
Hervé Ladsous, USG DPKO



DATE OF APPROVAL:

APPROVAL SIGNATURE:
Atul Khare, USG DFS



DATE OF APPROVAL: 4/5

ANNEX I Police capacities²

1. **Performance capacity:** Tools, money, equipment, consumables available to do the job. E.g. vehicles, firearms, personal protective equipment.
2. **Personal capacity:** Making the staff sufficiently knowledgeable, well trained, skilled and confident to do the job. E.g. staff members have knowledge of the latest legislation.
3. **Workload capacity:** Ensuring there are enough staff with broad skills to cope with the workload. E.g. Specialist staff are available '24/7' to deal with all types of emergencies.
4. **Supervisory capacity:** Ensuring that there are effective monitoring and reporting systems in place. E.g. Staff members know who to refer to when they have a problem.
5. **Facility capacity:** Ensuring that there are facilities to carry out the policing function effectively. E.g. there are enough police stations or alternative facilities within a reasonable distance for effective policing and community liaison.
6. **Support Services capacity:** Ensuring that there is effective back-up for front line services. E.g. Personnel / support functions, training, forensic examination services.
7. **Systems capacity:** Ensuring that there is effective information management, ICT and timely information flows, consistency of data among various institutions dealing with personnel, adequate finance and financial management information systems, including among donors providing support to police.
8. **Structural capacity:** Ensuring that the organisation hierarchy is the optimal model: as few layers of management as possible and devolved decision making. The Headquarters function should be to support and facilitate the operational arm – not the other way round.
9. **Role capacity:** Ensuring that individuals, teams and departments have been 'empowered' to operate effectively within the overall organisational strategy with devolved budgets and decision making to obtain optimum performance.

² Taken from Toolkit on Police Integrity (DCAF, 2012).

ANNEX II

Framework for Police Performance Measurement³

- **Process measures** assess whether agency policies and practices are consistent with professional standards. The process measures are essentially a set of checklists indicating whether an agency has adopted a particular policy or practice. They include an examination of policies on use of force and traffic and pedestrian stops, an evaluation of the scope of training programs, an assessment of agency early warning systems, an examination of policies related to transparency, and an assessment of agency interaction with the community through citizen advisory councils, public attendance at community meetings, and other forums.

Indicator	Definition	Source
Police policies	Do policies on use of force and traffic/pedestrian stops conform to national best practices?	Analysis of written policies
Training programs	Hours of academy and in-service training on use of force, stops, ethnic sensitivity	Analysis of training curriculum
Early warning system	Databases on, e.g., tracking citizen complaints received by officers, use of force, stops	Analysis of early warning system specifications
Transparency	Publishing of data on, e.g., crime complaints, arrests, stops, use of force, citizen complaints	Analysis of departmental reports, website
Community interface	Establishment of citizen advisory council, public attendance at open district meetings, citizen participation in anti-crime activities	Analysis of data from departmental records, observation of meetings

- **Officer conduct:** the degree of professionalism with which officers conduct themselves in their interactions with the public, the volume and disposition of citizen complaints filed with the agency's internal affairs division or with a citizen complaint agency, and officer outlook and morale, including job satisfaction, perceptions of agency leadership, and climate of integrity.

Indicator	Definition	Source
Handling of routine incidents	Professionalism of officers when interacting with persons requesting assistance or stopped by the police	Brief surveys to assess satisfaction of "consumers" of police services
Citizen complaints	Number of citizen complaints, rate at which complaints sustained, proportion of officers disciplined	Analysis of annual reports of complaint agency
Officer morale and ethics	Officer job satisfaction and "climate of integrity"	Surveys of police officers

- **Outcome measures** include crime rates (adjusted for community demographics), response times, clearance rates, willingness of citizens to cooperate with the police, and community opinion of the police.

Indicator	Definition	Source
Community opinion	Public opinions of police effectiveness and police misconduct	Surveys of randomly selected community

³ Taken from "Selected International Best Practices in Police Performance Measurement" by Robert C. Davis (RAND, 2012).

		members
Crime rates	Rates of reported crime and criminal victimization, adjusted for community demographics	Analysis of records management system data and/or surveys of randomly selected community members
Citizen cooperation with the police	Willingness of citizens to report crimes and non-crime problems to the police	Surveys of randomly selected community members
Response times	Time to respond to emergency and non-emergency calls for service	Analysis of data from departmental records
Clearance rates	Proportion of crime reports cleared by arrest	Analysis of data from departmental records

ANNEX III

Building a financially sustainable police service⁴

- **Policy-based Budgeting:** Is the National Police Development Plan consistent with an overall security strategy of the host State? If such a strategy is missing, is the plan consistent with other strategic documents? Are the threat assessments which determine the cost of providing security and which budget requests from the line ministry accurate?
- **Resource Envelope:** Have police and security sector authorities discussed the cost of providing security with the Ministry of Finance (Treasury) in light of a projected resource envelope?
- **Donor Alignment:** Are the strategies, programs and investments that support the security sector in the host State, including police, synchronized in terms of public financial management standards?
- **Personnel Expenditure and Management:** Are accurate data available on the personnel strength of the host State police? What is the distribution of officers according to rank and pay-grade? Is payment of salaries timely? Is payment done according to financial management information systems (FMIS) and are control mechanisms set up? Do the numbers and skills-set of existing police personnel match the existing (or changing) police strategy, and do changes to police numbers or skills profiles necessitate changes to personnel spending? In short, how many police officers are to be employed, at what levels of remuneration (and benefits), and in what type of rank structure?
- **Asset management:** Is the procured equipment commensurate with the skill level of the host State police officers? Has procurement been executed according to integrity principles and practices, including transparency, good management, prevention of misconduct, compliance and monitoring as well as accountability and control?

⁴ Courtesy of the World Bank..

ANNEX IV

Good practices in setting up an internal oversight body⁵

- When recruiting for an internal control unit, focus on senior police officers with a good reputation, high formal education and long and varied experience. Not only will this kind of officer serve as a role model for other police officers, but they will also be credible in discussions within an assignment and be more successful in detecting problems and proposing realistic solutions.
- Let the first assignments of the unit be simple, with a high probability of success in finding irregularities. Avoid politically sensitive areas at the beginning.
- Be prepared for challenges to the mandate of the unit and officers involved. Make sure that the top management understand that they need to respond immediately and directly to those who question the mandate of the unit or the individual police officers.
- Do not assign inspectors to inspections that involved their previous units or beats: this would create unnecessary challenges to the objectivity and independence of the inspectors.
- Pair up with a police service from a different region or province to do peer reviews on similar topics or areas and exchange lessons learned.
- Present and market the reports and activities of the internal control unit both internally and externally. The purpose of this is twofold: 1) to spread information about the unit, who they work for and the methods they use; and 2) especially internally, to market the senior officers of the unit in order to promote role models.
- After their tour of duty in the internal control unit, promote the senior police officers to higher positions compared to those they had when they were recruited to the unit.
- Define internal investigation as the height of an officer's career, so that an officer who is on the way up wants it on his/her record.

⁵ Taken from Toolkit on Police Integrity (DCAF, 2012).