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**REPORT  
OF THE  
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY  
ON  
COMMUNAL DISTURBANCES**

**RANCHI-HATIA**

**(AUGUST 22-29, 1967)**

**1968**

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REPORT

A.I.R.	.	All India Radio
A.P.R.O.	.	Assistant Public Relations Officer
B.M.P.	.	Bihar Military Police
C.I.D.	.	Criminal Investigation Department
C.M.	.	Chief Minister
C.P.I.	.	Communist Party of India
C.P.I.(M)	.	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
Cr.P.C.	.	Criminal Procedure Code
D.C.	.	Deputy Commissioner
D.I.G.	.	Deputy Inspector-General
D.M.	.	District Magistrate
Dy.S.P.	.	Deputy Superintendent of Police
F.F.P.	.	Foundry Forge Plant
F.I.R.	.	First Information Report
H.E.C.	.	Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd.
H.M.B.P.	.	Heavy Machine Building Plant
H.S.L.	.	Hindustan Steel Ltd.
I.G.	.	Inspector-General
J.C.O.	.	Junior Commissioned Officer
L.S.G.	.	Local Self-Government
L.E.B.B. School	.	Lionel Edwards Bengali Boys' School
N.C.s.E.	.	Non-Combatants, enrolled
O.R.	.	Other Ranks
P.S.	.	Police Station
R.M.C.	.	Rajendra Medical College
R.M.C.H.	.	Rajendra Medical College Hospital
R.S.S.S.	.	Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh
S.D.O.	.	Sub-Divisional Officer
S.I.	.	Sub-Inspector
S.O.	.	Statutory Order
S.P.	.	Superintendent of Police
T.O.P.	.	Town Outpost
U.F.	.	United Front

**PART I**  
**CHAPTER I**  
**INTRODUCTORY**

1.1 A number of communal disturbances occurred at various places in the country between the months of August and October, 1967 and the Central Government decided to appoint a Commission to inquire into these disturbances.

1.2 The text of the notification issued by the Central Government on 1st November, 1967, is as follows:—

**NOTIFICATION**

**"S.O. 3960.—Whereas the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary to appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into a definite matter of public importance, to wit, the communal disturbances that have occurred in the country since the first day of August, 1967:**

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (60 of 1952), the Central Government hereby appoints a Commission of Inquiry consisting of the following persons, namely:—

*Chairman*

1. Shri Raghubar Dayal, Retired Judge of the Supreme Court of India.

*Members*

2. Col. B. H. Zaidi, Bar-at-Law, Member of Parliament.
3. Shri M. M. Philip, formerly Secretary to the Government of India.
  - (i) The terms of reference of the Commission shall be as follows:—
    - (a) to inquire into the causes and course of the major communal disturbances since the first day of August, 1967 at the places and on or between the dates specified in the Schedule to this notification;
    - (b) to inquire into the adequacy of the administrative measures taken to prevent and deal with the said disturbances;
    - (c) to recommend measures which may be adopted for preventing the recurrence of such disturbances; and

- (d) to consider such other matters relating to communal disturbances as the Commission may think fit.
- (ii) The Commission shall make a report to the Central Government on the disturbances at each place as it completes its inquiry in relation to that place and will be expected to complete its inquiry and submit its final report to the Central Government by 30th April, 1968.
2. And, whereas, the Central Government is of opinion having regard to the nature of the inquiry to be made by the Commission and other circumstances of the case, that all the provisions of sub-section (2), sub-section (3), sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 (60 of 1952), should be made applicable to the Commission, the Central Government hereby directs, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), of the said section 5, that all the provisions of sub-section (2), sub-section (3), sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of that section shall apply to the Commission.

#### SCHEDULE

1. Ranchi-Hatia (August 22—29).
2. Jainpur and Suchetpur (District Gorakhpur—U.P. (September 24-25).
3. Ahmadnagar (September 18).
4. Sholapur (September 17).
5. Malegaon (Maharashtra) (September 24).
6. Sursand (District Muzaffarpur—Bihar) (October 13—15)."

1.3 The time for submitting the final report was later extended by Government to 31st October, 1968.

1.4 The first meeting of the Commission was held on 20th November, 1967 and thereafter meetings were held as and when necessary. In their letter No. 19/47/67-Poll. I(A) dated 30th November, 1967, the Government of India made a request to the Commission that the Commission should sit in private while recording evidence. This request was made under the proviso to rule 1A of the Central Commissions of Inquiry (Procedure) Rules, 1960. According to this proviso, a request made by the Central Government has to be accepted by the Commission and the request was, therefore, accepted. All evidence was recorded in camera.

1.5 In accordance with rule 2(b) of the Central Commissions of Inquiry (Procedure) Rules, 1960, a notification was published in the press inviting all persons acquainted with the subject matter of the inquiry to furnish a statement relating to such matters as were

specified in the notification. The following is the text of the notification:—

### NOTIFICATION

"WHEREAS by the Ministry of Home Affairs Notification No. 19/47/67-Poll.I(A) dated the 1st November, 1967, the Central Government has appointed a Commission of Inquiry to inquire into the communal disturbances that have occurred in the country since the first day of August, 1967:

Now THEREFORE this notification is issued by and under the order of the said Commission inviting all persons acquainted with the subject-matter of the inquiry to furnish to the Commission statements relating to the matters specified below:

- (i) the causes and course of the communal disturbances that occurred in Ranchi-Hatia from August 22 to August 29, 1967;
  - (ii) whether there have been other communal disturbances in recent years in Ranchi-Hatia;
  - (iii) whether there was any tension between the communities immediately preceding the disturbances of August 22 to 29; if so, whether any information was sent to the authorities or any attempt made locally to resolve the tension;
  - (iv) whether there is any organisation or group in the locality which has fomented communal tension or directly or indirectly created provocative situations;
  - (v) are there any places of worship, properties, customary festivals or processions in the locality that tend to create friction between the communities;
  - (vi) has there been any attempt in the local press to raise communal issues in a manner that might create communal tension;
  - (vii) were the administrative measures taken to prevent and deal with the said disturbances adequate;
  - (viii) was medical aid for the injured timely and adequate;
  - (ix) what, in the estimate of the person furnishing the statement, was the extent of casualties and loss of property;
  - (x) what, in the opinion of the person furnishing the statement, are the measures that could be adopted to prevent the recurrence of such disturbances.
2. Every statement furnished to the Commission should be accompanied by an affidavit in respect of the facts set out in the statement and sworn by the person furnishing the statement.

3. Every person furnishing a statement shall also furnish to the Commission along with the statement a list of documents, if any, on which he proposes to rely and forward to the Commission wherever possible the original or true copies of such documents as may be in his possession or power and shall state the name and address of the person from whom the remaining documents may be obtained.
4. The statements should reach the Office of the Commission, Reserve Bank Building, Second Floor, Parliament Street, New Delhi-1, by the 31st January, 1968."

1.6 The notification was published in the following newspapers on the dates noted against each:—

— Indian Nation, Patna	27th December, 1967.
Searchlight, Patna	27th December, 1967.
New Republic, Ranchi	30th December, 1967.
Aryavarta, Patna	26th December, 1967.
Pradeep, Patna	27th December, 1967.
Sade-aam, Patna	27th December, 1967.
Sathi, Patna	26th December, 1967.
Vishwamitra, Patna	26th December, 1967.
New Republic, Ranchi	6th January, 1968.

1.7 The Government of Bihar was also requested to give wide publicity to this notification and to furnish the following information:—

- (i) brief facts regarding other communal disturbances that may have occurred in Bihar in recent years;
- (ii) whether Ranchi-Hatia and Sursand are particularly susceptible to communal disturbances; if so, what preventive measures have been taken by the State Government;
- (iii) what arrangements exist for the collection of intelligence regarding communal tensions; was there any prior information that communal disturbances were likely to occur in Ranchi-Hatia and Sursand;
- (iv) were any lists of potentially dangerous persons in the area maintained; if so, were any preventive arrests made;
- (v) what steps have been taken by the State Government for the rehabilitation of the victims of the disturbances and for restoring confidence amongst the minority community.

1.8 The last date for receiving statements was subsequently extended to 15th February, 1968, on requests received from several persons and organisations.

1.9 Under rule 3(1) of the Central Commissions of Inquiry (Procedure) Rules, 1960, the Commission has first to record the evidence,

if any, produced by the Central Government. The Central Government, however, intimated that they had no evidence to produce before the Commission.

1.10 In response to notification dated the 19th December, 1967, 18 affidavits and statements were received. One of the affidavits enclosed ten others purporting to be from eye-witnesses. A list of persons and organisations that furnished affidavits and statements will be found in Annexure I.

1.11 All oral evidence was recorded at Ranchi. In all 137 witnesses were examined of whom 58 were employees of the State Government, 17 employees of the Heavy Engineering Corporation, 8 Army Officers and 54 non-officials. The names of witnesses examined and dates on which they were examined are given in Annexure II.

1.12 A list of documents exhibited in the course of oral evidence is at Annexure III.

1.13 We would like to express our appreciation and gratitude to the Bihar Government and its officers for their full co-operation and making available all the material the Commission considered necessary for its consideration.

## CHAPTER II

### MODE OF INQUIRY

2.1 No sworn affidavit was filed by Government officials or by the officials of the Heavy Engineering Corporation with respect to the incidents or the steps taken by each of them. Obviously the Government and the H.E.C. filed, and so did the non-officials and organisations also, narrative statements in general on the basis presumably of information collected by the persons submitting statements with affidavits to the best of their belief and information. The Convener of the Sampradayikta Virodhi Committee sent a statement containing its provisional conclusions on investigation conducted by its representatives. The Convener was asked to send a list of persons who might be eye-witnesses to the disturbances under inquiry. No such list was received. In fact, the Commission could not ascertain from most of these statements the persons who would be competent and useful witnesses for the purpose of the inquiry. This led the Commission to start recording of evidence of the official witnesses first. It fixed the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police to be the first few persons to be examined. It was from the statements of these persons and the statements of the subsequent witnesses that other witnesses could be summoned. Similarly, the statements of the persons who had filed written statements on behalf of certain bodies were first recorded and it was ascertained from those persons the witnesses whom they would like to be examined by the Commission. The Commission then chose the persons to be examined. The actual list of witnesses examined is at Annexure II. It also includes the witnesses who had filed individual statements in the first instance. Only a few persons who had filed statements were not examined, the examination being considered unnecessary for the purpose of ascertaining the course of events. Their statements, however, had been taken into consideration.

2.2 We would like to state here in brief our view that the narration of actual events during the disturbances in the written statements appear to be a prepared narration to support the case of the person submitting it without any care being taken for precision and truth, as would have been expected in a statement by an individual supported by his own affidavit. The persons mentioned as witnesses of certain events in the written statements when examined either did not actually support some allegation, if put to them, or simply ignored mentioning the crucial fact in the statement attributed to them. We have, therefore, been very cautious in accepting the statements of the witnesses at their face value.

2.3 Annexure IV gives the names of the persons who were summoned to give evidence but did not appear either due to failure to serve them or due to their own default. One of them, Shri Bhola Prasad Singh, Minister for L.S.G., Housing and Tourism, in the

U.F. Government, was first sent a registered letter requesting him for sending his statement supported by an affidavit "in regard to a statement alleged to be made by him" and on getting no response, a registered letter was sent to him inviting him to attend in person to give his statement. It is presumed that the registered letters duly reached him, but the Commission got no response from him.

2.4 We have taken into consideration the statements and information furnished by public servants from the records in their possession and which they had dealt with without further examining them for the correctness of the statements or of the information furnished.

2.5 We could not examine Shri B. B. Shrivastava, who was Commissioner, Chhotanagpur Division, during the disturbances in August, 1967, as he died later; but have taken into consideration his reports and letters to the State Government.

2.6 We have also considered the comments made by the District Magistrate, Ranchi, on these reports. We express our surprise and dissatisfaction with the Government supplying him copies of the reports. They could have been supplied if the Government wanted his explanation on certain matters contained in the reports but they were apparently not so supplied. It should have been left to the Commission, in the circumstances, to put unfavourable matters, capable of an explanation, to the District Magistrate.

2.7 Of the persons who had sent in their written statements during the course of the recording of evidence by the Commission, a few were examined. The statements of the others were just looked into. The names of such persons are given at Annexure V.

2.8 Rule 5 of the Central Commission of Inquiry (Procedure) Rules, 1960, provides for the representation of persons by a legal practitioner. The rule is in these words:

"The Central Government, every person referred to in rule 4 and with the permission of the Commission, any other person whose evidence is recorded under rule 3—

- (a) may cross-examine a witness other than a witness produced by it or him;
- (b) may address the court; and
- (c) may be represented before the Commission by a legal practitioner or, with the consent of the Commission, by any other person."

2.9 The right to be represented by a legal practitioner is, it would appear, given to the Central Government and to such persons to whom notice is issued under rule 4 which reads thus:—

"If, at any stage of the inquiry the Commission—

- (a) considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct of any person; or

(b) is of the opinion that the reputation of any person is likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry,

the Commission shall give to that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the inquiry and to produce evidence in his defence."

2.10 Any other person whose evidence is recorded under section 3 included other witnesses appearing before the Commission and so anyone of them could cross-examine the witnesses other than those examined by himself and be represented by a legal practitioner only with the permission of the Commission. The Central Government did not exercise its right to be represented by a legal practitioner. The inquiry was in camera. The possibility of a person examined requesting permission to cross-examine other witnesses and be represented by a legal practitioner implied the presence of the person concerned throughout the proceedings of the Commission and seeking the permission of the court for cross-examining any witness at any stage of the proceedings. To keep such a possibility open would have rendered the proceedings in camera futile and it was, therefore, decided by the Commission that no legal practitioner would be allowed to any person examined as a witness. The Commission issued no notice under rule 4 to any person and, therefore, no right accrued in favour of any person to be represented by a legal practitioner. In the result, no counsel appeared for anyone before the Commission.

2.11 It may be mentioned that a formal application by one of the persons filing written statements for permission to be represented by a counsel was rejected by the Commission.

2.12 Copies of written statements filed by persons in response to the notice issued under rule 2 were not supplied to the other persons filing written statements. It was further decided by the Commission not to recognise any person as a party to the proceedings. There were no parties to the proceedings. The Commission was just to collect evidence and probe into the matter referred to it under the terms of its appointment.

2.13 It must be noted, however, that the absence of counsel made the task of the Commission more difficult in marshalling and checking up the evidence.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **SCOPE OF INQUIRY**

We decided not to record evidence about every incident which took place during the disturbances or to record evidence about any incident in great detail. We recorded the evidence which in our opinion was sufficient to give us a clear picture of how the disturbances started, how they spread in various localities and between members of the different communities on the 22nd of August and the following days up to the 29th of August. We did not concern ourselves with the actual culprits taking part in the incidents. That is left for the investigating agency and for the courts. Similarly, we recorded evidence about the action taken by the public authorities previous to the commencement of the disturbances and in dealing with them as a whole.

## PART II

### CHAPTER I

#### HISTORY OF INCIDENTS LEADING TO THE DISTURBANCES

1.1 The disturbances at Ranchi on the 22nd August, 1967, started ostensibly on account of brickbatting on a students' procession that afternoon in protest against the move for making Urdu the second official language of the State. The history in connection with this move for our purposes may be taken to commence from the time the State Government formed after the general election of 1967, and known as the United Front Government, prepared its programme of work. The programme covered 33 points and one of them related to the recognition of Urdu as the second official language of the State. The programme was mentioned in the Governor's speech on the 17th March, 1967. The Jan Sangh, a constituent of the United Front Government, did not subscribe to the making of Urdu the second official language of the State and it was given liberty to oppose it at any time. The question of the implementation of this item of work did not come up officially before the Cabinet. However, a circular appears to have been issued by the Deputy Chief Minister, Shri Karpoori Thakur, giving directions among others to the effect that—

- (i) in all the government offices (excluding courts) all letters, applications, petitions etc. in Urdu should be accepted and their replies also be given in Urdu, as far as possible,
- (ii) all important government publications should possibly be translated into Urdu, and
- (iii) that all government sign boards be also written in Urdu besides Hindi.

Reference to the circular is to be found at page 27 of the report of the Secretary, Samyukta Socialist Party, Bihar, presented at its second Sammelan.

1.2 On the 14th July, 1967, a non-official bill was moved in the Bihar Legislative Assembly by a Congress member, Shri Nasiruddin Hyder Khan, for making Urdu the second official language of the State.

1.3 This led to protests from Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Jan Sangh and certain Congress members.

1.4 A procession consisting of the Jan Sangh, Hindi Sahitya Sammelan and some Congress members marched to the Legislative Assembly while in session, entered the premises of the legislature, shouted anti-Urdu slogans and abusive slogans against Shri Karpoori Thakur. Subsequent to this, there had been regular agitations

against government and against Urdu throughout the State, both in the press and from the platform. It was decided to hold meetings etc. aganist Urdu in the fortnight from 12th August to the 26th August. On the 12th August the Jan Sangh organised a procession and a meeting at Ranchi. It distributed a hand bill in this connection. The contents of the hand bill referred to the undesirability of making Urdu the second official language of the State and made it clear that the opposition was to Urdu being made the second State language and not to the taking of such steps as might be considered necessary for encouraging the study of Urdu in the State. It was said that participation in the procession and the meeting would save the country from further partition and from going into the claws of Pakistan; that the question of the language which had led to the partition twenty years ago had been raised by some Pakistani and anti-national forces; and that the Congressmen eager for the move had failed to see that the result would encourage communalism and disrupt the unity of the country. The hand bill is Annexure VI.

1.5 The local authorities made arrangements for the maintenance of peace and communal harmony in the city during the proposed procession and the public meeting. Annexures VII and VIII are the two orders, one by the Superintendent of Police and the other by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Everything passed off peacefully.

1.6 On the 16th August, one Vijay Ranjan describing himself as the President of the Chhotanagpur Division Students Congress staged a demonstration at Shaheed Chauk at about 10-15 a.m. against Urdu and against Shri Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, Chief Minister, who was to visit that place. He was opposed by Shri Akram Ali, a Communist leader, who shouted pro-Urdu slogans. They were both removed by the Police.

1.7 On the 17th August, Vijay Ranjan distributed a Hindi pamphlet headed "Challenge to the manhood of the New Generation". In this pamphlet he used, to say the least, strong language against the supporters of Urdu. The theme of the pamphlet was that the move to make Urdu the second official language of the State was to win the votes of Muslims referred to as friends of Pakistan and to create an atmosphere so as to force the people to take to violence and thus cause disorder in the country. It was also mentioned that Pakistan was behind the move and acted through its agents in India after its relations with China became closer after the Indo-China war.

1.8 The pamphlet referred to slogans alleged to have been shouted by the Communist processionists who had taken out a procession on the 20th July, 1967, Vietnam Day, especially slogans like "Pakistan Zindabad", "Urdu Ko Lal Salam" etc. After referring to the alleged conspiracy of the Communists and the treacherous Muslims, it questioned whether such conspiracy would succeed and whether they would leave the venomous serpents alive again without crushing their hoods. The pamphlet ended by stating their demands and by informing the Deputy Commissioner of the situation arising out of the move to make Urdu the second official language of the State. The pamphlet is Annexure IX.

1.9. On the 20th August, Vijay Ranjan sent an intimation in writing to the Officer-in-charge, Kotwali, informing him that he would take out a procession on the 22nd August against the proposed recognition of Urdu as the second official language of the State. He moved in the city in a rickshaw that day and made announcements using provocative language against Muslims. As a result of such announcements in Muslim areas, feelings against Hindus got excited. Due note of the fact of Vijay Ranjan's conduct was taken by the public authorities and Vijay Ranjan was arrested on the 21st August. The Dy. S. P. in his order to the Traffic Inspector and the Officer-in-charge, Kotwali, on the 21st August, 1967, stated that the activities of Vijay Ranjan had created communal tension, that there was serious danger of breach of peace on this account and that the activities of Vijay Ranjan and his associates should be curbed before it was too late. He further expressed the hope that with the arrest of those persons, the programme to take out a procession on the 22nd August might fall through. The friends of Vijay Ranjan could not be arrested. The Officer-in-charge of Kotwali informed the Dy. S. P. on the 22nd August that the chances of taking out a procession were practically nil. However, on the 20th of August the Special Branch had reported to the Superintendent of Police that the chances of a clash between anti-Urdu processionists and pro-Urdu men as well as the C.P.I. men could not be ruled out. Dy. S. P. made an order on the 22nd August that the police arrangements of August 12 in connection with the anti-Urdu agitation by the Jan Sangh Unit of Ranchi should be repeated that day for maintaining law and order. His order further stated that Muslims and the C.P.I. Unit of Ranchi might stage a counter procession. Traffic Inspector I was directed to be on mobile duty on the Main Road to collect intelligence and to acquaint him and the Superintendent of Police of the situation every hour.

1.10 The procession was to start at about 1 O'clock.

## CHAPTER II

### EVENTS OF 22ND AUGUST TO 24TH AUGUST, 1967

22nd August, 1967

2.1 To appreciate the details of the various events during the disturbances we may give here a brief idea of the layout of the township of Ranchi. Ranchi city consists of two portions, the township of Ranchi and the notified area of Doranda, to the south of it. The population of Ranchi town in the 1961 census was 1,22,416 and that of Doranda 17,833. About 20% of this population was Muslim. The north portion of Ranchi Municipality, to the north of the Hazaribagh Road, and the Cart Sarai Road, mostly consists of government buildings. The south-western portion of the northern half, bounded by Lohar Daga Road, now known as the Ratu Road, the Main Road, the Cart Sarai Road and the Harmu Road, is predominantly a Hindu area and can be briefly described as the Ratu Road and Upper Bazar area. The southern portion of the Municipality starts from south of Hazaribagh Road and Cart Sarai Road. Main Road runs north to south. About half a mile down the Firayalal Chauk, from where Hazaribagh Road goes north-eastwards off the Main Road, are the two areas where Muslim population predominates. The two areas are on either side of the Main Road. To the eastern side of the Main Road is the area which can conveniently be called Karbala Chauk area. It includes Gudri and Fateullah Lane and is bounded on the south by Konka Road. The Church Road divides the area practically into two parts and runs south-eastwards from the Main Road. On the western side of the Main Road is the Hindpiri area. There is some Hindu population in this area but it is stated to be concentrated in particular streets. Hindpiri Central Street and Konka Road meet the Main Road near the Rattan Talkies, which is at a distance of about 6 furlongs from the Firayalal Chauk. Between these two places, viz., Firayalal Chauk and the Rattan Talkies, are the Daily Market, the Taxi Stand and the Urdu Library. Just on the east of the Main Road near Firayalal Chauk is the Civil Hospital.

2.2 Cart Sarai Road runs westwards from Shaheed Chauk, which is on the Main Road west of the Firayalal Chauk. Kutcheri Road runs north-eastwards from Shaheed Chauk. On the Cart Sarai Road are situated the Kotwali and the Jain Mandir; opposite to Kotwali is the Marwari School and on the south of the Kotwali and the Jain Mandir is the Zila School. On the west of the Zila School is the Baralal Street. Azad School is situated on a triangular piece of land; to the north of this is the Cart Sarai Road, to the east, separated by a street, is the Jain Mandir and to the west, also separated by a street, are other buildings.

2.3 In addition to these three main localities, viz., the Upper Bazar, the Ratu Road and the Hindpiri and Karbala Chauk areas,

incidents took place on the Hazaribagh Road, on the Chutia Road, which runs south-eastwards from the Church Road from a point about half a mile from the crossing of the Konka Road, Church Road and the Karbala Tank Road. Stray incidents also took place on the Kanke Road going northwards from the junction of the Ratn Road and the Upper Bazar Road, and also on the Booty Road on which is situated the Rajendra Medical College in the northern part of the Municipality area.

2.4 Now we describe in general how the disturbances developed in various areas of the city. The sequence of events is based on the oral evidence of witnesses mentioned in Annexure II and on the sequence of events given in the note prepared by the DIG, CID, Crime, on the basis of investigation of the cases reported in Ranchi town, Doranda and Namkum area and in the Hatia industrial area during the communal disturbances.

2.5 The procession of boys started at about 1.30 p.m. on the 22nd August from the L.E.B.B. (Lionel Edwards Bengali Boys') School near the Zila School and dispersed at about 3.15 p.m. near the Firayalal Chauk after it had gone up to the Welfare Centre. The procession on its return journey was brickbatted at the junction of the Central Street, Hindpiri and of the Konka Road with the Main Road. The boys returned the brickbats by the Muslims who had gathered at the mouth of the two streets. The police escorting the procession pushed back those people and headed the procession northwards. Some brickbatting also took place near the Urdu Library. The procession then began to thin out. Some of the boys injured were taken to the Civil Hospital, where their injuries were examined at 3-10 p.m. Some of the processionists went further from the Firayalal Chauk towards the Azad High School and threw brickbats at the Azad High School at about 3.15 p.m. The Azad High School remained under attack by the boys and the Hindu people who collected there till about 6 p.m. when the School boys were escorted under the orders of the Police Minister to Hindpiri, a Muslim majority area, by the police in police vehicles. The Superintendent of Police and the Sub-Divisional Officer were on the spot almost from 3-30 p.m. till 6 p.m.

2.6 The Karbala Chauk area appears to have witnessed several incidents from 3.30 p.m. It may be stated that since the brickbattting of the procession, the Muslims in that area appeared to be active. It was in this area that one Sushil Kumar was attacked between 3.30 p.m. and 3.45 p.m. He was rescued by Shri Abdur Rauf and taken to St. Barnabas Hospital where his injuries were examined at 4 p.m. The other serious incident in this area took place between 4.15 p.m. and 4.30 p.m. when Shadilal Malhotra and Bhim Sen were attacked near the Konka Road at about 50 yards from Rattan Talkies. People in Hindpiri area were also agitated from about 4 p.m. It appears that apart from the agitated feelings on account of the brickbatting of the boys at about 2.45 p.m. the news of the brickbatting and attacking of the Azad High School led to the excitement of the Muslims in this area. Shadilal died at 5-40 p.m.

and the news of his death enraged Hindus further and it led to a general brickbatting, assaults, looting and burning of shops and houses in the Upper Bazar area and other parts of the city.

2.7 199 cases were reported at the Kotwali, Ranchi, up to midnight on the 22nd August. 14 of these cases took place between 1-30 p.m. and 4-15 p.m. when Shadilal was stabbed. In 9 of these cases Muslims were aggressors and in 5 Hindus. Between 4-15 p.m. and 6 p.m. when Shadilal's death became known, 35 cases took place; Muslims were aggressors in 16 cases and Hindus in 19. Between 6 p.m. and midnight 150 cases took place; Muslims were aggressors in 49 cases and Hindus in 101. These 199 cases have been discussed in the 133 items in the note of DIG, CID. Some of these cases referred to several incidents or reports which had been grouped together on account of their forming one single transaction for purposes of investigation. A scrutiny of these cases in the note of DIG, CID, shows that by 3-15 p.m. the Azad High School had been attacked by a Hindu mob, Ram Sarikha Singh was attacked by a Muslim mob at Bazar Tanr, a Muslim mob attacked the Paradise Hotel, a Hindu mob of 50 to 60 persons attacked the Petrol Pump on the Hazaribagh Road and another Hindu mob consisting of students attacked a Muslim on the Kutcheri Road. The scrutiny also shows that 10 incidents took place between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m. in Hindpiri, Konka Road and Karbala area and Shaheed Chauk. One incident took place at Shaheed Chauk where a Hindu mob assaulted a Muslim student and looted his cycle and books. In the other 9 incidents, Muslims attacked Hindus in 8 cases and Hindus attacked one Muslim in Gwalatoli, Hindpiri. The 10 cases included 4 cases of looting. 18 incidents took place between 5 p.m. and 6 p.m. in Hindpiri, Lake Road, Konka Road where Muslims attacked Hindus and on the Church Road, Gwalatoli, Hindpiri, Upper Bazar, Cart Sarai Road and Old Hazaribagh Road where Hindus attacked Muslims. 27 incidents took place between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. where Muslims of Hindpiri, Main Road, Konka Road, Purani Ranchi, Karbala Chauk and Gudri attacked Hindus and Hindus of Pyadatoli, Daily Market, Bariatu Road, Main Road and Purulia Road attacked Muslims. 28 incidents took place between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m. where Muslims in the Church Road, Irgu Road and Main Road attacked Hindus and Hindus of Church Road, Chutia Road, Main Road, Ratu Road and Harmu Road attacked Muslims. 16 incidents took place between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. in practically the same areas. 11 incidents took place between 8 p.m. and 10 p.m. 5 incidents took place between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. 9 incidents took place between 11 p.m. and 12 midnight.

2.8 The scrutiny further shows that apart from the murderous attack on Shadilal at about 4-15 p.m. on the Konka Road, Dev Narayan Pathak was murdered on the Church Road by a mob of armed Muslims at about 6 p.m., that Hanumant Lal was killed on the Konka Road at about 7 p.m. by a mob of Muslims and that the first person killed by Hindus was a Muslim in a lane 50 yards south of the Ratu Road at about 8 p.m. Killing by the Hindus started thereafter in other areas also. Of the total of these cases, Muslim mobs were concerned in 57 cases and Hindus in 75 cases. The com-

munity of the aggressor in the remaining cases could not be determined.

2.9 Three military parties were patrolling from about 9 p.m. on Ratu Road, Hindpiri and Church Road. Further patrolling by the military started at about midnight.

2.10 Of the various incidents on the 22nd August detailed mention may be made of the first attack on the processionist boys by the Muslims of Hindpiri and the Konka Road side, the attack on the Azad High School by the Hindus, the attack on the armed picket at Rattan Talkies with explosives by Muslims of Hindpiri and the burning of stalls near the gate of the Sadar Hospital by the Hindus.

2.11 A procession of boys mostly 15 years of age started from the L.E.B.B. School at about 1-30 p.m. in protest against the move for making Urdu the second official language of the State. The procession collected further boys from the Marwari School and Balakrishna School and then proceeded via Shaheed Chauk to Firayalal Chauk and then along the Main Road towards the south. It first went to St. Xavier's College. No boy of that College joined it. During conversation between the processionists and the College staff, someone from among the processionists threw a brickbat which hit the Vice Principal on the face. No notice was taken of it and the processionists then retreated and moved further along the Main Road. They passed Taxi Stand, Daily Market, Urdu Library, Rattan Talkies and reached Gossnar's H. E. School. No boy joined the procession from the Gossnar's H. E. School. It proceeded up to the Social Welfare Centre and then returned. It was accompanied by a police force led by the Officer-in-charge of Kotwali Police Station and consisting of about 28 lathi constables and one more Sub-Inspector. The processionists kept on shouting anti-Urdu slogans. On their way back when they reached near the Rattan Talkies, brickbats were thrown at them from the mouth of the Hindpiri Central Street on the left and from the mouth of the Konka Road on the right by Muslim groups. The processionists also retaliated by throwing brickbats. The police pushed back the people and headed the procession towards Firayalal Chauk. In the brickbattling a few of the processionists sustained injuries. Some of the persons on the street also sustained injuries. It may be mentioned that an armed picket under a Sub-Inspector and a Magistrate was on duty at the Rattan Talkies from the forenoon of that day. It did not interfere with the procession nor did it take any steps against the persons collecting at the mouths of the two streets, when they found the procession returning. In fact, they appeared to be mere spectators.

2.12 The procession thinned out and, anyway, dispersed by the time it reached the Firayalal Chauk. Of course some boys went further towards the Shaheed Chauk and towards the Azad School. The injured processionists went to the Sadar Hospital and had their injuries examined and got treatment. The Officer-in-charge rang up the Kotwali and the Superintendent of Police and informed them about the situation.

2.13 Of the 15 people examined at the Sadar Hospital between 2-45 p.m. and 5-20 p.m. on the 22nd August, seven were boys. Of these boys two were Muslims, Shri Ahmad aged 12 years, son of Jafar of the Daily Market, who was the first to be examined at 2-45 p.m. and Kurban, aged 5, son of Basir Chand of Hindpiri 2nd Street examined at 5-05 p.m. The other five were Amarendra, aged 13, son of R. P. Mishra of Ranchi Police Office, Om Prakash Sarogi, aged 15, son of Sitaram Sarogi of Upper Bazar examined at 3-10 p.m. Anil Sarkar, aged 14, son of Sunil Sarkar of Kutcheri Road, Ajoy Kumar Samanta, aged 14, son of Puran Ch. Samanta of H. B. Road examined at 4-10 p.m. and Santosh Pandey, aged 16, son of Dwarika Pandey of Lake Road examined at 4-25 p.m. The officer-in-charge who was injured at the Azad School was examined at 3-50 p.m. Two adults of Hindpiri G. Toli, Md. Kalim, aged 45, and Hatim, aged 36, were examined at 4-10 p.m. and 4-25 p.m. respectively. The fact that the officer-in-charge and the injured boys went to the Sadar Hospital tends to support the version of the procession dispersing by the time it reached the Hospital close to Firayalal Chauk.

2.14 The other persons examined by 5-05 p.m. are Jagdish Lal, aged 35, of Church Road, Shadil Malhotra, aged 39, Bindeshwari Pd., aged 35, and J. Lal Ghosal. There is evidence that these persons were attacked separately in different incidents.

2.15 Shri Ahmad was summoned twice but he could not be served and it could not, therefore be got on record where and in what circumstances he got hurt. If he was injured at Daily Market, it would have been on the return journey of the procession and not on the outward journey as the processionists must have passed Daily Market on the outward journey much earlier.

2.16 The officer-in-charge, Kotwali, after ringing up the police officer in Kotwali from the Sadar Hospital proceeded to Firayalal Chauk and learnt that there was stone throwing going on at the Azad High School. He rushed to the school and noticed some persons standing in the lane to the right of Balakrishna School and some Azad High School boys in the verandah of the school. The stone throwing was being exchanged between the school boys and those people. The Sub-Inspector chased the people on the Cart Sarai Road and the officer-in-charge chased the people on the Balakrishna Road. In the meantime the officer-in-charge was hit with a brickbat on the head. He asked the boys not to throw stones and on their desisting, he himself proceeded on a scooter to the Hospital to get his injury bandaged. The injury was examined at the Hospital according to the Hospital entry at 3-50 p.m. He returned to the spot again at about 4 p.m. and saw the brickbatting again in progress between the people in the lane and the boys of the school. The police people chased those people again on the Cart Sarai Road. In the meantime, the S.D.O. and the S.P. arrived there. The S.P. on getting the information at about 3-15 p.m. from the officer-in-charge about the brickbatting on the processionists, closing of the shops and the situation being tense, telephoned the Deputy Commissioner and, failing to contact him, contacted the S.D.O. and informed him of the situation. Picking up the S.D.O. from his court, the S.P. and the S.D.O. went to the Kotwali, directed police vehicles to be ready with teargas, lathi police

and armed force and to follow their vehicle, and reached the Azad High School. He saw some boys throwing stones at the back of the Azad High School and a number of people on the Kotwali Road, i.e., the Cart Sarai Road. They chased those people away, went round the corner of the Azad High School, cleared the place of the boys throwing stones at the school and again reached the other end of the school and started clearing the road to Kotwali. The boys in the school were also throwing stones. He told them not to create tension. They stopped throwing stones. They had to order lathi charge on the crowd on the Upper Bazar Road. After clearing the road of the people by lathi charge, they went to the Main Road, to the Lake Road and then came back to the Azad High School and found the crowd still standing there on the Kotwali Road.

2.17 It may be mentioned that the entire Upper Bazar Road is congested and narrow and is the centre of business and trade in the city, and, therefore, there is always a fairly large assembly of persons in that area. 22nd of August also happened to be a market day. The Superintendent of Police then went to the Kotwali and contacted the Deputy Commissioner.

2.18 The S.D.O.'s statement is also to the same effect. According to him, the lathi charge on the Upper Bazar Road people took place after he had returned from the Kotwali, having telephoned to the District Magistrate. The S.D.O. stated in his deposition that when he went inside the school at about 4-15 p.m. he noticed that the walls of the compound and verandah and some of the floors had been broken and brickbats obtained therefrom. There is some evidence that Azad School boys did not throw brickbats. This may be at the late stage after they had been collected in the hall; but the injuries on a number of the school boys and the breaking of the floor tend to support the S.P.'s and the officer-in-charge's statements that, in the early part, they were also brickbatting. He heard people near the school shouting, "Why don't you go to the Hindpiri and Rattan Talkies where Hindus are being attacked by Muslims?" This warned him of the situation turning communal and so he went to the Kotwali to inform the Deputy Commissioner.

2.19 After clearing the Upper Bazar Road, the S.D.O. returned to the Azad High School. He again noticed about 100 boys on the Kotwali Road between Balakrishna School and the Azad High School, throwing brickbats at the Azad High School. At that time there were no boys on that side inside the Azad High School. He asked those people to disperse. When they did not listen and put up a bold front, he ordered a lathi charge. One of the boys in the crowd received a bleeding injury. 20 or 25 boys entered the dharamshala, and the other boys fled away. The S.D.O. and the police force, however, could not enter the dharamshala to make arrests as they did not succeed in opening the collapsible door, which had been closed. Thereafter the Police Minister arrived. The boys from the dharamshala came out and there arrived a large number of people from either side. They all complained to the Police Minister of the high-handedness of the Police, and the Police Minister pacified them saying that he would look into the matter and that they should go away, leaving the police to do its duty. The Police Minister and the S.D.O. then went inside the school, saw a number

of injured boys there and at the suggestion of the Police Minister, arrangements were made for escorting the boys to Hindpiri.

2.20 Some time later the Azad High School was set on fire. It is complained that the Azad High School, which is just 40—50 yards from the Kotwali, had been placed that day in the custody of the police and yet it was burnt. The allegation about the school being placed in the custody of the police is not borne out by the evidence as a whole. There appears to have been no particular reason for specially placing it in the custody of the police. The fact that the Kotwali is close to the school does not necessarily lead to the inference that the police had been negligent in not protecting the school from being set on fire. The time of setting fire to the school is not precisely known. After 6 p.m. there was general flare up in the area and the police at the Thana might not have noticed the actual setting of fire. The allegation that during the presence of the Police Minister the school was kept under attack, that some books were taken on the road and burnt and that the burnt pieces of books were shown to the Police Minister, is also not acceptable on the basis of the entire evidence about this incident.

2.21 The attack on the Azad High School led to a rumour in Hindpiri that the Muslim boys in the school had been murdered and that made the people in that locality enraged and anxious to rush towards the school from the Lake Road side, but they dispersed on the arrival of the police force.

2.22 The Police Minister went to Hindpiri at about 4-30 p.m. and pacified a Muslim crowd. It was from Hindpiri that he had gone to the Azad High School on being told about the school boys being surrounded by the Hindus there.

2.23 The third incident again took place at the Rattan Talkies. It was an attack by the Muslims of Hindpiri on the armed picket there. Shri R. N. Thakur was the Magistrate in charge of that picket.

2.24 There is difference in the versions of the incident given by the magistrate and by the members of the police party, viz., Sub-Inspector Ram Adhar Singh, Havildar Ratan Singh of the Armed Guards and Traffic Constable Rameshwari Singh. We prefer the latter version. It is to the effect that a Muslim mob armed with swords, spears, lathis etc. came from the Central Street side. Constable Rameshwari Singh asked them not to remain on the road. He heard someone saying that the constable was obstructing them and so should be attacked. Someone thereafter aimed a sword blow at him. He avoided it. He was then struck with a lathi on his left arm. On his shouts for help, the Sub-Inspector with the armed guards ran towards him and in the meanwhile a bomb hit the Sub-Inspector. Constable Rameshwari Singh and Havildar Ratan Singh managed to remove the Sub-Inspector to the verandah of the Rattan Talkies when, in the meantime, the Havildar was hit on the left eye by a bomb. A third bomb hit the two constables of the Armed Guards. It led to the collection of a huge crowd at the Rattan Talkies. People went to the first floor for protection.

2.25 Havildar Ratan Singh and a Constable fired six shots in the air, Havildar Ratan Singh fired five and the constable one. Havildar Ratan Singh did not see the magistrate at that time. He has stated that he in fact shouted for the Magistrate but could not find him. Nor did the Magistrate come on the spot. He informed the Kotwali about the incident on the telephone. The Magistrate came to the spot after the arrival of the Police Minister who arrived some time after the arrival of the extra force.

2.26 We do not prefer the Magistrate's version of the incident in view of variations in his statements. In his very first report dated 22nd August 1967, he stated that a mob consisting of some two dozen miscreants tried to overpower the armed force, that they threw hand grenade at the police force and that the Havildar fired five rounds and the constable fired one round at the miscreants which, however, did not hit any one of them, presumably on account of darkness and because of the failure of electricity. This version would clearly indicate that the firing was resorted to when the attack was made on the police party and that the firing was not effective due to darkness. Similar impression was conveyed to the S.D.O. who happened to inquire from him on the spot about the incident. He wrote in his report dated the 23rd August to the Deputy Commissioner, that the armed party stationed at Rattan Talkies had fired five rounds of bullets under the orders of R. N. Thakur, Magistrate, in self-defence. In his detailed report sent later about the incidents in the vicinity of the Rattan Talkies, and presumably, given on the 23rd of August, Shri R. N. Thakur said:

"At 6-30 p.m. while I was taking tea in the tea stall attached to the Rattan Talkies, some two dozen Mohammadan Goondas suddenly attacked the Armed Force shouting slogans like Pakistan Zindabad and down with the Police and uttered abuses. They not only hurled stones over the armed force and the shops on either side but also threw a bomb (hand grenade) over the armed force. The S. I. of Police received serious injuries on his face and fell unconscious. The same was the case with the Havildar, whose left eye was also injured. A constable also received injuries in his body. For some time the armed force became nervous but they plucked up courage and fired six rounds at the miscreants, who fled away. It may be noted in this connection that there was complete darkness in the area caused by the cloudy weather and complete absence of street lights which had also gone off then. Consequently there was no casualty as a result of the firing of 6 rounds. The miscreants spread all over the main road and set fire to a number of Hindu shops which started burning and everything could be vivid to the eye in the light of the flames except the miscreants who concealed themselves in the bye-lanes."

2.27 In his deposition he stated that all the constables and the Havildar went up to the first floor of the second building, that they fired six rounds on their own and that he had given no order for firing. When recalled and confronted with his detailed report, he admitted

that he was taking tea in the stall near the cinema hall. His explanation for not mentioning that the firing was done from the first floor of the cinema building was that he had to write the report in great hurry at the request of the S.D.O. on the morning of the 23rd August. He, however, had to agree that if it was so, it could not have been done in self-defence.

2.28 Lastly, the sequence of events prepared by the D.I.G., C.I.D., happens to mention in connection with this incident that the magistrate had gone to a nearby tea stall and he could not come near the force as the shop-keeper closed the door due to fear. We believe that the magistrate was not with the armed guards when the incident took place and that he was possibly in the tea stall. He could not pick up courage to state these facts straightforwardly and gave out a wrong version about the firing being in self-defence. It appears that it was after the police people had given out the true fact, to the effect that the firing was from the first floor, that he took courage to state it.

2.29 There were about 27 stalls in front of the Sadar Hospital on the Main Road. One among the people enraged on the death of Shadilal, on coming out of the Hospital set fire to one of these stalls. This led to the burning of all the 27 stalls. The fire engines summoned to extinguish the fire could not succeed in controlling the fire. The S.D.O. when talking to the magistrate at the Rattan Talkies after the hand grenade incident learnt of the shops near the Sadar Hospital being set on fire. He and the Deputy Superintendent of Police proceeded there. He found the Main Road blocked with wooden boxes placed across the entire road about 100 yards from the Hospital. He got the barricade removed and rushed to the burning shops. All those shops except one belonged to Muslims. By the time he reached there only one stall had been burnt and fire was spreading to the second. The fire brigade was sent for and arrived in about 15 minutes. It worked from 7 p.m. till 9-30 p.m. Later another unit of fire brigade also arrived and worked, but both the units were ineffective in extinguishing the fire as they had to fill water from a tank about 400 yards from these stalls. They used to fetch water in turn. There were numerous occasions when no fire engine was working. They found one person lying injured very close to the burning stall. He was a Muslim. He was picked up and sent to the Hospital.

2.30 There was a police force stationed near the south-western corner of the Hospital. It seems to have done nothing either to arrest the culprit or to extinguish the fire.

2.31 Electric lights in most of the areas where the disturbances took place on the 22nd of August were off till about midnight. The areas affected by the absence of lighting were Main Road upto Railway Crossing, Club Road, Pepee Compound, Hindpuri, Church Road including bye-lanes, Post Office and Court area, Booty Road and Morabadi area from Circuit House upto Ramakrishna Mission. It was not due to the breakdown of electric supply but, as reported by the Electric Supply Company, was due to its staff not being able to reach the requisite switchboards to switch on the lights on account

of the disturbances. They could get police escort after 11 p.m. when they proceeded to switch on the lights.

*23rd August, 1967*

2.32 On the 23rd of August, 1967, in spite of the imposition of the curfew throughout the day, a number of incidents, sixteen in all, did take place in different localities of the town. Three incidents took place on the outskirts of Ranchi in village Bhitta, Kokar and at Nabkum. This shows that the disturbances were spreading beyond the town. In all these nineteen incidents, dealt with in the note by the D.I.G., C.I.D., Hindus were the aggressors. In addition to these cases, reports of two incidents were found to be false and one case dealt with in this note is of a house search conducted by a Deputy Magistrate as a result of which some explosive powder, empty containers of bombs, spears and pharsas and one country-made bomb were recovered. This led to the arrest of a few Muslims. The Report of the Inspector of Explosives dated 20th November, 1967, shows that the big size cracker (the so-called country made bomb) had a core of gunpowder and was a piece of unauthorised fire works and that its possession was a violation of rule No. 6 of the Explosives Rules, 1940.

2.33 The main incident on this day took place in the Rajendra Medical College where the Muslim boys removed to a separate hall near the Principal's office and porch, were attacked by the Hindu boys as a result of which attack one Muslim boy died in Hospital and about 12 others received injuries.

2.34 One incident of murder took place in Namkum area. The dead body of a Muslim was found on the night of the 23rd August near the Namkum military farm.

2.35 The events at the Medical College took place in this order. The Principal on learning of the trouble at Ranchi on the evening of the 22nd August asked his Warden and Assistant Warden to go round the campus and see about the situation. He got their reports at about 9 p.m. to the effect that they had met the boys who were fully confident of maintaining communal peace and that there was nothing to worry about.

2.36 On the 23rd August things were normal in the morning. Classes were attended by the students. Only the day scholars did not attend, some of them having informed the Principal of their inability to attend the classes due to curfew orders.

2.37 On learning about the arrival of dead bodies at the Forensic Department of the College, he went there and found a gathering of the students, employees and outsiders. A truck of dead bodies was also there. He persuaded those persons not to collect and to go away, had the dead bodies delivered to the Forensic Department and left instructions that the door of the Department should be closed and that only the staff and police were to be allowed there.

2.38 At about 2-30 p.m. he learnt of some fire in one of the hostels. He went there accompanied by the boys, the Warden and other Professors and on questioning was shown a half-burnt suit case presumably of a Muslim student. Both Hindu and Muslim boys were present there. He was told by a few Muslim students that they were feeling unsafe. The Hindu boys complained that a crowd of Muslims was collecting at the Bariatu village closeby. He, therefore, asked his Warden and the Professor to take the Muslim boys to the College hall from the hostel and he himself proceeded to the Kotwali. On being told that the army was in charge of the whole affair, he informed the military officer of the position and told him that his problem was about the evacuation of the Muslim boys out of the campus and the protection of the Hindu boys from the Bariatu village people. He was told by the military officer that he was unable to evacuate the Muslim boys on the 23rd and that he would arrange for it on the following day and also that he would send some force to the college. He returned to the college and found the Muslim boys collected at the entrance hall of the college. Shortly thereafter a magistrate with some police force arrived there. The magistrate selected the badminton court, about 150 yards from the porch, for stationing his force. From there the porch could be seen but not the hall where the boys were being kept. Shouts from the lobby behind the porch could be heard by the magistrate at the badminton court, but the shouts from inside the hall would probably not be heard. The Principal's suggestion to post a few constables at the lobby to keep watch over the Muslim boys was rejected by the magistrate on the ground that he could not split up his force. Some of the boys wanted to go to their houses in the city along with their local guardians. About three boys left in one conveyance which came on a guardian being rung up by one boy. The Principal himself took another boy to a house on the Bariatu Road.

2.39 He returned to his house at about 7-30 p.m. after telling the magistrate that he would be back by 8-30 p.m. At about 8-30 p.m. he received a telephonic call from a police officer informing him of a fire at the back of one of the hostels. At the same time the Warden and the boys of the hostel arrived and informed him of the fire. When he was about to leave his compound, the Durwan arrived and said that a fight had taken place with the Muslim boys who had been kept in the Hall. An injured Muslim boy was noticed in the compound of the Professor next to his house and he told the Professor to take the boy to the Hospital. On reaching the college he found all the glasses of the entrance broken, a boy lying injured outside the stair-case and 3 or 4 boys lying under the table in the Conference Hall. The injured boys were then removed to the Hospital.

2.40 At about 9-30 p.m. he found the Police Minister, the D.I.G. of Police and some others at one of the boys' hostels. The boys found in the college and the injured boys, except five who had been seriously injured, were sent by the Police Minister to Ranchi. The two Muslim girls in the girls' hostel were removed from the hostel on the 24th of August.

2.41 In addition to the police force at the badminton court, a number of Home Guards had also been deputed there and a mobile

police party in charge of a magistrate was also patrolling that area. Neither of these parties appears to have noticed the incident in the hall. The static party was in charge of Shri H. N. Kant, Magistrate, and the force with him consisted of one Havildar and 8 armed constables. According to his deposition, he learnt from the Home Guards at about 8 p.m. about smoke coming out of Hostel No. 2. He sent a Sub-Inspector to look into the matter and got his report at about 8-30 p.m. that it was only a kitchen fire. The mobile party also happened to arrive at about that time. Noticing the closing of windows and going out of lights in the Girls' Hostel and the boys rushing towards that hostel, he asked Shri Dubey, Magistrate in charge of the mobile party, to proceed to that hostel and told him that he would follow after collecting his force. He had gone up to 150 yards (though the distance given in his report is 50 yards) when he found Dubey returning and was informed that every thing was all right in that Girls' Hostel. The boys were asked to go back to their hostel and he returned to his static post. It was at about 9 p.m. that a Police Sub-Inspector informed him that the Hindu students had entered the building and assaulted some Muslim students.

2.42 Shri B. M. Lall, Sub-Inspector, happened to be telephoning from the Medical College when some Muslim boys came running to him and told him that some boys were coming towards them and that they might be attacked. He sent the Home Guard who was sitting near the telephone to the Magistrate and asked him to come over. He then noticed about 50 students armed with iron bars and knives entering the Conference Hall. He challenged them asking them to stop or they would be shot. Then the assailants fled but a few entered the Conference Hall. He shouted loudly facing the badminton court asking the Home Guards to come but none turned up. He rang up the Control Room and the Kotwali. On the arrival of the Principal and the Professors, he rushed to the badminton court and found the Magistrate there. According to him the incident took place in such a short time that he could not fire.

2.43 We cannot help feeling that the static patrol under Magistrate Kant failed in its duty in not rushing to the Hall when the incident took place. The breaking of the glass panes in the porch and the lobby indicate that the boys must have gone from the front as well, and if these people had been alert they would have noticed the boys proceeding and should have watched their movements. Even if Shri Kant was on the road towards the Girls' Hostel, he could have noticed the boys proceeding towards the Hall from the back side. Anyway, the noise and cries of the boys should have attracted their attention.

2.44 The services of the College staff could have been utilised in watching the hostels and the Conference Hall and their presence might have acted as a deterrent to the Hindu boys from burning things in the hostel at night and from attacking the Muslim boys in the Hall. The Principal did think of utilising their services but put it off thinking that the segregation of the boys and posting of the police would meet the situation which according to his assessment did not portend any untoward incident happening. He may have been influenced this way due to the previous unhelpful attitude of

the staff when caste riots had taken place and also when they did not remain with the Muslim boys on the 23rd August till his return from the Kotwali.

*24th August, 1967*

2.45 On the 24th August, a number of incidents, 27 in all, took place in Ranehi. The curfew was relaxed from 12 O'clock to 6 p.m. that day and during this period half the incidents mentioned in the report of the D.I.G., C.I.D., took place. Another feature of the incidents of this day is that some incidents took place in a few villages at some distance from the city, namely in village Bajra, village Padara and village Badan. An incident also took place at Namkum. In all these incidents except one, Hindus were the aggressors. Two persons were killed in an incident in village Bajra and one person was killed in an incident in village Badan. The only incident in which the Muslims were the aggressors took place near Tiwari Tank Road, Hindpiri area, where a Nepali was assaulted with dagger by three persons who looked to be Muslims. Four persons were killed in a house in Kanke Road at about 2-30 p.m. and three persons were killed in Lower Chutia, an area not patrolled by the Army or the Police that night.

2.46 On the 24th August and the night between the 24th and 25th August, many incidents took place in H.E.C. colony area. They would be dealt with separately.

## CHAPTER III

### EVENTS OF 25TH AUGUST TO 29TH AUGUST, 1967

*25th August, 1967*

3.1 On the 25th of August again a number of incidents took place in Ranchi town and in Tatisilwai, about 9 to 10 miles from Ranchi. Of the 24 items noted in the DIG, CID's note, Hindus were concerned as aggressors in 23. These items include 5 cases of picking up of 6 dead bodies and 4 cases of murder of six persons—three in Ranchi and the fourth in Tatisilwai, 3 persons were killed in the Tatisilwai case.

3.2 An incident took place on the 25th August in Hindpiri in which the military had to fire. Capt. Mangat Ram and Shri R. N. P. Sinha, Magistrate, deposed about it.

3.3 At about 10 p.m. that night there was a hue and cry and under the orders of Maj. Sahrawat, Capt. Mangat Ram proceeded to that area. He had left the vehicle on the lane and proceeded on foot to the place from where shouts were coming. The shouts were 'Bajrang Bali ki jai' and 'Alla-ho-Akbar'.

3.4 When, on being asked to disperse, the shouting crowd did not go back, Capt. Mangat Ram took the permission of the Magistrate to disperse the unlawful assembly and ordered firing. One shot was fired and the mob dispersed. Later he heard a very deep sound from inside the Hindpiri T.O.P. He had heard two sounds which appeared to be of gun shots. There were shouts of 'Bachao' from some house. He rushed there with three men and sent a person to Major Sahrawat to send more force.

3.5 On the western side of the outpost he found a mob shouting. He reached there shouting "military had come and do not do anything". The shouts of Alla-ho-Akbar then ceased. Shouts to the effect 'T.O.P. ko bachao' were heard and these shouts were followed by the shouts of 'Bajrang Bali ki jai'. The shouts were coming from the T.O.P. outpost and from two houses adjacent to it. He noticed a crowd in front of the T.O.P. He ordered his men to fire. A shot was fired. It had no effect. Another shot was fired. The mob then dispersed and went to Kunjra Mohalla. The firing resulted in no casualty.

*26th August, 1967*

3.6 On the 26th August again several incidents took place not only in Ranchi town but also in Tatisilwai, in Angara Police Station, in village Rampur and village Lachiragi and in village Jamchua within Hatia Police Station.

3.7 On the night between 26th and 27th August an incident took place in village Nausera close to the H.E.C. Colony between a military party and the villagers. It would be described later.

3.8 In 27 out of the 29 incidents Hindus were the aggressors while one related to the recovery of bombs, bullets and cartridges from the house of one Bannu Mian on the Lake Road. In another incident some Muslim stabbed a Hindu.

3.9 The incidents on this day resulted in the killing of many Muslims. A family of 11 was killed in village Jamchua. A family of 7 persons was killed in village Rampur. 2 persons were killed in village Tatisilwai. In all 22 people were killed that day and 12 dead bodies, 5 Hindus and 7 Muslims, were recovered.

*27th August, 1967*

3.10 On the 27th August only one incident took place in Ranchi and one near village Suril, where Hindus murdered one Muslim returning to his village.

*28th August, 1967*

3.11 On the 28th August a few incidents took place in the city and also within Bundu Police Station and in village Kurkhuru.

*29th August, 1967*

3.12 On the 29th August only one incident took place. A Hindu mob attacked the workshop of a Muslim on the Bariatu Road.

3.13 Detailed figures of the persons dead, persons injured, cases of arson and looting datewise are given in Annexure X for the city of Ranchi and in Annexure XI for the area other than Ranchi town area and the H.E.C. area. It may be noted that the figures shown of the persons dead within brackets are included in the figures noted for those days.

## CHAPTER IV

### EVENTS AT HATIA

4.1 The industrial establishment of the Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd., Ranchi, is situated at Hatia, about 7 miles from Ranchi. The colony spreads over an area of 4 sq. miles. Most of the area covered by the colony is within the jurisdiction of Sadar Police Station, Ranchi. The rest is within the jurisdiction of Hatia Police Station situated close to the D.T. Quarters and the Plants. Out of the 1400 Muslim employees, 650 with their families resided in the township. During the disturbances the entire area was controlled by the headquarters through Hatia Police Station. Ordinarily 3 constables of Sadar Police Station are posted in Sector II for keeping the Police Station informed of the events in that area. During the disturbances the information was presumably given by these constables to the Hatia Police Station and the events were dealt with by that Police Station.

4.2 The H.E.C. authorities on learning of the disturbances at Ranchi on the 22nd August got on the alert and took steps to watch the situation in the colony. There is a security force to look after the security of the H.E.C. Plants. It has nothing to do with the law and order situation in the colony, but on learning of the trouble at Ranchi some of the forces were withdrawn from the non-essential plants and deputed in the town to be on the alert and watch the situation. Nothing happened on the 22nd August. On the 23rd also no incident took place.

4.3 The situation does not appear to have continued to be normal. The Intelligence Report from the Intelligence Section of the H.E.C. (Security Division) dated the 23rd August, 1967, stated that some of the scattered Muslim employees in the HEC colonies were reported to have grown panicky and were removing their families to safer places and that there were rumours that there might be some trouble of a communal nature at site V of Sector II. It further stated that police vigilance was required, particularly at site V of Sector II, that the intelligence staff had been alerted and that all possible co-operation would be given to the local police to maintain law and order in the HEC area and to prevent any planned mischief by professional mischief-mongers and goondas.

4.4 The Intelligence Report dated the 24th August, 1967, stated that the situation at site V of Sector II became tense since the evening of 23rd August. Both the Hindus and Muslims there were equally apprehensive of the designs and the intention of the other community. It further stated that the Muslims were reported to have shifted their families and children to Doranda and were living in groups in quarters in site V and that the Muslims of the other sectors of the HEC colony were also reported to have temporarily shifted to

site V and for reasons of safety and security in the event of any mass attack from Hindus against them. It further stated that the situation had become highly tense since the evening of 23rd August.

4.5 A Peace Committee was appointed, but according to the Intelligence Report without any tangible results.

4.6 At about 10 p.m. on the 23rd of August, 1967, some Hindu members of the Peace Committee alleged that when on their round they were challenged by one Muslim who threatened them and the matter was thereafter circulated among the Hindu employees at the site in a manner which created undue panic among them and led them to clamour for effective police protection.

4.7 On receipt of the information the Chief of the Security Division and the local police officer visited the spot and adequate precautionary measures were taken by the local police in co-operation with the security personnel of the HEC by posting police constables and security staff at all vulnerable points at the site and introducing night-long patrolling by the patrol parties.

4.8 Extra police force in charge of a Magistrate was posted at Hatia Police Station for patrolling the area. The H.E.C. authorities put some of their transport vehicles at the disposal of the Police for patrolling. Members of the Peace Committee, too, were asked to contradict any rumours which had started floating about the Ranchi incidents.

4.9 On 24th August morning things were peaceful. At about 2-30 p.m. that day the Chairman of the Corporation was told on the telephone that a Sikh had been stabbed at site No. 5, Sector II. The Chairman directed the Chief of Security to proceed there and went himself there too. The report was found to be false. At site No. 5 there were about 400 Hindu families and about 200 Muslim families. Both Hindus and Muslims were there in groups and they told him that they apprehended trouble from the other side. He pacified them and got them to say that they would live peacefully as they had been doing in the past. He later on called a meeting of the members of the Management Committee and they decided to inform the law and order authority of the apprehensions. They also decided that the various Heads of Departments and their staff should go to the colony and ask the people not to get panicky.

4.10 At about 4-30 p.m. that day the dead body of a Muslim was found near the water tower adjacent to the Lakma Hill. On getting this news the Chief of Security thought of evacuating the Muslims from their residences as they might not be in a position to ensure their protection. The Muslim workers were scattered all over the colony and occupied one or two flats in a block of 12 or more flats. The extra police sent by the D.I.G. on being asked by the Chief of Security was utilised in escorting the families.

4.11 The first information about some actual incident having taken place in Hatia was received by the Chairman, H.E.C., at about 5-15 p.m. It was about 2 or 3 persons being injured at the dam site. He

proceeded to the spot but on learning on the way that one dead body had already reached the Hospital, he went to the Hospital and directed the Chief Medical Officer to take all necessary measures to provide necessary medical aid to the injured who might be coming to the Hospital. He saw the injured persons there. He contacted the Chief of Security and asked him to contact the civil authorities suggesting the imposition of curfew and evacuation of Muslims. The Security Chief had already taken action in that regard.

4.12 Four buses were placed at the disposal of the police for evacuation purposes—the first bus at 7 p.m., the second at 7-30 p.m. on the 24th August and the third at 10 p.m. on the 24th August. The fourth bus was made available at 11 a.m. on the 25th August. The first bus was used till 2 p.m. on the 24th, the second bus till 10 a.m. on the 25th on evacuation work though it continued to work till the 27th morning. The third bus was used on evacuation work till about 3 p.m. on the 25th August. The fourth bus worked up to 7-30 p.m. on the 25th of August. Besides these four buses one D. K. Sharma also helped in evacuating the Muslims on a private truck arranged by the police.

4.13 Shri N. P. Varghese, Deputy Chief Fire Officer, also gave lift in his vehicle to certain persons. In all about 1300 Muslims were evacuated by the afternoon of the 25th August to the Artisan Hostel which was lying vacant at the time.

4.14 Some of the Muslims could not be evacuated either because they did not come out of their flats or the guides with the evacuation parties were unable to point out those flats.

4.15 Muslims inside about 12 flats were attacked and murdered during the night of the 24th and 25th August. Besides the murders inside these flats, cases of murders took place in Dhurwa area on open land. A few houses were set on fire. There were a few arson cases in the flats. Most of the arson cases were in the houses of Muslims in Dhurwa area. Dhurwa is within the jurisdiction of Hatia Police Station.

4.16 The Chairman made a round of the colony during the night from 11 O'clock to 3 O'clock. He noticed some people in the streets at about 10 p.m. and asked them to go back to their houses. On his further rounds he did not find anybody in the streets. On the morning of the 25th he was informed of the figures of injured persons who had arrived at the Hospital till then and was told further that out of the injured two had expired.

4.17 Brig. Manohar Singh saw him at about 8-15 a.m. on the 25th August and was informed by the Chairman of the situation in order to make necessary arrangements for the colony.

4.18 The Chairman made necessary arrangements for the feeding etc. of the evacuees at the Artisan Hostel.

4.19 At about 10 a.m. on the 25th August he ordered the closing of the factory on getting information from the General Manager of HMBP that some persons had been sharpening mild steel rods in the plant.

4.20 At the closing of the factory the employees leaving the factory were searched especially because of the possibility of their carrying any sharpened rods. Only one person was found to have in his possession one such rod. In addition, one sharpened rod was found in the HMBP plant by the Deputy General Manager and the Senior Security Inspector on the 25th August. It was thereafter that a report was made to the General Manager who then contacted the Chairman.

4.21 The allegation that weapons were manufactured in the plant on the 24th August, that the gate was opened at about 11-30 a.m. instead of the usual time of 2-30 p.m. and that the persons leaving the premises were not searched at the gate, does not appear to be correct, as the manufacture of the weapons on a large scale in any of the plants—FFP or HMBP—would not go undetected and unreported when the workers are many and belong to different communities and parts of the country. The gates are opened at the lunch interval. There are three such intervals, one in connection with each of the shifts. The intervals are 10-30 a.m. to 11 a.m. for 'A' shift, 12 noon to 1 p.m. for the second shift, i.e., 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., and 7 p.m. to 7-30 p.m. for the 'G' shift.

4.22 The interval for the Foundry Forge Plant for the morning shift starting at 6 a.m. is from 11 to 12 O'clock and for the general shift from 1 to 2 p.m.

4.23 The records of absentees do not show any absentee after the meal hours of the morning shift on the 24th August in H.M.B.P. or in F.F.P. as well. No report was made of any collection of weapons at the F.F.P. The allegation that a number of workers left with weapons at the opening of the Gate at 11-30 a.m. on the 24th August cannot be accepted.

4.24 The Hindu workers in the HMBP might have thought of sharpening rods on the 25th morning when practically no Muslim worker attended the plant and even then the attempt was noticed and reported. It appears that advantage has been taken of the fact of recovery of some sharpened rod, on the 25th morning in building up the story of weapons being made on the 24th of August, and people leaving the factory in large numbers at about 11-30 a.m. No complaint in this regard appears to have been made to the Chairman or any other authority as would be normally expected if the allegation that weapons were made in the plants on the 24th August and were carried away by the workers had been true.

4.25 A scrutiny of the sequence of incidents prepared by the D.I.G., C.I.D., shows that the disturbances started at Hatia at about 4 p.m. on the 24th August and the localities most affected were Sector II and Dhurwa area. The incidents could not be promptly reported to the police and most of the dead bodies were found either during the evacuation proceedings or subsequently.

4.26 The Police available at Hatia on the evening of 24th August was far from adequate and could not have possibly coped with the disturbed condition even if it had full information of what was

taking place within the colony though it could have conveyed the situation to the officers in Ranchi for reinforcement.

4.27 Of the 23 cases mentioned as having taken place on the 24th August, the cases of murder were 12, out of which 3 cases were in Tiril Ashram area, 5 in Sector II and the rest in different places around Police Station Hatia. In these incidents, 26 persons, 25 Muslims and one Hindu were killed.

4.28 According to D.I.G., C.I.D's report on the 25th August 18 cases occurred, of which 7 cases were murder cases. 9 persons were killed in one house (B-2344, Sector II, Site IV) during the night between the 24th and 25th August, 7 persons were killed in another incident in DT quarter No. 1606 at about midnight on the 25th of August and 2 persons were killed on the evening of the 25th August in quarter No. B-72 in Sector I. One person was killed in DT quarter No. 1969 and another near quarter No. B.55, Sector I. One person was killed in an open field west of Latma Hill. Three persons were reported to have been murdered near BBJ Colony in Aam Bagan area but the bodies could not be traced.

4.29 On the 26th August a case of triple murder took place in a DT quarter near Latma Water Tower. 17 dead bodies—3 Hindus and 14 Muslims—however, were recovered from different places including the hospital. Besides 2 cases of arson with looting and one case of looting took place.

4.30 A large number of cases of looting of Muslim quarters were reported. They were, however, booked in 14 cases for purposes of investigation.

4.31 On the 27th August one stabbing case took place. The victim died in the Hospital.

4.32 Four Muslim dead bodies were recovered on the same day, three from the Hospital and one from the road in front of quarter No. B.2024 in Sector II. One dead body of a Hindu was found at the Railway Station, Hatia. 30 cases of burglaries were reported on this day.

4.33 On 28th August, 11 burglaries were reported which included one case of Doranda area. 5 Muslim dead bodies and 3 Hindu dead bodies were found on the 28th August. These deaths had taken place some time between 24th and 28th August.

4.34 The report of the Dy. S.P., Central Intelligence Bureau (Ministry of Home Affairs) to the Government of India, dated 29th August states "Barring a stray stabbing case resulting in the death of a Muslim on the morning of August 28, no other incident was reported during the day." There is oral evidence said to be based on F.I.R. lodged with the police of such an incident, but there is no such report lodged with the local police and the fact does not appear to have come to its notice or to the notice of the local authorities.

4.35 On 29th August one dead body was found in quarter No. B.610 in Sector II. One person was arrested on this day in possession of stolen property. 3 burglaries were reported.

4.36 On the 1st September 3 skeletons were found in the bed of Hatia Dam; two of the skeletons could be connected with persons deceased.

4.37 A datewise statement of the persons dead, persons injured and of arson and looting cases is in Annexure XII.

4.38 The various places from where dead bodies were recovered are noted in Annexure XIII.

4.39 The FIRs of the various incidents were sent to Sadar Police Station for registration though the statements of the complainants were recorded by the staff of the Hatia Police Station.

4.40 The figures for the deaths show that mostly the murders were committed on the 24th and 25th August, though quite a good number of dead bodies were recovered on the 26th and 27th August.

#### **Firing of Nausera**

4.41 The military had to fire at Nausera on the night of 26th August, 1967, and caused one death. The events relating to this incident were deposed by the Chairman, H.E.C., Shri Basir Ali, Shri S.P. Sinha, Magistrate, Lt. Shahane and Shri A. K. Banerji, Additional Collector.

4.42 At about 3 p.m. on the 26th August, great commotion took place in Sector II and the rumour went round that some attack had taken place by Nausera Muslims on the Hindus in Sector II. The Chairman, H.E.C., proceeded there and found the residents of Sector II standing at their doors. The alleged Nausera people were nowhere to be seen. In the meantime two military trucks came there. The Chairman told them of the rumours, sent one of the trucks to make a round of the colony and with one person from that Sector and the military truck he went to village Nausera about three miles away.

4.43 At Nausera he found a meeting of Muslims and Hindus in progress for the formation of a Peace Committee. People of both the communities told him of their apprehension of an attack from the Hindus of Sector II. He assured them that nothing of the kind would be done. Then those people asked him to request the military to take a round of the village at night. He promised to arrange it. He returned to Sector II and explained to the people there what he had done at Nausera.

4.44 At about 8-15 that night he told Brig. Manohar Singh who had gone to his house what had been done at Nausera and asked him to send the military to patrol that village.

4.45 Shri Basir Ali spoke of the formation of the Peace Committee and the visit of the Chairman to his village. He was one of the persons who were arrested by the Home Guards. He and three other

persons were taken on a vehicle to Jagannathpur and were later dropped at the Artisan Hostel.

4.46 On the 26th August at about 8-30 p.m. Lt. Shahane was asked to go to Sector II for patrolling as there was commotion there. He proceeded there with 11 men on a jeep. Shri S. P. Sinha, magistrate, accompanied the party. Lt. Shahane has deposed to the following effect.

4.47 On the way he met 4 Home Guards on a vehicle. They had 4 persons with them. On inquiry they told him that they had found the four civilians armed with knives, swords and spears in Nausera village. On his inquiry those persons replied that they were just looking for their relations and were arrested by the Home Guards. This was denied by the Home Guards Inspector who further told him that they were arrested when running to attack a person Lal Sahib and that Lt. Shahane would have to go to Jagannathpur where Lal Sahib was, as Lal Sahib's life was in danger. Lt. Shahane then directed the Inspector to go to their military camp at the Artisan Hostel to hand over the civilians there and to get a further section of troops in that vehicle sent to Jagannathpur and he himself with his men walked to that place. He was informed by Lal Sahib that two or three families from Nausera had come near Tiril Ashram and that they had to be brought from there to Jagannathpur.

4.48 Lt. Shahane proceeded to that village and met a police jeep coming from Nausera village. On being questioned the police people told him that there was a mob of 200 or 300 persons at Nausera village and that the situation was much worse there. He asked the police party to accompany him. Proceeding further he met another jeep in which there were a Magistrate and a Police Officer and two policemen. He asked that Magistrate and the party to accompany him. The party then left for Nausera village.

4.49 Lt. Shahane found the barrier down at the railway crossing. After looking up the Idgah near the railway crossing to see whether anyone was there and also the chowki of the gate-keeper who was not there, the barrier was lifted and the vehicles passed to the other side. There were four vehicles, two of them police vehicles and two military. They did not notice any crowd on the other side of the railway line.

4.50 They reached a hut after the first gradient. As soon as the first policeman entered the hut, 2 or 3 shots were fired from the Nausera village side and there came loud shouts of 'Gherao' and 'Maro' from a crowd of 500 or 600 people, as estimated from the depth and volume of the shout.

4.51 The village Nausera has got houses on both sides of the road and the road is sufficiently wide. Sounds also came from the other side of the raised mound to the right of these vehicles.

4.52 Lt. Shahane then asked the driver to reverse the vehicle and told his men to take defensive position around them. The moment they began to turn, people in the crowd were noticed advancing

from a distance of 200 to 300 yards and fired five or six shots. Lt. Shahane then took the permission of the magistrate to fire on the advancing people and ordered his men to fire. The mob then spread out. Sounds came from the maize fields behind the huts near which their vehicles were parking.

4.53 In the meantime he learnt that the railway gate had been closed and tied by wires. He ordered his men to open it. The mob continued to advance towards them. He then ordered the second firing. When the gate opened, the military moved towards the Jagannathpur temple and took its position behind the searchlight of the Electricity Board. Noticing the mob continuing to advance, he ordered the third firing when they came within the area lighted by flood light. Thereafter the mob did not advance any further and after waiting there for some time, Lt. Shahane and his party returned to Sector II from where shouts were heard. In all, 65 shots were fired.

4.54 The statement of Shri Sinha magistrate is practically the same as that of Lt. Shahane though not so complete. Both in his report submitted to the Additional Collector Shri Banerji and in his statement before the Commission, no reference was made to that portion of the incident which relates to the Home Guards bringing a few persons under arrest and their telling Lt. Shahane of the circumstances of their arrest. The report which Shri Banerji submitted to the Deputy Commissioner appears to refer to that incident, but it seems to have confused the arrest of the persons by the Home Guards as arrest by the military patrol party which ultimately had fired. These variations do not affect the main incident of firing.

4.55 On the 27th August morning Shri U.C. Prasad and a Sub-Inspector of Police were sent to village Nausera to find out the casualties as a result of the firing. They could find only one dead body there. No report had been lodged by anyone in the village about injury due to firing.

4.56 The incident illustrates the result of apprehensions entertained by people on the basis of rumours. Nausera people appeared to have thought that the military party approaching their village at night were the Hindus of Sector II and fired from their side to keep them away. The military party thought that the Nausera people were on the war-path and were attacking them and so fired in self-defence. The misunderstanding could not be cleared on account of pitch darkness at the time. The only light was from the head lamps of the vehicles.

## CHAPTER V

### STEPS TAKEN

#### A—Ranchi

5.1 The sanctioned district police has 'striking reserve' of 10 Havildars, 5 Naiks and 135 Constables. Most of the striking reserve were deputed on regular duties and, therefore, two Companies of Bihar Military Police were sanctioned for the district. They were BMP-V and BMP-II. Of the striking reserve, available force for law and order duty on the 22nd August consisted of 10 Havildars, 5 Naiks and 22 Constables. Of the total strength of BMP-V—1 Subedar, 1 Jamadar, 6 Havildars, 3 Naiks, 3 Lance Naiks and 84 Constables—only 1 Subedar, 1 Havildar, one Naik and 23 Constables were available for law and order duty, the rest being deputed on other duties. Of the total strength of BMP-II—1 Subedar, 1 Jamadar, 6 Havildars, 3 Naiks, 3 Lance Naiks and 90 Constables—the available force was 1 Havildar, 1 Naik and 25 Constables. Thus, the total available force from the striking reserve and the two Companies on 22nd August 1967 consisted of 7 Havildars, 4 Naiks and 70 Constables—even less than the sanctioned striking reserve. The deployment of the striking reserve and the Company of BMP-V and the Company of BMP-II is given in Annexure XIV. In view of regular demands on these forces, one BMP Gurkha Battalion was earmarked for the district. This was called up and only 10 Havildars and 67 Constables were further available from it. Thus, the total force available was 17 Havildars, 4 Naiks and 137 Constables—practically equivalent to the normal striking reserve. 30 Constables were withdrawn from the various T.O.Ps, Ranchi and were deployed to escort the procession of boys. This force was subsequently utilised for law and order as well. The entire deployment of force on law and order duty on the 22nd August is shown in Annexure XV. The deployment chart shows that the forces deployed on the 22nd August consisted of 19 Officers, 35 JCOs and 284 men. These included 17 Officers, 4 JCOs and 167 men deputed from midday onward that day. The additional force of 3 officers and 3 men for H.S.L. Colony and of 11 JCOs and 71 men for patrolling from about midnight must have been withdrawn from the forces otherwise deputed.

5.2 It may be mentioned here that the police posted in connection with the procession of boys consisted of the posting of the armed pickets at Rattan Talkies and Urdu Library and a lathi picket at Dr. Quddu's Dispensary. The lathi picket at the Deputy Commissioner's Chamber and the lathi and the armed pickets at the Chief Minister's residence were on account of the programme of the proposed procession to go there to deliver their memorandum. The procession escort was posted, to start with, at the Firayalal Chauk in connection with the visit of the Chief Minister. It was, however, free to escort the procession at the time it was taken out.

5.3 When the trouble started at the Azad High School the force available with the Superintendent of Police consisted of three platoons, i.e. of about 90 people. Subsequent to 4 p.m. some of these forces were being sent to the places from where reports of incidents were being received at the Kotwali. How they were all utilised cannot be said with any definiteness as there is no record available. The police log book, which was started some time about 6 p.m. on the 22nd August and was maintained up to 1.15 a.m. on the 23rd August is not available. It is said to have been lost during the confusion at the Kotwali on account of the presence of the crowd that day. The entries in the station diary are very meagre and do not refer to any deputation of police parties.

5.4 The arrangements made to deal with the law and order situation arising out of the taking out of the procession cannot be said to be as complete as they should have been in view of the possibility of communal clash as a result of the taking out of the procession.

5.5 The emergency scheme prepared in 1965 provided for 15 armed pickets in different portions of the city in addition to the 10 pickets for the protection of vital installations, and the city of Ranchi and the township of Hatia were divided into six zones for patrolling. Even the arrangements made on 29th March, 1967, provided for 5 armed static pickets with magistrates and 4 mobile patrol parties, consisting of magistrate and armed force of the strength of 1(4). It seems to be the minimum arrangement considered adequate to control the situation if it turns out to be disturbed.

5.6 There was no armed picket in Hindpiri area or the Karbala area or the Upper Bazar area or the Piyadatoli area, the areas which were mainly affected on the evening of the 22nd August.

5.7 The paucity of armed pickets need not necessarily have been due to the paucity of the armed police force available, but if so, then extra police force should have been arranged. Unfortunately the two armed pickets with magistrates at Rattan Talkies and Urdu Library proved ineffective. The former picket failed to notice or ignored the collection of people at the mouth of the Central Hindpiri Street and the Konka Road, very close to its position in front of the Rattan Talkies. The picket should have been vigilant enough and it should have persuaded the people not to collect there when the procession was moving in that area and could reach that place at any moment. Later, this picket was immobilised on account of the attack on it with explosives. Of the picket, the Havildar and one Constable got injured in the attack.

5.8 The magistrate and the armed picket at the Urdu Library left the place of duty without any orders from superior officers and went to the Kotwali at about 7.45 p.m. when that area was in the midst of disturbances and several cases of arson, stabbing and looting had taken place in that area.

5.9 The military commenced arriving from about 7 p.m. and patrol parties were sent out at about 8.30 p.m. This means that no action could be taken by the police to maintain law and order in the

disturbed areas except at the Azad High School and the police, wherever it was posted, did not apparently take any such action against mischief makers which could deter the people from carrying on their nefarious activities. On the other hand, the general impression had been that either there was no police force available to deal with the mischief makers or it had directions not to act.

5.10 Section 144 of Cr. P. C. order was passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer at about 4-30 p.m. when he went to the Kotwali after his first round of dealing with the situation at the Azad High School. The District Magistrate was in difficulties to contact his officers as a result of the disturbances at about 4-30 p.m., the time when the offices closed and the officers and the staff had gone back to their houses. Steps were taken to contact the officers, call them and direct them to report to Kotwali. Shri A. K. Banerjee, Additional Collector, was informed on telephone at 6 p.m. to proceed to the Kotwali and take certain other magistrates with him. The District Magistrate also requisitioned the services of the officers under training at the Administrative Training School and other officers available in the district. The officers deputed on duty, having no magisterial powers, were conferred magisterial powers by the Government. The various deputations of the executive officers made by the District Magistrate between 22nd and 25th August are given in Annexure XVI. Annexure XVII gives the number of additional officers and men of all categories deputed to Ranchi during the disturbances.

5.11 The order imposing curfew was passed at about 6 O'clock. The announcement of the order, however, commenced much later. The announcement of 144 orders was started by the Assistant Public Relations Officer between 5 p.m. and 5.30 p.m. The actual hour might have been a little later, as there was no publicity van available at the time, the driver having gone home, and the jeep provided by the Sub-Divisional Officer had to be fitted with a mike. The announcement of the curfew was commenced by the Assistant Public Relations Officer after his return to the Kotwali at about 7.30 p.m. when he was told to announce the imposition of the curfew. The curfew continued up to 12 O'clock on the 24th August and was then relaxed upto 6 p.m.

5.12 For want of force neither of the two orders could be effectively enforced. People were moving freely on the streets in small or large groups. When military patrolling started after about 8.30 p.m. people would usually make themselves scarce into the lanes and by-lanes on seeing the patrol party arriving and would again come out once the party had gone away. Such a behaviour of the people accounts mostly for the officers not noticing anyone on the road when they went round the city that night or for any party really not noticing the actual commission of any particular incident of stabbing, looting or arson.

5.13 The additional police force began to arrive at Ranchi from the 23rd August. Just as further police force was available, it was deployed. Even then no patrolling was arranged for Chutia and

Kanta Toli areas to east of the Old Hazaribagh Road. The deployment of police force from the 23rd to 25th August is shown in Annexure XVIII.

5.14 On 25th August, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order dividing the entire Ranchi town and Hatia into 10 sectors and each sector was placed under a senior executive officer. The police force for the armed pickets, patrolling duty, reserve duty and rushing party is given in Annexure XIX. This force continued to work in these sectors on the following days.

5.15 The entire military force employed during the disturbance consisted of 20 officers, 8 JCOs, 538 ORs and 9 NCsE.

5.16 It may be mentioned that the 33 Lt. Regt. (Pack) was requisitioned when the army was requested on the 23rd August to enforce the curfew order as well.

5.17 Five patrolling parties were at first organised on the 22nd August at about 8.30 p.m. One for Ratu Road, one for Hindpiri area, one for Upper Bazar, one for Karbala Chauk and one for the Main Road from Daily Market to Welfare Centre. After midnight, other patrol parties and fixed pickets were arranged. Mostly the military patrolled the vulnerable areas, namely, Upper Bazar, Ratu Road, Hindpiri and Karbala Chauk areas and the police patrolled the other areas.

5.18 The military pickets were posted at the Gonda T.O.P., at the A.I.R. Station and Upper Bazar, Taxi Stand on the Main Road, Rattan Talkies on the Main Road, at the junction of the Club Road and the Main Road, Recruiting Office, Main Road, at Hindpiri, near the Government Industrial School, on the Church Road, on the Hazaribagh Road and near Plaza Cinema. It appears that the military pickets were posted to vulnerable spots, not necessarily to any predominantly Muslim or Hindu area.

5.19 Though the incidents continued till about the 29th August, the situation came under control at Ranchi from the 24th August onward.

5.20 Details of the persons evacuated at Ranchi during the disturbances are given in Annexure XX.

#### **Arrests for violation of curfew**

5.21 354 Hindus and 594 Muslims were arrested for violating the curfew orders between 22nd and 27th August. One Hindu was released on the 28th August. The remaining arrested persons were released on the 29th and 30th August. Detailed figures are given in Annexure XXI. On the 22nd August 4 Hindus and 61 Muslims were arrested. Although these arrests are stated to have been made for violation of curfew, there might have been other reasons also for them. The comparatively larger number of Muslims arrested that day was, according to the District Magistrate, due to the arrests

being made after the death of Shadilal, the stabbing of another Hindu and an attack on the armed picket at the Rattan Talkies. It appears from the statement of Brig. Manohar Singh that 50 or 60 persons were arrested along with arms from Kasai Mohalla on the night of the 22nd August by the party consisting of himself, Commissioner and others, while they were on a round of the city. The arrests took place after a crowd of about 400 people had run away on seeing the patrolling party. When warned to come out of the houses or the houses would be searched, only two old people came out. The houses were searched and these persons were arrested. The Commissioner's note in his diary of the 22nd also mentions about the arrests of 50 people armed with swords, spikes and spears near Karbala Chauk on his round with the Brigadier.

#### **House searches**

5.22 House searches for the recovery of arms and ammunition were organised during the period of the disturbances. In all, police conducted searches of 7 Hindu and 19 Muslim houses. The searches of 7 suspicious Hindu houses produced one bhala, 3 pharsas, 2 swords and 15 lathis and the searches of 19 Muslim houses produced one sabal, 3 knives, 81 bhalas, 51 pharsas, 36 swords, 149 lathis, 12 bows, 109 arrows, 12 pipes, 11 rods, 1 gun, 21 daggers, 7 banithis, 19 hesats, 2 guptis, 2 large bombs, 40 small bombs, 1 hand grenade and some rounds of ammunition.

5.23 Annexure XXII gives the statements of the houses searched and recoveries made datewise.

#### **Indiscriminate arrests**

5.24 There had been some complaints of indiscriminate arrests during the period of the disturbances. The Commissioner has referred to such complaints. Even the Governor had to tell the Commissioner that indiscriminate arrests should be avoided (*vide* Commissioner's diary for 28-8-67).

5.25 The Deputy Commissioner has stated that the general complaint about indiscriminate arrests seemed to have arisen out of the fact of officers being sent for interrogation of persons in the houses near about which incidents had taken place and also where no information had been given of the culprits soon after the incidents had taken place. Further the people came to know that the Police Minister had given a list of persons to be arrested. There might have been cases of arrest of some persons who later on were released as there was no justification for keeping them in detention.

5.26 It appears from the statement of certain witnesses that persons having access to the Ministers gave them lists of persons suspected to be behind the disturbances, or taking part in the disturbances, for their arrests and also the list of houses to be searched. The Ministers relying on those persons appeared to have passed on those lists to the local authorities for further action which could be nothing but the follow up action of arrests and searches. In these

circumstances some arrests might have been made unjustifiably for which the local officers may not be blamed.

5.27 The Police Minister had stated:—

"I got information that some of the big people were instigating poor people to commit such incidents. I directed the authorities to investigate the matter and take legal action against such persons. I later learnt that about 5 to 7 persons were arrested."

5.28 The Chief Minister had deposed:—

"I had a list of several names. I inquired whether they had been arrested or not, but they could not give me the exact information."

5.29 Shri R. P. Sarangi, State Minister of Agriculture in the U. F. Government, happened to hear a gun fire and was pointed out the house from where the gun fire took place. He rang up the police. The police entered the house, recovered the gun and other weapons and arrested 13 persons from that house. He felt that it was necessary for the police to take all those people to the Thana.

5.30 One witness has deposed:—

"On the 26th at about 11 a.m. I went to Circuit House to meet certain Minister who had arrived there. I was known to the two Ministers, Inderdeep Singh and Chandra Shekhar Singh, Ministers from the Communist Party. They were there. I told them about the situation suggesting the arrest of the goondas and some Jan Sanghis saying that if they were arrested the disturbances would cease. I gave them a list of the persons whom I suggested to be arrested. I informed them of the names of persons from whose houses explosives could be recovered."

5.31 It is in this context, it appears, that the Commissioner impressed upon the local authorities to restrict arrests to the registered goondas and to such people against whom there was evidence of having committed some crime.

5.32 He wrote in his diary for 24th August:—

"Reminded the S.P. that arrests of registered goondas should be made and other lists given by different individuals should not be depended upon as this would be a dangerous practice. The arrests should also include those against whom there was evidence."

and again in his diary for 27th August, after repeating the same to the D.I.G. and S.P. he wrote:—

"They were asked not to make arrests on the basis of list supplied by different persons as indiscriminate arrests create more problems than solve any"

and finally he said in para. 15 of his letter to the Chief Secretary dated 28th August, 1967, that

"If lists given by individuals are believed, innocent persons may suffer, which will give a bad name to the administration."

5.33 It is difficult to record any definite finding about any alleged indiscriminate arrests on the part of the arresting party in view of our hesitation to accept the oral evidence in this regard at its face value.

### B—Hatia

5.34 The police force at the Sadar Police Station did not have anything to do with the disturbances which took place at Hatia though most of the incidents took place within its jurisdiction. The explanation is simple. The police station is far off from Hatia and the disturbances required to be promptly dealt with and were being dealt with by the police posted at Hatia Police Station and the additional police force deputed there from Ranchi. The staff at the Hatia Police Station consisted of 3 Sub-Inspectors, 3 Assistant Sub-Inspectors and 10 Constables. There are four T.O.P.s. there and each T.O.P. has its own staff of one Havildar and 8 Constables.

5.35 Shri S. N. Jha, Magistrate, was ordered to go to Hatia Police Station at 11-30 p.m. on the 23rd August. He proceeded there with one section of armed police, i.e., one Havilar, 6 armed constables and three lathi constables. He was provided with a jeep, and with a police force at his disposal, he went round the township. The T.O.P. constables were also asked to patrol their respective areas and to collect intelligence reports and pass them on to him. There was no incident on the night between the 23rd and 24th August.

5.36 At 6 p.m. on the 24th August curfew was imposed and further force arrived. It consisted of 24 armed constables, 3 NCOs and one Subedar. By that time two deaths, one near the DT quarters and the other in-between Sections II and III had been reported. The magistrate detailed the forces at Hatia. Thus, one NCO and 4 constables were deputed at Dhurwa to evacuate the Muslims from that area, one Havildar, 4 Constables and one A.S.I. were detailed to patrol the Dhurwa area, one Sub-Inspector, one Assistant Sub-Inspector, one Havildar and 4 Constables were posted at Site 5 in Sector II. They were required to patrol the Site 5 area on foot. One Sub-Inspector, one Assistant Sub-Inspector, one Head Constable and 4 Constables were deputed to patrol Site and 4 Constables were deputed to patrol Site 4 in Sector H. One Sub-Inspector, one Assistant Sub-Inspector and 4 Constables were deputed at the Artisan Hostel where the evacuees were kept. One Havildar and 6 Constables were left at the thana as reserve.

5.37 Till midnight between the 24th and 25th August, the evacuating parties found 8 dead bodies, six in one flat and one each in the other two flats. These six bodies were found in a poultry house or outhouses.

5.38 The blocks of flats in that colony are situated around enclosures with the result that parties patrolling on the main road cannot notice any collection of people in the flats.

5.39 The patrolling was intensified on the 24th night. On the morning of 25th further armed force arrived. One Sub-Inspector and 18 armed constables were posted in Hatia village itself, and one Havildar and 4 armed constables were posted at the Experts' Hostel.

5.40 Four more magistrates arrived there in the evening on the 25th.

5.41 A military party also marched through Hatia on the 25th August morning. A company of the army arrived there at about 7 p.m. on the 25th.

5.42 The deployment of forces from 26th to 29th August at Hatia was the same as given in Annexure XXIII.

5.43 Curfew was imposed in Hatia from 6 p.m. on the 24th August to 8 a.m. on the 25th August and again between the same hours on 26th and 27th of August. It was imposed from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. on the 27th August and 7 p.m. to 5 a.m. on the 28th and 29th of August. Thereafter, its duration was curtailed but it continued upto the 8th September, 1967. This curfew period was the same for the Kotwali and Doranda Police Station areas as well.

### **Rehabilitation**

5.44 Instructions were issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner, Bihar, in connection with relief and rehabilitation of persons affected by these disturbances. These instructions are contained in Annexure XXIV. On representation orders were issued to make rehabilitation grants to shopkeepers also at Rs. 200/- each.

5.45 The assessment of the losses suffered by the victims was made by 11 sector officers sectorwise and their assessments were checked by superior officers. On the basis of such assessments cash grants and in some cases loans were given. The grants were first made by the Deputy Collector in charge of rehabilitation work on the 14th September, 1967. Cases which had been left unassessed by then or which came to notice later were inquired into by the Deputy Collector in charge of rehabilitation and a number of subordinate officers. The total damage assessed came to about Rs. 14,20,000 and the various properties affected were as follows:—

78 houses affected by arson.

65 shops and business premises affected by arson.

195 houses affected by loot or damaged.

128 shops and business houses affected by loot or damaged.

Three places of worship affected by arson or damaged.

One school—Azad High School—damaged.

5.46 Instructions about loans were finalised some time in January, 1968, and since then loans amounting to Rs. 1 lakh had been distributed to 66 persons. Of these cases two have been given only a part of the loans sanctioned for want of funds and 21 more cases are now pending sanction when funds will be available. The loans are repayable in 10 instalments and carry interest at 5 $\frac{1}{4}$ %. Annexure XXV gives the details of the loans advanced.

5.47 Loans have been given to both Muslims and Hindus, but the majority are Muslims though the majority of persons getting bulk loan of Rs. 5,000/- are Hindus.

5.48 Annexure XXVI gives the break-up of grants community-wise. The total amount distributed up to 31st May, 1968 comes to Rs. 4,98,544.00.

5.49 The widows were paid maintenance grants. 31 widows were found eligible for them. Sanctions have been received in the case of 22 and the other 9 cases were being sent to the Government. The amounts of maintenance grants vary from about Rs. 40 to Rs. 125 per month. The widow of Shadilal, however, refused all grants except educational grants for children. She is prepared to accept maintenance grants provided the Government makes a special grant according to her status. The papers had been sent to the Government.

5.50 Payments of the various grants and loans were made at the houses of the persons affected. They were not required to go to any office.

5.51 The medical students of the Rajendra Medical College received Rs. 500/- per head as education grant. They were paid according to their wishes, i.e., by draft sent in the person's name or paid on his return to Ranchi. They were provided tickets for going home.

5.52 The grants were promptly made. The rehabilitation grants to artisans and persons whose residential houses had been damaged were made by 20th September, 1967. 3/4ths of the grants and loans were distributed by 31st December.

5.53 Of the 3 mosques affected by arson and damage, the grant of Rs. 2,000/- for the repair of Jama Mosque has not yet been accepted by the mosque authorities. The authorities of the other two mosques have accepted the grants.

5.54 Three relief camps were set up at Ranchi, one at the Circuit House, another at the Chief Minister's Bungalow and the third at a Minister's Residence, No. 5, Ratn Road. The expenditure on these relief camps is not included in the figures of relief and rehabilitation in Annexure XXVI. The expenditure on the relief camps has been as follows:—

	Rs.
A. Evacuation, Reception and Dispersal ..	93,800.21
B. Feeding charges in Relief Camps ..	19,333.75
C. Dispersal grant and cash doles ..	1,497.30
D. Other relief ..	6,337.00
Contingent expenditure ..	<u>18,999.00</u>
	<b>1,39,967.26</b>

5.55 Most of the expenditure for the maintenance of evacuees at the Artisan Hostel at Hatia was borne by the Heavy Engineering Corporation.

### Arrangements at the Artisan Hostel

5.56 The Artisan Hostel had been lying vacant for some time and, therefore, its water and electrical fittings were not in complete order on the night of the 24th August when the evacuees were kept in it. The electric and water supply was not actually cut off. Action was taken for the immediate restoration of the full supply of water and electricity. The electricity could be supplied from the 25th August onwards. Water supply from the tap was not sufficient for the total number of evacuees. The Artisan Hostel was built to house only 250 students and the evacuees numbered over 1,200. Arrangements for the supply of water through water tankers was made for several days. An additional pipeline was also fitted and a dozen fresh taps were fitted in the Hostel.

5.57 For the messing of the evacuees, the arrangements were not so satisfactory. Cooking vessels supplied were not adequate. Cooking bowls (degs) were obtained from the canteens to start with. It was after a fortnight that the State Government supplied them with cooking utensils. The inmates managed for serving vessels on their own.

5.58 Rice supplied was bad in quality. It was broken rice and smelt too. Ultimately arrangements were made for the supply of 'nan'. About a maund and a half of milk used to be supplied for the babies and for tea. Powdered milk was also supplied by CARE through the district authorities. All the provisions mentioned in the report (Annexure XXVII) were supplied to the camp by the H.E.C. free of cost.

5.59 The Markazi Muslim Relief Committee was formed for providing relief to the Muslims at Ranchi. Its constituent members were Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Jamiat Islami and some individuals. The evacuees were staying in 29 camps. The Christian Mission, Ramakrishna Mission and Shanti Sena people were also associated with the relief work.

5.60 The total amount of loss or damage to properties looted or burnt, according to the written statement filed on behalf of this Committee, comes to Rs. 23 lakhs and odd. According to the spokesman of the Committee the rehabilitation grants made to the riot-affected persons had been too inadequate.

5.61 The Ranchi Central Relief Committee at St. Barnabas' Hospital provided food to the various camps. This Committee received cooperation from the various relief bodies in the town and said in its report presented to the Prime Minister on the 6th September that it became in effect the coordinating committee of the various voluntary endeavours. Those cooperating agencies were—

The National Christian Council of Churches (CORAGS)

St. Xavier's College

Menonite Central Committee (Chandwa)

Muslim Central Relief Committee

Adim Jati Sewak Mandal

Gandhi Smarak Nidhi

Marwari Relief Society

Punjabi Hindu Biradari  
 Y.W.C.A.  
 Ramakrishna Mission.

The Committee has done good rehabilitation work, as appears from the note about the work done.

The Committee was successful in arranging that the people of the Markazi Committee distributed foodstuffs obtained from the Committee to the Hindus and the Ramakrishna Mission people distributed supplies to Muslims. The basic idea was that the people of one community should be of help to the people of the other community.

5.62 The Muslim students in the R.M.C. have not gone back to their rooms in the hostel. The Muslim employees of the H.E.C. have not returned to their quarters. The Muslim students demand a separate hostel or a separate wing of a hostel to themselves. In case of the allotment of a wing, the rooms not occupied by them should be allotted to the boys of the other minority communities and backward classes. The hostel should have a Muslim Superintendent. We are not in favour of any such separate allotment of accommodation to the Muslim students. The Muslim students are otherwise moving freely in the classes and hostels with the other boys of the college and their relations with the Hindu students are getting closer. The employees of the H.E.C. seem to be sticking to their resolve not to return to the allotted quarters in view of some impression that this suggestion of theirs has been agreed to in principle in oral discussion with the Central Minister concerned. In the memorandum submitted to the management of the H.E.C. on the 29th August, 1967, it is stated that the demand for a separate pocket in the H.E.C. colony exclusively for Muslim employees was not in any way an indication of the separatist tendency by the Muslim employees but was put forward keeping in view the consideration that in this way the Management could very easily safeguard the lives of the Muslim employees if any such communal frenzy erupts again in future. The memorandum impressed upon the authorities that the demand was not negotiable. We are unable to support the demand. We do not consider it either conducive to the return of harmonious relations or to ensure the protection of Muslim employees in case of any future riots any easier.

#### Medical arrangements

5.63 The injured persons went to one of the four hospitals, viz., the Sadar Hospital, Ranchi, the Rajendra Medical College and Hospital, Ranchi, St. Barnabas Hospital, Ranchi and the H.E.C. Hospital, Hatia, or were sent there by the police. 100 persons were treated at the Sadar Hospital, 26 in the out-patients department and 58 indoor patients. 16 medical students, kept in the ministers' bungalow were also classed as indoor patients. Nine dead bodies were received and were sent to the R.M.C. Hospital for post mortem examination. Of the 100 people treated, 5 died. Extra ambulance, vehicles, extra doctors and extra medical staff were secured. The patients were supplied with extra diet, fruits and milk from the hospital.

5.64 Voluntary donations in the form of milk, fruits, biscuits etc. were received from Red Cross Society and Lions Club, Ranchi.

5.65 All the medicines required for their treatment were met from the stores of the Sadar Hospital. No extra medicines had to be purchased from outside.

5.66 15 injured persons were treated at the St. Barnabas Hospital, Ranchi. All the patients were cured.

5.67 At the R.M.C. Hospital 39 persons were treated. Five patients died.

5.68 On 26th August, subsequent to the arrest of some of the students of the Rajendra Medical College, students were on strike and thereafter nurses, trainee-nurses and house surgeons struck work in sympathy with the students. The permanent medical staff, however, continued to work and there was, therefore, no adverse effect of this strike on the attention to be paid to the patients admitted to the Hospital. The striking staff resumed work from the morning of the 28th August. No complaint during the period of disturbance or later against the staff with respect to the care of the patients was received by the Superintendent of the Hospital.

5.69 19 persons were treated at the H.E.C. Hospital. Of these patients, 5 died. These patients included one Gulab Khan, driver, who is shown in the statement as discharged from the H.E.C. Hospital. As he was not an employee of the H.E.C. he was, after a stay of 15 days, in the hospital, sent to Sadar Hospital, when he was able to sit and was eating well. This was done in the ordinary course under the orders of the Chief Medical Officer and not under the direction of anyone else.

5.70 A dispensary was opened at the Artisan Hostel where the Muslim evacuees from Hatia colony were kept. The dispensary continued there till January 1968. Two doctors remained in charge of the dispensary for about two months. Thereafter, one doctor used to visit the dispensary for about two hours. Specialists also used to visit the dispensary for two hours a day up to 1st of September. Medicines were distributed free. No complaints about the medical treatment were made to the medical officers or the authorities.

#### **Investigation of cases**

5.71 Special staff was deputed to Ranchi for supervising and carrying out investigation of cases. The D.I.G., C.I.D. (Crime) and his Superintendent of Police were first deputed to supervise investigation and later on, a team of 30 officers were mobilised to deal with these investigations. These included Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors. Three Deputy Superintendents of Police were also deputed for supervisory work.

5.72 The D.I.G., C.I.D., reached Ranchi on the morning of the 28th August. By the morning of the 29th August the total number of cases registered from the beginning of the incidents in all the three police stations, viz., Kotwali, Hatia and Sadar, was 138. Besides 8 cases, one from Angoora P.S. and 7 from other unspecified T.O.Ps were also registered. The C.I.D. staff found out the place of incidents from perusal of the station diaries at the police stations and

the diaries at the Town Out-Posts as well as from local visits. The staff recorded the statements of persons making the complaints in some cases and got FIRs registered on the basis of these statements. Knowing that the registration of FIRs was being done through the C.I.D. staff, people started visiting police stations and lodging their FIRs there. Printed forms of complaints started coming in in September, 1967. The forms were, it is understood, got printed by the Markazi Relief Committee and Jamiat-i-Islamia Relief. Complaints which related to a previously registered incident were tagged with those cases.

5.73 The total number of reported cases were 494. Out of these, 51 reports were cancelled as they were duplicates. Of the remaining 443 cases, 38 cases were C.I.D. controlled cases. Investigation in these cases was done by the regular police staff but guidance and final shape in these cases were given under the direction of the C.I.D. staff. Out of these cases, charge sheets as a result of investigation have been submitted in 30 cases, final reports submitted in six cases and two cases were pending investigation.

5.74 The remaining cases were controlled by the local authorities and were investigated by the regular police like ordinary cases, though the C.I.D. staff gave general guidance.

5.75 Of the remaining 405 cases, final reports have been submitted in 380 cases, charge sheets in 23 cases and two cases are pending investigation.

5.76 192 Hindus were charge-sheeted in 46 cases and 22 Muslims have been sent up in 7 cases. 24 Hindu and 5 Muslim accused are absconding.

Annexure XXVIII gives the datewise break up of the various reported cases thanawise and the number of aggressors community-wise.

5.77 Annexure XXIX gives the details of the 443 cases offence-wise, the number of persons accused in the FIRs, those named in the investigation and those actually arrested. It also gives the details of the house searches and the property recovered.

5.78 The number of cases of murder, stabbing, loot, arson, burglaries and theft and explosives is 79, 56, 121, 75, 103 and 3 respectively. 409 Hindus and 102 Muslims were arrested during investigation. 65 items of property were recovered from 12 Hindu houses out of 409 houses searched. 45 items of property were recovered from 6 Muslim houses out of 41 houses searched.

#### **Post mortem**

5.79 Total number of persons reported killed is 184. These include 19 Hindus and 164 Muslims and one unverified. The corpses recovered were 155. The break-up of these 155 corpses is as follows. 73—65 Muslims and 8 Hindus—are from H.E.C. area and 25—23 Muslims, one Hindu and one unverified—are from other areas. 57—47

Muslims and 10 Hindus—are from Ranchi. According to the Deputy Commissioner:

"The figure of the dead find some corroboration from the calculation of the dead persons from the first information reports and also from the inquiries made by the H.E.C. authorities with respect to deaths among the families of their employees."

Dead bodies of 29 Muslims reported to have been killed during the riots could not be traced.

5.80 All the post mortem examinations of the persons who died during the disturbances were performed at the Rajendra Medical College and Hospital by Dr. R. S. Prasad. 155 post mortem examinations took place. Out of these 11 were on human skeletons and the rest on dead bodies. The break up is 12 Hindus, 11 male and one male child; 113 Muslims—75 males, 17 females, 14 male children and 8 female children (seems to be an error of one in one of the figures); underterminal 30—male 12, female 12, male children 3 and female children 3.

5.81 Sharp cutting weapons were used in 71 cases, sharp pointed weapons in 18 cases, blunt weapons in 30 cases, mixed weapons in 29 cases and weapons about which no conclusion could be drawn in 7 cases in which mostly skeletons were examined.

5.82 Dr. R. S. Prasad examined the usual external organs and found no injuries on the female organs. He also examined vagina and uterus. No foreign body was found in any case. No female body was found pregnant. Apparently there was no case of rape. He did not notice any case in which female breasts had been chopped off.

5.83 The youngest child died was 3 months old. It had one stab wound, bruise on the head and fracture of the skull. The fracture of the skull might be due to a fall. The next older child was 6 months old and had bruises on the scalp and fracture of the skull due probably to blunt weapons like lathis. It could have also been due to a fall.

5.84 Most of the stab injuries were on the chest, abdomen and liver area and appeared to have been caused from the front. Most of the sharp cutting weapon injuries were on the neck inflicted from the side.

5.85 After the post mortem examination, the bodies were kept separate communitywise so that they might be removed for disposal according to their respective religious faiths. The caste of the dead bodies was determined on a number of factors usually associated with the persons of a particular community.

5.86 Some complaint has been made of dead bodies not being made over to the claimants. The District Magistrate has deposed that bodies claimed on the mere ground of community were not

made over to the claimants and those claimed on the basis of relationship, if not already disposed of, were made over to them and that unidentified bodies were not made over to anybody. This was the right attitude. No case has been brought to our notice in which a body claimed by a relative was not delivered to him. The Muslim Inspector denied that anybody claimed any corpse and was refused.

5.87 Two Inspectors of Police, one Hindu and one Muslim, disposed of the dead bodies of the Hindus and the Muslims respectively.

5.88 The Hindu bodies were cremated with wood and kerosene oil. The bodies were wrapped in cotton sheet and burnt. No pundit for performing any rites for the dead was called and none was available.

5.89 The Muslim bodies were buried. The Inspector took them to the river Harmu side, had a large pit dug and placed the dead bodies in the pit, all the males on one side and the females on the other side. Each body was laid separately. The pit was of chest high deep. The bodies were then covered with earth. No coffin cloth was provided for the male Muslims but it was provided for the females.

5.90 Efforts to obtain maulvis to perform the necessary religious rites at the burial were made but none offered to go for the purpose. The Muslim Inspector then recited some prayers, namaaz janaza on the occasion. As for the body of the medical student, Mohd. Idris, which was buried on the 4th September, 1967 (it having been kept in the cold room of the hospital from the 24th of August to the 4th of September) the burial was done after performing complete religious rites with the help of a Muslim priest from Bariatu.

#### **Fire-fighting arrangements**

5.91 The fire-fighting arrangements at Ranchi can hardly be called adequate or efficient. Two fire engines were obtained from the H.E.C. on the night of the 22nd August. The fire brigade utilised during the disturbances could hardly control the spread of fires in time on account of paucity of water. When the 27 stalls in front of the Sadar Hospital were set on fire on the evening of the 22nd August, one fire-brigade reached there within about 15 minutes and by that time only 2 or 3 shops out of 27 had been burnt. It worked from 7 P.M. to 9-30 P.M. but proved ineffective in controlling the fire. In addition, another fire brigade unit also arrived and worked later. The fire units had to fetch water from a tank about 400 yards from those stalls. They went to fetch water in turn but still there were occasions when no fire brigade was working.

5.92 Similarly, one Inspector of Police went with a fire brigade from the Kotwali to a house which had been set on fire. The fire brigade had to fetch water from a hydrant near the Circuit House but the hydrant did not work. It then went to the Line Tank and the fire engine storage tank was filled there. By the time it returned to the spot, the shop adjacent to the burning house also caught fire.

5.93 Some better arrangements for water supply as well as an increase in the number and efficiency of fire-fighting units are indicated.

### Peace efforts

5.94 A Peace Committee was organised on the 23rd August and according to the District Magistrate it met everyday thereafter. Various leaflets appealing to the people to maintain peace, not to believe in rumours etc. were issued on behalf of the State Government, the District Magistrate and the Public Relations Department. These leaflets were distributed from 25th August onwards. These leaflets were distributed by the publicity vans in Hatia and in other villages within a radius of 12 miles from Ranchi.

5.95 One aspect of the Public Relations Department deserves some notice. The functions of the Publicity Officer are said to include his reporting the information gathered from the public to the Deputy Commissioner and to arrange publicity of things to be publicised on behalf of the authorities, but no written report was submitted by the Publicity Officer to the authorities with respect to Urdu controversy nor did he receive any material for publicity from the authorities in that connection. In both these respects there had been some shortcoming. The Public Relations Officer should have been in a position to gather information from among the communities as a result of the agitation in connection with Urdu and should have been able to convey such information to the authorities. The authorities could have used the Publicity Department to announce the action they were taking in connection with this agitation. The State Government too could have utilised its Publicity Department to propagate its considered views on the Urdu question. The failure of the authorities to use this agency appears to be due to the fact that it had no clear-cut policy on account of the differences among the constituent members of the U.F. Government.

## CHAPTER VI

### CALLING UP OF THE MILITARY TO THE CIVIL AID

6.1 At 4-30 P.M. on the 22nd August the Superintendent of Police suggested to the District Magistrate, when informing him about the situation to call the military as the communal situation might get out of hand, two incidents at Rattan Talkies and Azad High School having already taken place at a distance of one mile. The District Magistrate contacted the Administrative Commandant of the local army unit posted at Ranchi and requested him to render military aid to which he agreed. The Superintendent of Police thought of suggesting the calling out of the army in view of the brickbatting at Rattan Talkies and the mob attack at Azad High School, where the police had not succeeded in controlling the situation. In view of these two incidents and his recollection of an earlier incident of 1964 when some Muslims encircled by a mob had been killed, he thought the army would be helpful to deal with the situation.

6.2 The Administrative Commandant at Ranchi conveyed the request of the Deputy Commissioner to Brig. Manohar Singh who was Station Commander, Ranchi. He was given the message of the Deputy Commissioner to the effect that there had been serious trouble in Ranchi, the situation had got out of control and that they wanted immediate help from the army. Brig. Manohar Singh asked the Administrative Commandant to get more details of the situation from the Deputy Commissioner. Some time later, Brig. Manohar Singh could succeed in contacting the Deputy Commissioner on the phone but the Deputy Commissioner could not give him any more detail. They decided to meet at the Kotwali and assess the situation and to decide about the quantum of help that would be required.

6.3 Brig. Manohar Singh reached the Kotwali at about 6.30 P.M. and found a huge crowd there, the people shouting all sorts of slogans and complaining about the looting of their property. At 7.05 P.M. he got the following written request for military aid from the District Magistrate:—

"There have been many incidents between Hindus and Muslims since this afternoon at many places in Ranchi City. The situation is serious and Military aid is necessary. It is requested that Military aid may kindly be provided at once in aid of the civil force. The request was made on telephone to Major Mohanjit Singh at 1700 hours and again to the Brigadier at 1745."

The Superintendent of Police told him on enquiry that the whole city was in turmoil and arson, looting and stabbings were going on. He could not give details of the deployment of the three police companies at his disposal, but simply said that he had at that time two officers and about 60 constables available.

6.4 In the meantime Col. P. S. Bakshi arrived and he and the Superintendent of Police were sent out to go round the city, assess the situation, see where the trouble was and where exactly the help was required. The Superintendent of Police told them that they wanted static military pickets at Telephone Exchange, Water Supply, Civil Hospital, Power House and the Circuit House and military patrol pickets for Upper Bazar, Lower Bazar and the Refugee Camp. When they had gone the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar, the Commissioner of Chhotanagpur Division, the Police Minister Shri Ramanand Tewari, the Deputy Commissioner and Brig. Manohar Singh kept on discussing the position. Ultimately the Commissioner said that the earlier the situation was handed over to the military the better and also spoke of giving the control to the army. Brig. Manohar Singh told him that the army would do the needful if the request was put down in writing by the Commissioner. He also suggested their going to his office as he had to inform the Sub Area Commander about it. The Police Minister agreed with the Commissioner's assessment of the situation and agreed that the control be given to the army.

6.5 At Brig. Manohar Singh's office the Sub Area Commander spoke to the Commissioner on the telephone. The Commissioner made over the following note to Brig. Manohar Singh:

"I, Shri B. B. Srivastava, Commissioner, Chhotanagpur Division, do hereby hand over the control of measures to suppress disturbances in Ranchi Town to Brig. Manohar Singh, the Station Commander RANCHI, as measures taken by the Civil Police have become ineffective. I leave it entirely to the army authorities as to the quantum of troops that is required to bring the situation under control.

2. The Civil Police is placed under your command for this purpose.

3. The control may please be handed over once the situation returns to normal.

B. B. Srivastava,  
Commissioner, Chhotanagpur Division,  
22-8-67."

6.6 Later, the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, Brig. Manohar Singh and Col. Bakshi went round the city from 9 P.M. to 2.30 A.M. with two vehicles, with about 8 to 10 army sepoys and policemen and a jeep fitted with a mike and loudspeaker. It was being announced that the army had been given the control of the situation and that anybody indulging in goondabazi would be arrested. People were warned not to indulge in arson, looting and stabbing. The announcement actually being made by the Assistant Public Relations Officer was to the effect that the town had been handed over to the military and anyone coming out would be shot. One witness deposed that the S.D.O. told him that curfew was on and

the military was in charge of the city. Another witness has stated that, addressing the jawans at midnight on 22nd August, the military officers told them that the city had been put under the control of the military. One magistrate has deposed that he told the people in Hindpiri and Gwalatoli, that the military had taken charge of Ranchi town and the people who indulged in loot and murder would be shot. The Principal of the Rajendra Medical College was told at the Kotwali that the army was in charge of the whole affair and he should contact the military officer. The Principal, after waiting for some time, explained the whole position at the Rajendra Medical College to the military officer.

6.7 Handing over of control of the measures for suppression of disturbances to the army together with the placing of the police under military was taken to mean the handing over of the operational control over the city to the army.

6.8 In this connection a reference may be made to the circumstances in which the Commissioner gave the note in writing. This we have from the Sub Area Commander, Brig. K. K. Kuriyan. When the Administrative Commandant, Ranchi, told him on the phone at about 5.00 P.M. about the requisitioning of the military by the civil authorities, he was taken by surprise. He could not get any information about the situation from the Administrative Commandant, Ranchi or from the I.G. of Police at Patna whom he telephoned. He was keen to ascertain what the actual position was as there had been previous occasions, according to him, when attempts had been made to alert military in anticipation of trouble when the situation did not warrant it. It seems that he had an idea that the military had the option to refuse to comply with the request of the civil authorities for military aid.

6.9 His version of the conversation with the Commissioner on the phone is that the Commissioner told him that the situation at Ranchi was not under control, that the Police was ineffective and that he, in exercise of his powers, had handed over the control of the city to the army to bring back the situation to normal and that the Chief Minister and the Police Minister though not happy about it had ultimately agreed with the decision to hand over the control of the city to the army. He put it to the Commissioner whether they could have something in writing, stating the situation and handing over the control to the army. When the Commissioner agreed to give a note in writing to that effect, Brig. Kuriyan dictated on the phone the points to be given in writing. This means that handing over control of the measures for suppression of disturbances to the military and putting the police under the army had been mentioned by him to the Commissioner for being put in writing.

6.10 On both these points he and the Commissioner had been in error. The types of duties that the armed forces may be called upon to perform in aid of civil authorities are mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Confidential Instructions on Aid to the Civil Authorities by the Armed Forces, and one of such duties is maintenance of law and order. Paragraph 5 provides that for maintenance of law and order

and when time is short, a local civil authority may make a requisition direct to the nearest military authority located in his jurisdiction and that the local military authorities are bound to comply with such requisitions. This leaves no discretion to the military authorities not to comply with the requisition even if the requisition had been improperly made. The question of propriety or impropriety of the requisition by the civil authorities could be a matter of dealing with the appropriate authorities after the event. Of course, the military authorities could inquire about the situation in order to assess the strength of the force which they have to provide in aid of the civil authorities.

6.11 Paragraph 8 emphasises that it is essential that the machinery of the Civil Government should be maintained as long as possible and that consequently, every effort should be made by civil authorities to retain control with the civil resources at their disposal. Paragraph 9 emphasises the duty of the civil authorities to requisition military assistance if they have reason to think that a disturbance is likely to occur which would be beyond the power of the police to control. Paragraph 11 mentions that even after a disturbance has broken out, the arrival of troops upon the scene often results in an improvement of the local situation and makes it easier for the civil authorities to establish control without actually having to employ troops.

6.12 Paragraph 15 deals with control. It reads—

"The Control of measures for the suppression of disturbances should remain in the hands of the civil authority for as long as possible even if troops have been requisitioned, until Martial Law is proclaimed. The following are the exceptions to this principle:—

- (a) When a magistrate has requested the officer commanding troops to disperse an unlawful assembly [see Code of Criminal Procedure Section 130 (i)].

In such cases the control of the measures is vested in the military commander on the spot. The police officer on the spot and any police force he may have with him do not automatically come under the orders of the officer commanding troops by virtue of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure; but the circumstances will almost invariably be such as to attract the right of private defence and it is the practice, as an administrative arrangement, for the members of the police force to place themselves individually or collectively under the command of the military commander for the purpose of exercising that right. As soon as the unlawful assembly can be held to have been dispersed, the control by the military authority ceases and must be resumed by the civil authority. The question whether the unlawful assembly has, or has not, been dispersed should be decided by the magistrate, in consultation with the

military commander who has undertaken dispersal. The military commander must be satisfied that the safety of his force is not endangered by premature cessation of military action.

- (b) When any particular operation such as the clearing or searching of an area, is handed over to the control of the military authority.

In these cases the control is limited to the operation and ceases on its completion."

6.13 It is clear now that the control of measure for the suppression of disturbances must remain in the hands of civil authorities until Martial Law is proclaimed, except in the two circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) above, viz., when a magistrate has requested the officer commanding troops to disperse an unlawful assembly and when any particular operation such as clearing and searching of an area is handed over to the control of the military authority. The Commissioner's request for the army's help actually was not for any of the purposes mentioned in these two exceptional clauses of (a) and (b). He was not a magistrate and was not calling the army to disperse any particular unlawful assembly. The question of application of clause (a) can arise only when the military force is at hand and the magistrate finds its aid necessary to disperse an unlawful assembly, which the magistrate is unable to disperse without the help of the military. The unlawful assembly is not expected to continue till the army requisitioned by the magistrate happens to arrive. There was no case for the application of the exception (b) as the military was not called to clear the town of Ranchi of its residents or for searching the entire city.

6.14 Brig. Kuriyan seems to have drawn the picture as a result of his conversation with the Commissioner to the effect that it was not a question of a single mob to be dispersed but that the whole city was in the grip of mobs and the job for the army was to disperse them and prevent them from forming up again. He, therefore, thought that the circumstances would come under paragraph 15(b) of these Instructions. He, however, stated that the position pictured during the conversation was a very confused one and that he suggested the use of the word 'control' of the operation to cover up cases where magistracy might not be in a position to specify or actually point out an unlawful assembly or area to be cleared.

6.15 About the second point, of the police being put under the control of the army, Brig. Kuriyan was of opinion that the situation pictured did not permit any possibility of a discussion between the army and the police on the measures to be taken, and particularly the possibility of a discussion in respect of the action to be taken by the police was remote.

6.16 Legally the police cannot be put under the military and, therefore, no such order can be put down in writing. It is a different matter that for administrative considerations the police officers may put themselves collectively or individually under the command of the military commander for the purpose of exercising the right of

private defence, as mentioned in paragraph 15(a) of the Instructions and as explained by the Secretary to the Government of Bihar in the Political (Special) Department in his letter No. A/LCM-103/60C-14677C dated the 27th December, 1960 to all District Officers. In paragraph 3 of this letter it is said that the placing of the members of the police force individually or collectively under the command of the military commander was neither in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Police Act of 1861 nor in consonance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code but that it is considered desirable to have complete unity of purpose, which is expected to be brought about by full discussion and due respect being given by the police to the view of the military authority, because if this fails and the military assumes complete control, then it becomes a case of declaring Martial Law under which the military commander will naturally assume the supreme direction of affairs.

6.17 In the circumstances it was suggested in this letter (i) that so far as may be practicable, the employment of armed forces and civil police on the same task should be avoided and that only a clearly defined specific operation should be entrusted to the armed forces in which no police is required and (ii) that where employment of police becomes necessary in assisting the carrying out of a task which has been entrusted to a military commander, the command of the police so employed should be entrusted for that limited purpose to the military commander. It was expected that in such a situation, it would be possible for the military and the police to arrive at agreed decisions and that the police would not have any difficulty in accepting the instructions of the military commander, but such instructions were to be issued to the police after full discussions and through the officer in charge of the police forces of a senior police officer available on the spot. In case of difference of opinion between the military commander and the police, the Commissioner and the State Government should be consulted with the least possible delay.

6.18 It is also mentioned in this letter that when searches have to be conducted in a disturbed area, the work should as a rule be entrusted to the police who are empowered by law to do so and are familiar with the legal formalities to be observed. If a magistrate accompanies the search party, the combined military and police units will operate under his orders, and if not accompanied by a magistrate, the searches should be conducted by the police party, while the armed forces may cordon off the area.

6.19 The effect of the form of the written request given to the military has not been in this particular case favourable to the administration. None of the police officers happened to have a clear notion of what the order meant. The general impression had been that the police was to take orders from the military and was not to act on its own initiative. The magistracy, according to the District Magistrate, was not affected by the order in view of what he had been told by the military people, but once the control of measures to suppress the disturbances was handed over to the military, there was no more work for the magistrates to do in connection

with the dispersal of an unlawful assembly. The military had already got its direction to take steps to disperse the same unlawful assembly in order to suppress the disturbances. However, the main thing is the effect on the police employed at Ranchi during the period of the disturbances, and also the effect on the minds of the people. The people also thought, and the announcement itself said, that whole city had been made over to the military and that the military was in complete control. In fact the announcement led some person to ring up the police control that night to enquire whether Martial Law had been proclaimed. He was told that no Martial Law had been proclaimed. The only effect of the form of the written request had been to create confusion among the executive authorities about the part which they had to play in dealing with the disturbances. One witness has stated that it was announced publicly that the control had been made over to the army but the army people used to say that they were not in effective control and that they had come merely to assist the civil authorities. The civil authorities said that the army was in control. It was not clear who was really incharge of the situation. Such an attitude could not have been conducive to the efficiency of the administration in dealing with the disturbances.

6.20 The general complaint against the police not doing anything on its own when noticing persons setting fire or looting property or directing people seeking its help to the military, gives force to the view that the police felt that it could not take any initiative in any matter unless ordered by the military.

6.21 The I.G. of Police on arrival at Ranchi on 23rd August gathered that the police had the impression that the army being in control of the city, they had no initiative left and that they had to carry out the instructions they get from the military in connection with the postings of pickets and arrangements of patrolling parties. He, therefore, had a talk with the Sub Area Commander and it was agreed that the police could function in its normal manner and that the army had come to aid the civil authorities. This reply he got from the Sub Area Commander when he put a direct question to him as to whether the army had taken complete control over the city. He then told his officers the real position and directed them to arrange their pickets and patrolling parties in areas where the army had not posted their own pickets and arrange for the patrolling according to the Police Communal Emergency Scheme.

6.22 The D.I.G. of Police, Southern Range, was out of station on 22nd August and returned to Ranchi at about 9 a.m. on the 23rd August. He told the Commissioner on the 24th August that now that he was back, there should be some arrangements for the working of the police and the military and that the police should be put on their feet. A meeting was accordingly called that evening. At the meeting that evening Brig. Kuriyan suggested withdrawal of the army as the D.I.G. of Poice was back. The D.I.G. of Police, however, suggested that the army should not withdraw as people had a lot of confidence in it. What he proposed was that the police should do the searching, arresting and checking of curfew passes and the army should do the picketing and patrolling. The Army

agreed to his suggestion about giving back the operational control to the police and coming only to the aid of the civil authorities. The D.I.G. of Police, Southern Range, also stated that when the army had taken over operational control it was not necessary for magistrates to accompany army on patrol. The magistrates accompanied the army parties possibly to let the army have orders of the magistrates for firing, if necessary. Similarly, it was not necessary for the police patrol to accompany army parties. Police parties were also deputed by the army authorities.

6.23 At the meeting the army made over the control *de facto* but did so in writing only on the 25th morning. This was deposited by both Brig. Manohar Singh and Brig. Kuriyan. The statement of the D.I.G. of Police supports it. The District Magistrate, however, said that he did not know of the handing back of the control by the military till about the middle of September and that also through a letter from Brig. Manohar Singh of the 11th September. He said that he was not aware of the police being told on the 25th of August that the situation was no longer under the control of the military and further stated that the police continued to operate in the same way as before upto the 25th August. We can only infer a lack of coordination between local senior officers.

6.24 No mention of the making over of the control by the military to the civil authorities is to be found in the Commissioner's letter dated the 28th of August to the Chief Secretary or in the diary of the 24th August maintained by the Commissioner. On the other hand item (d) of paragraph 25 of the letter dated the 28th August states :

"I had taken the immediate initiative in utilising the services of the army in aid of the civil authorities. I shall be grateful for your advice as to when the army should be allowed to withdraw leaving the civil authorities to deal with the situation."

6.25 Of course, the advice sought was in respect of the withdrawal of the army, but the expression "leaving the civil authorities to deal with the situation" can lead to the inference that the military was to deal with the situation so long as it was not withdrawn and that the civil authorities were not to deal with the situation.

6.26 All this history about the calling of the military and making over the control to it, led to a lot of confusion in the actual working of the civil authorities during the disturbances. It is to be regretted that such a confusion should have arisen even though the State Government had been in a way forewarned about such a situation arising by the previous Deputy Commissioner in 1964. The Government did not appear to have realised the significance of the question raised by him and left the question undecided. In his letter No. 1844/C dated 11th September, 1964, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, stated after referring to the provisions for requisitioning the services of the army to disperse unlawful assembly, as contemplated in the Criminal Procedure Code, that the army had always been called to aid in quelling large-scale civil disturbances.

when the strength of the police was found inadequate for effectiveness in a big area and that it was the state of a temporary breakdown of the ordinary law and order machinery over large areas but there were no particular unlawful assemblies which any particular magistrate had failed to disperse.

6.27 He referred to what he understood from his military friends to have happened in Rourkela in Orissa where the civil authorities did not agree to sign that they were handing over the area to the army and the army authorities insisted that they could act only if the civil authorities handed over complete control of the area for the limited purpose of restoring order.

6.28 After expressing his view about the constitutionality of declaring Martial Law and about the matter under discussion, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, wanted the position to be examined and clarified.

6.29 He repeated the point more clearly in his letter No. 1158/C dated the 6th May, 1966. In paragraph 4 of his letter he stated:

"The other point which requires clarification is that the officers of the armed forces have an impression that as soon as a civil authority calls out armed forces for assistance the civil authority is to hand over complete charge of the situation to the army till they are able to restore normal conditions for the civil authority to function. I had pointed out that this often becomes a subject for controversies. The impression entertained by the officers of the armed forces appears to me to be erroneous. The armed forces have clearly to function under the civil authority as long as there is no martial law. There is no question of handing over of any area to the army as such, but what is involved is the readiness of the armed forces at the spot and in case of necessity they are to use force under the orders of the magistrate present or in self defence."

6.30 The State Government replied to this letter on the 13th September, 1966, directing the Deputy Commissioner that the instructions contained in State Government letter No. 14677C dated the 27th December, 1960, read with the blue booklet "Instructions on aid to the civil authorities by the armed forces" would explain the points raised in his letter under reference, and suggesting that the government might be referred to if after going through those instructions he needed any clarification on any particular point.

6.31 Thereafter the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, wrote to the Government his letter No. 3645/C dated 19th December, 1966. In this letter he repeated the point that for some reason the officers in the armed forces have an impression that when the civil authorities called them for assistance on actual breakdown of law and order, they have formally to hand over the affected area to them, that confidential instructions did not provide for such handing over but that in view of the civil authorities in Rourkela in Orissa having been made to give something in writing to satisfy the army commander, it was desirable that all officers of the armed forces were im-

pressed upon to appreciate that no formal handing over by the civil authorities were contemplated under those instructions. No reply to this letter has been given by the Government so far.

6.32 Though reference has been made to handing over the entire area to the military and not to the handing over of the control of the measures of suppressing disturbances, the idea behind the question raised is the same as in paragraph 15 of the Instructions, i.e. the control of the measures is to remain with the civil authorities till Martial Law is declared and, therefore, no question of handing over of control of the measures or of the area to the military should arise when military is called upon to aid the civil authorities. The only requisition to the military can be that it is being called to help in the maintenance of law and order, but how it would be required to help in that task would be decided later by the civil authorities. If the procedure is followed strictly, there would not be any friction or any misunderstanding between the civil authorities, the military and the people.

6.33 The military continued to aid the civil authorities at Ranchi till the 21st September, a pretty long period. It is a moot point for consideration whether the military should be used in dealing with communal or other disturbances as frequently as it appears to have been used in the recent past. It would be preferable that the State Armed Police forces be augmented to be readily available to the local police in case of such an emergency. It is for the State to maintain law and order and it has to maintain requisite forces for the purpose. If, for some reason, the State does not shoulder the responsibility, the Central Government has to undertake it and should augment the Central Reserve Police to make it available to the States in case of such emergencies. Such a force may take longer time to reach the place of disturbances and may not be as effective as the State Armed Police force could be. Frequent use of the army, and occasionally for long periods, may lead to undesirable consequences. The forces necessarily have to come more in contact with the civil population and are liable to evoke complaints from the people. Complaints have been made against the military operating in Ranchi and Hatia. The complaints made to the military authorities, on investigation by them, were not substantiated. But the very fact that the people complained against the military would tend to undermine their morale.

## PART II

### CHAPTER I

#### WHETHER THE DISTURBANCES WERE PREPLANNED OR NOT

1.1 The question whether the communal disturbances were pre-planned by any person or party may be answered in the negative in the light of the preponderance of evidence before the Commission despite the fact that from the very start public statements of political leaders, directly or indirectly, expressed the view that the disturbances were preplanned and organised. Such statements have been much exploited by the people in their comments in the papers and had been used in support of their versions submitted to the Commission.

1.2 In this connection reference may be made to the press statement issued by the Government of Bihar on the 24th of August that a faction of the Congress had a hand in provoking such incidents as were recently witnessed in Ranchi for political ends. This was naturally denied by the Congress people. The Home Minister on his visit to Ranchi on the 29th August is also reported to have said that the disturbances appear to be pre-planned and organised.

1.3 Coming to the evidence, one of the Ministers of the U. F. Government said:

"I do not think that the disturbances at Ranchi had been pre-planned.

The reason why a simple anti-Urdu procession and its brick-batting could lead to such large scale disturbances may be that the general feeling among the people with regard to attacks on others or inflicting pain on others including women and children does not evoke the same feeling of revulsion or reluctance as was the case in the past. Most of the incidents in these disturbances were not the result of mob actions as used to be the case with riots in previous times but were of cases where people attacked others while asleep or women and children or taking them unawares and attacking.

The general communal atmosphere has been developing to such an extent that even a small incident could flare up a communal disturbance. Such an atmosphere has been developing since the 1962 elections and one of the reasons can be traced to the ballot paper. Such an atmosphere has to be checked not only by Government but by all the political parties. The people of various communities have

to be made to feel that they belong to one country and that they have to live together. Any feeling in one community about the other being a foreigner has to go."

1.4 Another Minister of the U. F. Government, though not stating directly that the disturbances were preplanned or organised, would appear to have considered from the circumstances that possibly the persons interested in toppling the U.F. Ministry might have engineered the disturbances, though further statements would tend to indicate that the disturbances flared up on account of the persisting distrust between the communities. He states:—

"Some factors which give rise to such communal incidents seem to be the great distrust between members of the two communities, the belief of the Hindu community about the Muslims getting explosives etc. from Pakistan and the reaction to violent incidents happening in Pakistan. The 1964 riots were a reaction to the happening in East Pakistan.

We politicians would like to do anything which would support us and our party and the parties founded on religion, Hindu or Muslim or other, would like to raise such issues which would help them in securing the support of the people. Newspapers carried on propaganda and reports vigorously but no action could be taken against them as politicians have to approach them for support. In spite of any amount of police and army it seems that such incidents can take place when there is mutual distrust between persons living side by side."

1.5 Another Minister of the former Bihar Government who had also expressed in the papers that the disturbances were created by the communists, another constituent of the U. F. Government, stated:—

— "This (the aforesaid statement) was based on the information gathered by me and my observation of the atmosphere of Ranchi and other places like Sursand.

One factor accountable for communal tension is the attitude and activities of the political parties in the sense that they have to secure the votes of any group or community and, therefore, their activities are directed to win the support of such groups or communities on a particular occasion. When a communal disturbance takes place, the other political parties blame the Jan Sangh. Naturally the Jan Sangh has then to clear itself like other parties, and save its prestige and blame the other political parties in the field. The Communist Party specially, which intends to create chaos and tension, does encourage such activities. The Communist Party feels that its strong rival is the Jan Sangh and, therefore, after having encouraged some communal disturbances, it blames the Jan Sangh.

The statement made on behalf of the Government by the Chief Minister that a faction of the Congress was responsible for disturbances at Ranchi was based on the consideration of the facts that Congressmen moved a non-official resolution for making Urdu the second official language of the State and Vijay Ranjan, a Congressman, had arranged the procession at Ranchi and it was thought that the resolution would precipitate matters, as the parties within the United Front Government were divided on this item of the programme of making Urdu the second official language of the State. The non-official resolution could have been moved only if all the parties had agreed. My own reading of the position seems to be that it may be that the Congress might have taken the risk, having anticipated, of commission of the riots on the 22nd August, but it could not anticipate riots of the scale which actually took place and that it was the Communist Party which was responsible for the widespread disturbances in Ranchi."

1.6 Another witness stated:—

"On the whole I think that the riots of 22nd August were not preplanned in the sense that anybody had determined that riots should be committed on the 22nd August and they worked for it.....

The riots just erupted and developed on account of the hesitant action and confused thinking of the authorities."

1.7 Another witness said:—

"The withdrawal of a number of cases against students even in connection with the robbing of the Post Office etc. and the withdrawal of cases relating to lawlessness during the election campaign mostly by the non-Congress parties and their supporters gave an encouragement to lawlessness of which one of the symptoms happened to be communal disturbances also."

1.8 Another witness stated that the riots were not exclusively communal riots but were the results of some parties obviously working to create trouble. The faction of discontented Congressmen were interested in creating difficulties for the U.F. Government. The Jan Sangh, a constituent of the Government, was itself interested in creating difficulties for the government. The indifferent attitude of the police was due to the judicial inquiries ordered by the U.F. Government in certain incidents. During the disturbances some business people also took part in the riots.

1.9 None of these grounds appears to be sound for holding the view that the riots had been worked up by the parties mentioned by the witness.

1.10 Another witness representing a party stated that the disturbances were not preplanned by anybody but the riots broke out all of a sudden mainly on account of the communal tension which had been gathering strength for some time past and also on account of the inactivity of the police to take action in certain situations.

1.11 Needless to say that there was no information with the local authorities that there was any plan to create disturbances on the 22nd August. The District Magistrate has stated:—

“According to my information, there was no organised attempt by any political party to create communal disturbances. I am, however, of opinion that once the riots started, political parties might have taken advantage of the situation.”

1.12 The mere fact that many incidents took place at about the same time on the 22nd August in different parts of the city is no sure index of the incidents having been preplanned. Both the communities were concerned in the incidents. Preplanning of the disturbances is presumed to be by one of the parties and it is in that sense that the aggrieved party alleges the disturbances to be preplanned.

1.13 The fact that schools were open on the 22nd August and small children of both the communities joined the classes, tends to support the view that no community had preplanned the disturbances. Muslim boys attended Azad High School and Hindu boys attended other schools including Gurudutt Mandali High School. Even the Hindu girls attended the Balika Vidyalaya.

1.14 The news of brickbatting of the processionists by the Muslims of Hindpiri reached the Upper Bazar when the boys reached there and the boys began to brickbat the Azad High School. The people who had brickbatted the procession must have continued in an excited mood and the news of the brickbatting of the Azad High School further instigated them to carry on their disturbing acts. We are definitely of the opinion that the disturbances in Ranchi were not preplanned and that they developed out of the incident of the brickbatting and subsequent events. The disturbances became general throughout the city after the death of Shadilal, a refugee, who had made himself prominent as a spokesman of the Hindus, specially during the incident on the 29th March, 1967 between the Hindu students and the Muslim Taxi drivers.

1.15 An allegation has been made that the incidents at Hatia were organised and planned by the members of the R.S.S. and Jan Sangh. There is no evidence about any such general organised attacks by the members of these bodies forthcoming though allegations had been made of private meetings at certain places at the houses of certain persons said to be associated with R.S.S. and Jan Sangh. Even if it is true, private meetings at certain places would not suffice to establish the allegations against these organisations.

1.16 Two witnesses deposed about previous information of the organised attacks. One stated that he was informed about a decision at a meeting that the work of assaulting Muslims would start at 6.30 p.m. on the 24th August. He did not convey the information to the Police; though he states to have gone to Hatia thana to convey the information of this decision of the R.S.S. to the Officer-in-charge, but he was not there. Still he could have informed the Head Constable or the person than in charge of the thana.

1.17 Another witness deposed about his being told by a butcher who came running with his family at about mid-day, that his Hindu servant had advised him to leave the place immediately as trouble would start after dusk. He too did not inform any authority for want of transport to go anywhere.

1.18 We do not consider these statements sufficient to establish pre-arrangement about committing the riots when no information was conveyed to any authority and when the trouble really started much earlier, i.e., at about 3.45 p.m.

1.19 It is true that members of families of Muslims had been killed inside their houses but considering that the houses were scattered and that such murders took place in about a dozen houses, it would hardly support the allegation. A preplanned and organised murderous attack on members of the other community would have firstly started at the prefixed time and could be expected to have led to many more incidents simultaneously.

1.20 A witness had deposed:—

"The Hindus in general of the H.E.C., were not inclined to take any steps against the Muslims of the H.E.C. Colony on the ground that the Ranchi events did not concern them. On the 24th morning rumours were afloat that Muslims of Site 5, Sector II, had killed some Hindus."

He further stated:—

"Relations between Hindus and Muslims were quite cordial till the 22nd August, as already stated. But the Muslims used to think that what happened in 1964 might recur at any time.

Such communal incidents can take place all of a sudden because certain people are telling the youth that Muslims as a class are not bad and that there are good people among them too. That makes such people think that their particular friends are good people and the rest of the Muslims are bad. Therefore, when any such occasion arises, troubles start."

1.21 These statements tend to support our view that though relations between the two communities continued to be good, yet distrust existed and that the incidents at Hatia took place not as a result of organised plan but as a result of feelings getting agitated on hearing rumours about what happened at Ranchi. All the same the possibility of some groups working against the minority community in Hatia after the happenings in Ranchi on the 22nd August cannot be ruled out.

## PART III

### CHAPTER II

#### CAUSES

2.1 The disturbances at Ranchi have, as usual, been called communal disturbances. They can be so called as some members of one community acted aggressively against certain members of the other community without any particular personal animosity. Their aggressiveness was only due to the fact that they belonged to different communities. It would be wrong to suppose that the entire community or most of the members of one community took aggressive action against the entire community or most of the members of the other community. There had been instances of members of one community giving protection to members of the other community. The number of actual culprits and victims in the disturbances would be a very small proportion of each community. This is clear from the figures of the persons adversely affected in the different incidents of the disturbances; as given in Annexure XXIX. The total number of incidents reported is 443; the number of Hindus accused in the FIRS is 387 and Muslims 26. The number of accused persons named during investigation is 305 Hindus and 208 Muslims. Thus at most 692 Hindus and 234 Muslims were named, and making allowance for other unknown culprits the figures may even be doubled. According to the Census of 1961, the population of Ranchi-Doranda town group is 140,253 out of which, 92,553 are Hindus and 27,546 are Muslims; of Ranchi Municipality 122,416 out of which 79,066 are Hindus and 23,887 are Muslims; and of Khijri Anchal (which included village Hatia thana No. 248) 79,984 out of which 67,748 are Hindus and 1,627 are Muslims. The number of persons who got excited at the happenings of the first few incidents and created a generally disturbed condition throughout the area near the Azad High School, Karbala and Hindpiri, would be larger but still the number of persons giving expression to their feelings of animosity or indulging in aggressive acts against the other community would remain a pretty low figure when compared to the entire figures of the population of each community. Most of the members of each community do not appear to have favoured the activities of the persons taking part in the incidents but could not exert themselves against the violent elements for the time being, because of the fear for their own safety and unwillingness to get involved. The number of people in each community who get agitated and excited on such occasions on account of a latent feeling of communal tension appears to be larger than the number of persons who have actual feelings of animosity merely on grounds of communal considerations.

2.2 Now we may deal with what we have called the latent feeling of communal tension amongst the people of Ranchi and Hatia which flared up on account of the news of brickbatting of the processionists by the Muslims of Hindpiri. The various small incidents which took

place in Ranchi or in villages close-by, would indicate that the feelings between the communities were such as could be inflamed by any small incident involving persons of the two different communities. Such an explosive existence of feelings must have a deeper reason.

2.3 Ranchi-Hatia had shown signs of communal tension from time to time, especially on the question of taking out of religious processions. Incidents had taken place on such occasions in the past.

2.4 In 1964 the southern part of the Ranchi district was badly affected by communal trouble on account of the harrowing tales of atrocities committed on the minority community in East Pakistan, as given out by refugees passing through Jamshedpur and Chakradhpur areas to Hindus and Adivasis who met the refugees in the special trains.

2.5 In April, 1964, serious tension developed at Ranchi on the eve of the Ram Navamy festival when the extremist section of the Mahavir Mandal Committee refused to abide by the demands of the saner sections regarding the control of Mahaviri Jhanda processions.

2.6 On April 21, 1964, a rumour was circulated that two Muslims were trying to poison the water reservoir in Hatia colony. This created panic and led to angry demonstrations before the Hatia Police Station. There were also a few minor cases of arson involving Muslim shops and assault on a few Muslims in Hatia. The rumour, however, was found to be false.

2.7 In February, 1965, some Muslims were arrested in the Hatia arson case. Some of them made confessional statements. One of the confessing accused kept in the Ranchi Jail for judicial confession was brutally assaulted. According to the judicial confessions, some officers of the Pakistan High Commission in India had advanced money for subversive acts and their hand was suspected in this incident.

2.8 Instances of minor communal tension were reported in November, 1965, from several districts including Ranchi.

2.9 These few incidents do not, however, convey a full picture of the feelings between the communities. Incidents of lawlessness which took place in Ranchi some time in 1966, and continued till August 1967, indicate that whenever there was a possibility of an incident taking communal colour, it did take that colour and created a law and order situation. Most of the incidents of lawlessness had been connected with the students who had the impression that force would not be used against them.

2.10 On the 5th October, 1966, the boys of the Zila School, Ranchi, took out an unlicensed procession and burnt the effigy of the then Chief Minister. On October 6, the students of Ranchi College, Moradabadi, indulged in various acts of violence. The police used tear-gas and lathi-charged the mob to save the College authorities. On January 2, 1967, the boys of the Ranchi College, took out an

unlicensed procession and on January 3, 1967, the boys of the St. Xavier's College took out another unlicensed procession. It was joined by the boys of the other schools including the Marwari School and the Zila School. The procession turned violent. The students were lathi-charged and tear-gassed.

2.11 The student trouble continued. In the meantime there was firing at Patna and institutions were closed, and the schools and colleges opened on the 1st March, 1967, after the General Election of 1967 in which the Congress Party lost its majority among the elected members of the legislature. The victory of the other parties was taken to be the victory of the students and the students of Ranchi College again took out an unlicensed procession on the 1st March, 1967.

2.12 Between the 1st March and 29th March, 1967, eight incidents of lawlessness on the part of the students of Ranchi, both of schools and colleges, took place. On the 29th March, the incident between the students and a taxi driver took a communal turn.

2.13 The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, had doubts about effective measures to be taken to maintain law and order. He could not have said so in his correspondence with the higher authorities but the doubt clearly grew out of the policy statements of the United Front Government.

2.14 On the 29th March some 7 or 8 students assaulted a taxi Khalasi with whom there had been some exchange of words on the 26th March. The students ran away when other taxi drivers came to the rescue of the Khalasi. The students, however, again organised themselves and armed with hockey sticks etc. launched a sudden attack on the Taxi Stand at about 1 p.m. The taxi drivers ran away with taxis, but they damaged 5 taxis and the petrol pump of M/s. K. N. Roy. The students did other acts of hooliganism and ran away on the arrival of the police under the Addl. S.P. and a Magistrate. The boys, however, reassembled in a larger number and attacked the Police. The situation was desperate as the police had moved without any armed force. The District Magistrate advised the police to withdraw. The students had to take police help, however, when they learnt that one student had been beaten by the taxi drivers and in these circumstances the police succeeded in persuading the student mob to disperse from the Taxi Stand. The District Magistrate sent a wireless message to the Special Section, Patna, on the 29th March, 1967, about the incident and concluded the message by saying:—

"Panic prevails in the city. Police helpless. Orders about use of force or otherwise to deal with the students solicited as per our reference No. 637-C dated the 10th March, 1967."

2.15 In the note accompanying his letter to Secretary to Government dated the 30th March, 1967, the District Magistrate in paragraph 9 of the note said that—

"The situation has taken a communal colour. A communal riot was averted at Ranchi only by the timely arrival of the

police..... The law and order situation is obviously rapidly getting out of control in Ranchi."

2.16 The situation took a communal turn as most of the taxi drivers were Muslims and the students were Hindus.

2.17 On the 5th July an incident took place in village Pithoria, Police Station Kankey, when some Mohammedans were assaulted by some villagers of Pithoria under the belief that those people were carrying beef. This annoyed Muslims. The Superintendent of Police and Deputy Superintendent of Police visited Pithoria on the 7th of July and looked into the matter personally in view of the possibility of the incident causing communal tension both in Ranchi and in village Pithoria and the neighbouring villages.

2.18 In July, 1967, a small incident took place at Ranchi between two persons belonging to two communities and it tended to have some communal repercussions. Two Muslims were reported to have attacked Ram Jatan Ram of Nazir Ali Lane at 11 p.m. on 9th July. The incident attracted crowds from both the communities. Immediately on receipt of information the Dy. S.P. rushed to the place, looked into the matter and arrested as many as 11 persons from both the communities.

2.19 On the 27th July a serious clash took place between the students of Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra, Ranchi, and taxi drivers who are mostly Muslims. Prompt action by the authorities controlled the situation, though it could have given rise to communal trouble.

2.20 On the 9th August, 1967, another minor incident took place of a communal nature near village Shembo, Police Station Sadar, in which some Mohamedans were assaulted by the villagers of village Baridih, as they were carrying an invalid cow upside down, which created a suspicion that the cow was being carried for the purpose of being slaughtered. The Dy. S.P. looked into the incident and the persons responsible were arrested and a police force was also deputed to maintain peace.

2.21 The anti-Urdu agitation and the activities of Vijay Ranjan were, in the circumstances, sufficient to develop into such communal tension as could lead to serious communal disturbances.

2.22 The causes of the communal tension, as given by the different persons in their written statements, can be summed up as follows:—

#### I. Partition of the Country in 1947.

- (a) Distrust of the Muslims by Hindus on account of the feeling that in the struggle for independence the Muslims betrayed them and got the country partitioned;
- (b) subsequent treatment of Hindus in Pakistan; and
- (c) suspicion of persons of the community having sympathies with or acting as spies for Pakistan or

showing leanings towards Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War.

- II. Attitude of some Muslims indicating their separatism from the majority community, e.g., movements for reservation of posts, for separate institutions etc.
- III. Differences among the constituent members of the United Front Government in Bihar in matters of policy, especially with respect to making Urdu as the second official language of the State.
- IV. The attitude of the party in the opposition to topple the United Front Government.
- V. The declaration of the policy of the administration about the action to be taken by the authorities in dealing with law and order situation.
- VI. Attitude of the R.S.S. and Jan Sangh towards the Muslims.
- VII. Local reasons, some of which have already been dealt with in connection with the immediate causes.

2.23 Of the aforesaid reasons, the ones mentioned at Nos. III, IV and V are mostly based on political considerations. Reasons III and IV account for the agitation regarding making Urdu the second official language of the State. Reason V accounts for the absence of fear of the forces of law and order in dealing with the disturbances, when they broke out. We, however, have to comment on what appears to us to be the basic reason for the feeling of communal distrust that dates from the partition days in 1947.

2.24 We are aware of the acute communal situations arising in the country for a number of years prior to partition. They were considered to be the result of the policy of the British Government—the policy of divide and rule. The communal incidents then were mostly of local significance and took place on account of some alleged local grievances, generally connected with the playing of music before mosques at prayer time, obstruction caused to the passing of Tazias by the branches of the 'peepal' or other holy trees, cow sacrifices at the time of Bakr-Id especially and on any pretext which may have come handy at the time to create some trouble. The feeling of animosity engendered on the occasion was, at the most, between local residents and once the affair was over, the parties reverted to their old relationship which, on the whole, was cordial and friendly. There was nothing of mistrust between the two communities, however much agitated they might become on some particular issue at the instance of some interested parties. In essence, there was hardly anything of religion in the dispute, which gave rise to communal disturbances in those days and it was on this account mainly that the communal disturbances were attributed to the government policy of divide and rule. The partition of the country on the basis of the Hindus and Muslims forming two nations presumed a real difference of nationality between the two communities. But the creation of Pakistan did not and could not have removed most

of the Muslim population of India to Pakistan. Whatever be the number of Indian Muslims who migrated to the newly created Pakistan, they must have been a very small proportion of the entire population. The Hindus naturally felt unhappy about the partition of the country and consequently felt a grievance against the Muslims, whose attitude during the national struggle for independence, according to them, led to the partition of the country. We are aware of different views even on the question as to which community was responsible for the partition of the country. We have no intention to enter into the controversy. Suffice it to say that the Hindus believed that the partition of the country took place on account of the attitude of the Muslims in the national struggle. That gave them a cause for grievance. Anyway, as the result of the two-nation theory propagated by the Muslim League and the subsequent creation of Pakistan the Hindus came to look upon Muslims as people belonging to the other nation even though under the Constitution of the country they are as good nationals and citizens of the country as the Hindus are. In the nature of things, quite a good number of Muslim families have relations in Pakistan. Pakistan continued to take interest in the Muslims of India and still continues to take up what it considers to be their cause. What used to be a mere local affair between Hindus and Muslims before the partition in 1947, now tended to become a matter of international importance. This feeling of distrust which appears to be the natural consequence of the partition of the country and the creation of Pakistan and its future attitude towards the Muslims of this country is not diminished by the conduct of certain people among the Muslims on occasions when they happen to shout 'Pakistan Zindabad' indicating their sympathy with Pakistan. Slogans like this may be shouted by only a few misguided Muslims but they are often taken to be the attitude of the community in general.

2.25 A witness has deposed:—

"During the Indo-Pak War in 1965 there was communal tension in the city. It was on account of the Muslims listening Pakistani Radio and hailing Pakistani victories and Hindus listening to All India Radio and hailing to Hindu victories. Very few Muslims were noticed hailing Indian victories."

2.26 Reference may appropriately be made at this stage to a reported speech of Ghulam Sarwar at Asansol on the 14th June 1968 in the 'Sangam' dated the 19th June 1968 at page 4:—

"What happened to us in the last two wars is known to us. Just to deceive us it is said that Pakistan was badly beaten, we advanced right upto Lahore. It is a fraud. In order to mislead the nation even the truth is not admitted. In fact the reality is that Indian Army advanced in Lahore Sector so long as the road was clear and the Pakistani forces were not there. As soon as the Pakistani army arrived there we could not advance even an inch. On the contrary the whole division of our army was annihilated. Friends! we have not won the war with Pakistan but have lost it".

2.27 Another witness had stated:—

"The communal feeling at Hatia has as its basis the fact that, by and large, the minority community has feelings for Pakistan against India. Such feelings seem to have arisen from the time of the arson case in 1964 and the case of alleged poisoning of the water tank."

2.28 In short, this mistrust is not so much on account of communal consideration as on account of the supposed anti-nationalism of the other community as reflected in the conduct of a section of the community.

2.29 A few incidents which took place in Hatia gave the Hindus the impression that they were the result of attempts of the Muslims to injure the industrial plant. The incident of fire which took place on the 29th January 1964, was inquired into by Mr. Justice Mukherji. His report did not find any Muslim responsible for it though he found that the fire was due to sabotage. There were people in Hatia who were interested to bring discredit to the H.E.C. administration both on account of union rivalries and on account of the alleged groupism and factionalism among the senior staff in the Corporation. It so happened that Gen. Habibullah was one of the Directors in charge of security, labour etc. at that time. There was no finding against him except that like other top officials he too might have followed the pattern of favouritism in making appointments at the time of recruitment. However, the general impression about the fire being due to some Muslim machination did not cease as a result of Mr. Justice Mukherji's report just as suspicions do in general persist. In this case, however, it appears that Gen. Habibullah retired shortly after and that fact tended to confirm the general impression.

2.30 There was another case of arson in which several Muslims were arrested and at least one of them made a confessional statement in which some allegation against the hand of the Pakistan High Commission in the affair appeared to have been made. The case is subjudice at present.

2.31 These local incidents at Hatia tended to add force to the distrust between the two communities at Ranchi and Hatia, a distrust which finds vent only on occasions and does not usually mark normal behaviour of the members of the communities.

2.32 This mistrust is exploited by the political parties for securing the votes at elections. It appears from press reports that the political parties do take into consideration castes and communities of the voters in a certain area for the purposes of putting up a candidate in that area. A candidate having a majority of his caste people is more likely to be nominated by his party than one who may sometimes be better qualified to be a candidate from that constituency. A well-organised minority is able to put up its demands and offer its votes to the party supporting its demands. It appears that the Majlis-e-Mushawarat, a Muslim body which came into existence after the 1964 riots, promised support of the Muslims to the party, other than the Congress, accepting its demands, which included

demands for making Urdu the second official language of the State. Jan Sangh did not accept the demand but the other parties accepted it. The result was that, according to press reports, Muslims voted for the candidates of the parties other than the Congress and the Jan Sangh.

2.33 A witness has deposed in this connection:—

“The last general elections in Ranchi for the State Legislature were contested purely on communal basis. Mr. Guha Roy was a candidate of the C.P.I. and Mr. N. G. Mitra a candidate of Jan Sangh. Jan Sangh propaganda was against the Muslims. Therefore Hindus voted for the Jan Sangh candidate. Muslim Associations, Anjuman Taraqqi-e-Urdu and Majlis-e-Mushawarat, supported the Communist candidate, Mr. Guha Roy as they had decided to support the candidate of any party who would support the points set down by them, but not the Congress. So Muslims were supporting Mr. Guha Roy. Communal tension started from that time in Ranchi.

There used to be tension on the occasion of Muharram and Ram Navami but they never took such a serious turn.”

2.34 Such commitment of the parties to the demand for making Urdu the second official language of the State led to this demand being made an item of the programme for the United Front Government to implement and ultimately raised such a controversy as led to heat and excitement among the people of the two communities, the Hindus mainly against making Urdu the second official language of Bihar and the Muslims supporting such a demand.

2.35 The attitude of the U.F. Government in the controversy about Urdu was not helpful in smoothening the matter. The Ministers belonging to different parties spoke with different emphasis. The Communist Party wholeheartedly supported the move publicly for making Urdu the second official language of Bihar. Jan Sangh Ministers spoke against the move. The Chief Minister and some other Ministers spoke non-committally holding out that no decision had yet been taken on this controversial matter by the government. A clearcut declaration of the government policy on the matter might have been helpful in keeping the controversy within bounds but that was not possible in view of one of the constituent members being against it and possibly without its concurrence the programme for making Urdu the second official language of the State could not have been given effect to.

2.36 The U.F. Government policy, as initially stated on its assumption of office, had the effect of demoralising the police force especially and it has been discussed separately. It could not be a cause for the disturbances but could have affected the effectiveness of the steps taken to control the disturbances, a matter which has also been dealt with separately. The various previous incidents taking place in Ranchi and Hatia have already been discussed among the immediate causes for the happenings of the 22nd August disturbances.

2.37 A Minister in the U.F. Government has deposed :—

"I was told after the riots that the R.S.S. people hold their parades in the H.E.C. area. Such parades create distrust between the two communities. Distrust is also created by writings in the press some of which are false or much exaggerated."

2.38 It may be that some such mistrust is the basis of the alleged policies and activities of the R.S.S. and Jan Sangh which, according to Muslims, is the root cause of communal tension and disturbances. On the other hand, the activities of Jamait Islami and Majlis-e-Mushawarat are said to be the cause of communal tension and disturbances. Any activities limited to the members of a particular community are in the context of present circumstances bound to keep any prevailing tension alive and had little chance of subduing such tension.

2.39 This general mistrust and the inflamed feelings on account of the agitation for and against the move of making Urdu the second official language of Bihar appear to us to be cause of the commencement of the disturbances in Ranchi and of their quick development on the 22nd August. The mere incident of brickbatting and even of the attack on the Azad High School as a consequence would not have ordinarily led to the widespread disturbances of arson, looting and stabbing but for the fact that the goondas took advantage of it in localities where there was no police arrangement, i.e. in Karbala area, where the first fatal assault took place and of which no information could reach the authorities.

2.40 Another factor which led to the rapid spreading of the disturbances was the practical absence of police force from the scenes of disturbances. As already stated, the miscreants had a free time from, say, about 3.30 p.m. to 9 p.m. or even up to 12 midnight.

2.41 Another factor which was further responsible for quick development of the disturbances may be traced to the activities of the goondas at Ranchi. There is an exceptionally large number of registered goondas in Ranchi. According to one witness :—

"One special feature about Ranchi is that it has got a number of goondas here; about 10 head goondas both Hindus and Muslims and each head goonda has got four or five goondas. The goondas are encouraged by Cinema owners, liquor shops, bus owners and big business men. They utilise their services for the promotion of their business in different ways. Whenever any trouble takes place in Ranchi, the goondas start it and take charge of it. Even in the last August riots the goondas took charge of the various Chaurahas and started attacking people. It is true that the disturbances affect some big businessmen but it is a few businessmen who suffer and during the other peaceful days they get advantage from the goondas. It is, therefore, that big business men also encourage goondas. The authorities must be knowing these goondas and having the list with them."

2.42 A short paragraph about registered goondas in Ranchi may be quoted from the statement submitted by a previous District Magistrate of Ranchi. It reads :—

"Mostly the underworld of Ranchi consisted of Muslims and for a long time their gang leader was one Shahzada. With the awakening of communal feelings during thirties and forties and in the wake of partition of the country, the situation started changing a little bit. The Marwaris found out and backed some Hindu Bihari up-country toughs in the underworld who could stand up against the Muslim goondas. They were further strengthened by the refugee elements in the town and the new influx of Hindus coming in the wake of setting up of the new industrial plants and services. One Ramchandra Singh and Bajrangi Gowala among others were the Hindu underworld gang leaders and they were regularly financed by the Marwaris of Upper Bazar. The Muslim goondas led by Shahzada and Mobin were financed and supported by Muslims of Hindpiri side.

In the old Ranchi town the Main Road from Urdu Library running south up to Ratan Talkies was considered a Muslim stronghold and the Upper Bazar area as a Hindu stronghold. It seems that after some tussle and clashes in the underworld, the Muslim and Hindu goondas divided the town between themselves and a code was evolved wherein one was not to operate in the area of the other.

The goondas had to live on crime. Whenever they found an opportunity of operating they indulged in stabbing and extortion right on the Main Road. They would lie low, so long as the Police was on their heels after they had alarmed them by their crimes but only to reappear after some time. Shahzada got shot down in an encounter with the Police in 1965.....

There seemed some feeling of uneasiness prevailing among Muslims after the killing of Shahzada but the action of the authorities in arresting in a swoop most of the known goondas of Ranchi under a courageous City D.S.P. and an able S.P. brought confidence among all sections and restrained Muslim goondas from any desparate action on their part. The goondas were detained for long periods lasting six months or more under the D.I. Rules. This action in a way terrorised the goondas of Ranchi enough so as to make them lie low, so long as they thought that the administration had the necessary strength and will to act."

2.43 In his deposition before the Commission, he said that, according to his information, there might be more of Muslim goondas and hooligans than Hindu goondas and hooligans in Ranchi.

2.44 The present District Magistrate also deposed that goondas take advantage of the situation.

2.45 He also said that there was more lawlessness on the part of the Muslim goondas than on the part of Hindu goondas.

2.46 A similar idea is expressed by the Chief Secretary when he stated :

"Both at Hatia and at Ranchi, for some reasons or other, a feeling has grown for individuals to arrange for their own security instead of relying on Police, with the result that this has offered a good field for the 'goondas' to operate."

2.47 This appreciation of the part played by goondas might explain why assaults with deadly weapons started in the Muslim areas shortly after the brickbatting on the processionists on the Main Road and later brickbatting of the Azad School by the Hindu boys and other Hindus.

2.48 The list of registered goondas existing till March 1968 was prepared in 1957. It is supposed to be revised periodically. It is doubtful whether it had been so revised and kept up to date. The number of registered goondas under the 'Communal' category was 84—48 Hindus, 32 Muslims and 4 others. When revised after Holi in 1968, the number of registered goondas under this category increased to 186. The Commissioner wrote in his letter dated 28th August, 1967, to the Chief Secretary :—

"I understand on the highest authority that the list of registered goondas available with the police is thoroughly out of date and inadequate."

The figures of 1968 quoted above bear this out.

2.49 Of the 84 goondas on the list of 22nd August, 1967, 25—10 Hindus, 12 Muslims and 3 others—were in custody before the riots in some other connection and only 15 goondas—10 Hindus and 5 Muslims—could be arrested during the riots. The few arrests were due to the late action to arrest them. The Inspector-General of Police stated that steps to round them up were taken after reinforcement of force had arrived, i.e. some time on the 23rd August. The Inspector General of Police has stated that on a mere apprehension of a clash, the goondas are not arrested but steps are taken to arrest them when communal clash becomes imminent. Steps to arrest these goondas should have been taken after 3 p.m. soon after the boys started brickbatting the Azad High School. The oversight seems to be due to the gazetted officers being busy in rushing to the places of incidents; but this would not be a good explanation. The statement of the District Magistrate in this connection is :

"The arrests of the goondas were not made before the outbreak of riots. Steps were taken to arrest them after the riots broke out but on such occasions when trouble starts the goondas go underground and it becomes difficult to arrest them. They can be arrested prior to the break out of trouble. Arrest of goondas was started soon after the riots but practically none of the goondas could be arrested immediately."

2.50 If he meant to convey that the arrest of goondas started on the 22nd August we are not prepared to accept it.

2.51 There was another factor which was responsible for quick development of the disturbances. It was rumour-mongering. Rumours played an important part in inciting the people to commit arson, looting and stabbing at Ranchi. It was rumour that the majority of the dead were Hindus which led to the incidents in the Medical College on the 23rd August and it was rumours which floated in Hatia on the 23rd and 24th August, which led to the large scale murders at Hatia on the night between 24th and 25th August. The rumours floating nearabout the Azad High School were that the Muslims of Hindpiri had murdered Hindus while the rumours floating in Hindpiri were that the Hindus of Upper Bazar had murdered the Muslim boys in the Azad High School. Such rumours have a remarkable way of travelling very fast and it is not easy to take steps to stifle them in time before harm is done. Anyway, no steps were taken at Ranchi to stifle these rumours in time. The rumours which led to the incidents in the Medical College were the same—that Hindus had been murdered in Hindpiri. Similar rumours were floated in Hatia.

2.52 The explanation for not contradicting the rumours about the majority of the dead being Hindus is that the contradiction of the rumour would have led to a statement that the Muslims had been murdered in large numbers as it was well known that deaths had occurred of the members of both the communities.

2.53 This, however, does not explain the non-contradiction of the rumour about the Hindus of a particular area being murdered by Muslims of that area. Some means of checking the rumour could have been found. The Inspector General of Police had stated :—

"The situation which developed in Ranchi had repercussions in Hatia as according to me it was the result of unfounded rumours which got afloat, particularly the rumour that Hindus of Hindpiri had been murdered by Muslims. These rumours had travelled so far as Patna. Some sort of contradiction of such rumours should have taken place but it did not. The Government policy seems to be not to publish figures of casualties of communal disturbances communitywise. Even if the figures could not be published communitywise, contradiction of the rumours itself should have been published."

2.54 We are of opinion that the government policy about the publication of information about communal riots in regard to parties to it and to the number of persons injured requires reconsideration. The present policy is not to publish the names of the parties in the first instance. The news gets published only as 'trouble had taken place between two communities' or 'two groups'. A news like that fails in its primary object of not informing the people about the communities, if that be the object, for fear of people at other places getting excited and enraged against one another. The mere news of communal clash would raise the presumption in the minds of the

people of the country that a clash had taken place between Hindus and Muslims, even though actually it may not be so. Omission to give the number of the dead or the injured communitywise leads to speculative rumours and encourages interested persons of either community to circulate exaggerated figures. Other facts connected with the incidents should also be freely stated. In these days of various means of dissemination of news, any control over the news to be published by the government or the newspapers cannot be really effective. A fair objective statement of facts about any such incident is bound to have a more salutary effect than exaggerated and interested rumours by persons of either community, rumours which at times are taken to be facts, to be published even by foreign journals.

2.55 One of the causes for the disturbances at Ranchi is said to be the economic rivalry between the Muslims and the refugees from the Punjab who had settled down at Ranchi after the partition of the country in 1947. The refugees had made great inroads in certain trades which were exclusively run by the Muslims like vegetable marketing, fruit marketing and taxi driving.

2.56 We do not think that any such economic rivalry was responsible for the commencement of the riots though feelings arising out of such rivalry could lead to action by one of the parties against the other once the disturbances started. The Muslims had the grievance of being practically ousted from their traditional trades and the refugees had the feelings of bitterness out of their experiences at the time of the partition, which ultimately brought them from Punjab to Ranchi, a pretty long distance.

2.57 A similar economic reason for communal tension among the workers of the H.E.C. is said to be the employment of Hindus in place of Muslims who left their jobs after communal troubles. We do not think that there is much in this contention as there had been only a minor case of communal trouble at Hatia in 1964. It could not have led to any appreciable number of Muslims leaving their jobs and those jobs being taken up by the Hindus.

## **PART IV**

### **ADEQUACY OF ARRANGEMENTS**

#### **I. ARRANGEMENTS**

##### **A—Ranchi**

It is necessary to have an idea of what information of the situation the district authorities were possessed of before expressing any opinion about the adequacy of the arrangements made to prevent any communal disturbances as a result of the taking out of the anti-Urdu procession on the 22nd August, 1967.

2. Apart from the general latent feeling of communal tension which may be associated with the people of Ranchi, and with which we shall deal later, there were sufficient warnings for the local authorities to be vigilant about the anti-Urdu agitation leading to communal trouble. One of the points made out from the agitation on the platform and in the press against making Urdu the second official language of the State was that it would tend to lead to communal differences and disturbances. The very basis of the move and opposition to it was said to be political. While the pro-Urdu group stressed the necessity of Urdu being made the second official language of the State for the preservation and protection of their culture, etc., the opposition stressed that the move was not only invidious when considered in the context of various languages and dialects spoken in Bihar but was a move fraught with the danger of splitting up of the State and the country as Urdu had been instrumental, in some respects, in bringing about the original partition of the country in 1947. Such divergent points of view were bound to generate heat on occasions and thus tend to inflame the passions of the people of the two communities at large. This was realised by the State Government when the Dwitye Raj Bhasa Birodh Nagrik Samity was formed at Patna with a view to spearheading the agitation against the proposed acceptance of Urdu as the second official language of the State, and when the Samity decided to hold a meeting at Patna on 12th August, 1967, to mark the inauguration of "Bihar Vyapi Samananantar Raj Bhasa Virodhi Paksha", which was scheduled to be observed from 12th August to 26th August, 1967. The Political (Special) Department of the Government of Bihar sent a wireless message to all the District Magistrates, except the District Magistrate of Patna, and to all Commissioners, except the Commissioner of Patna, on the 7th August, 1967, requiring them to watch the situation to prevent the agitation from taking a communal colour and leading to breach of the peace, and directing them to take necessary action, according to law, to prevent trouble in such an eventuality. Two days earlier, i.e., on the 5th August, 1967, a circular was sent to all the Superintendents of Police, Bihar, by the C.I.D , Special Branch, Bihar, stating :—

"Hindu communal organisations and political parties are opposing this proposal whereas Anjuman Taraqui-Urdu etc. are pressing for the acceptance of the same.

Since the agitation may reach a sharp edge, apprehension of communal troubles cannot be ruled out.

You are, therefore, requested to alert all officers under you to be vigilant and collect intelligence against any evil design so that trouble is nipped in the bud. Necessary information may kindly be sent to this office as well.

Special Branch Officers have also been suitably instructed in this connection."

3. The Special Branch, Ranchi, submitted a report to the Superintendent of Police on the 20th August, 1967, referring to the proposed programme of Vijay Ranjan in connection with the anti-Urdu procession on the 22nd August and his distribution of some hand bill in the city. The contents of the hand bill had been taken as 'exciting' by the pro-Urdu men, specially the Muslims and the Communists. He further stated that people were criticising Vijay Ranjan for the said hand bill as well as the Government for not taking any action against him. The report of the Special Branch concluded thus :

"Hence the chances of a clash between the anti-Urdu processionists and the pro-Urdu men as well as the CPI men cannot be ruled out.

Necessary precautionary measures may be taken."

4. The Superintendent of Police got this report on the 20th August and necessary extracts from this report of the Special Branch were sent by the Additional Superintendent of Police to the Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Commissioner the same day. The Superintendent of Police has further stated that it was on the basis of this report that arrangements in connection with the procession were made on the 22nd August. The S.D.O. deposed that the arrangements of the 22nd August were made on the basis that a procession would be taken out and also on account of apprehension of the breach of peace.

5. The arrangements, however, do not really appear to have been made in expectation of the possibility of any communal trouble on the 22nd August. Both the District Magistrate and the Deputy Superintendent of Police have stated that the arrangements made on the 22nd August were not in expectation of communal trouble arising out of the anti-Urdu procession. The Deputy Superintendent of Police has further stated that if they had expected any communal trouble, the arrangements would have been more elaborate and thorough. This is clear from the fact that the arrangements were not in accordance with the communal emergency scheme.

6. The scheme prepared in 1965 provides that it would be desirable to arrest and detain all bad characters of both the communities at the initial stage when tension among the communities

starts building up, as communal trouble more often is fanned by bad characters than by the so-called communal leaders. No such action was taken against the bad characters.

7. With respect to patrolling and pickets, the scheme provided for the dividing of the city and Hatia into six zones and if situation demanded, the number could be doubled. It provides for armed pickets at 15 places in the city itself. These places are :

- (1) Upper Bazar T.O.P.
- (2) Garikhana Chauk
- (3) Karbala Chauk
- (4) Kantatoli Chauk
- (5) Hindpiri T.O.P.
- (6) Doranda P.S.
- (7) Rattan Talkies
- (8) Upper Bazar Mosque No. I
- (9) Upper Bazar Mosque No. II
- (10) Purani Ranchi-Palkot Road
- (11) Urdu Library
- (12) Daily Market
- (13) Doranda Chauk
- (14) Rangsaj Mosque, Church Road
- (15) Mahabir Asthan—Church Road.

8. The only arrangements made in connection with this procession was the posting of two armed pickets, one at the Rattan Talkies and the other at the Urdu Library and a lathi picket at Dr. Quddu's Dispensary. Even the main trouble spots like Upper Bazar, Karbala Chauk and Hindpiri had no static pickets. Arrangements should have been made not only to prevent the commencement of the trouble between the processionists and the pro-Urdu people but if it began, to get control over it promptly. Anticipation of trouble is the crux of administration and in that, the local authorities appeared to have failed.

9. The explanation for not making the necessary arrangements to deal with the communal situation arising out of the anti-Urdu procession is to be found in the two statements of the authorities : one, that no communal trouble took place on the 12th August, 1967, when the Jan Sangh organised a procession and a meeting against the proposal to make Urdu the second official language of the State and the other is that, according to their information, there was no likelihood of the procession being actually taken out on the 22nd August as Vijay Ranjan had been arrested on the 21st August and he had no followers to pursue the move to take out the procession. The first explanation really has no bearing on the question of making the arrangements for 22nd August. Much had happened in those 10 days between the 12th August and 22nd August. Agitations had been going on in the press all this time and the feelings of the Muslims at Ranchi had been aroused in view of the pamphlet

distributed by Vijay Ranjan and his subsequent vocal propaganda in the city, and this was not disputed. The mere arrest of Vijay Ranjan on the 21st August should not have been taken to be sufficient to remove all that build-up bitterness against the anti-Urdu opposition.

10. It is not known how this news about the procession not being taken out on the 22nd August after the arrest of Vijay Ranjan happened to grow when a procession was actually taken out and when it is in evidence that some person not alleged to be one of the intimate workers of Vijay Ranjan had been addressing the students of the L.E.B.B. School on the forenoon of the 21st August. The seed out of which such information grew and was conveyed to the authorities is to be found in the order of the Deputy Superintendent of Police to the Traffic Inspector and the officer in charge of Kotwali on the 21st August, 1967. This order directed the arrest of two associates of Vijay Ranjan and then expressed the hope that with the arrest of those persons the programme to take out a procession on the 22nd August might fall through. These two associates were not arrested and, therefore, there was no occasion for entertaining the hope. But the local police staff conveyed the news that there were no chances of the procession being taken out. If the authorities believed in such a report from their officers, no arrangements need have been made. If they did not believe in it or act upon it, full arrangements should have been made to meet the situation. Mere posting of the pickets on the Main Road could not have been taken to be sufficient to prevent, and much less to control, any outbreak of communal violence as a result of the provocation to the pro-Urdu people by the anti-Urdu processionists. The authorities seemed to have been lulled into a feeling of security on the mere report that the chances of taking out a procession were very little. No experienced administrator should have been so beguiled. In matters of arrangements, it is always safer and better to have arrangements on the higher scale than on the lower scale as the deficiency of an arrangement cannot be speedily made up in case the disturbances required more elaborate arrangements than had been made.

11. No alternative precautionary arrangements were made to which recourse could have been taken when trouble really started. The posting of a few pickets on the Main Road was considered sufficient for the safe passage of the procession. There had been warnings from the Government of the agitation leading to communal trouble. There was local tension between the communities on account of the propaganda of Vijay Ranjan. An application in writing had been given by the Secretary of the CPM, Ranchi city, to the Sub-Divisional Officer on the 21st August drawing attention to the objectionable activities tending to create communal trouble and praying for the taking of stern action against such persons. The order of the Deputy Superintendent of Police dated the 21st August 1967 itself stated that the activities of Vijay Ranjan had given rise to communal tension and there was serious danger of the breach of peace on this account. Some alternative arrangements could have been such as an alert to the army to be ready to come to the aid of the civil authorities immediately on being requisitioned and an

order for the magistrates and the police parties to take their position promptly on getting information of the trouble starting. What actually happened in the absence of such alternative precautionary arrangements was that for several hours no other arrangements of the police or of the military or of the magistrates could be had. It was from about 8 p.m. that the magistrates happened to arrive at the Kotwali. A small force of the military arrived a little earlier and the military and the magistrates and extra police, obtained by withdrawing from other duties, could go into action only between 8.30 p.m. and 9 p.m. and during the period between 3 p.m. and 8.30 p.m. or 9 p.m. there was no such additional posting of police parties or of magistrates as could have been helpful in controlling the disturbed situation. During this period even the two pickets at Rattan Talkies and Urdu Library did not prove very effective in controlling the excited people within their areas. The only persons available happened to be the gazetted officers who rushed from place to place on hearing of some trouble taking place at the various places. Of these the Superintendent of Police and the Sub-Divisional Officer remained busy at the Azad High School from about 3.30 p.m. to 6-30 p.m., Additional Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Superintendent of Police remained busy on the Main Road, and the District Magistrate visited the Kotwali, left instructions for the issue of 144 orders and the orders for curfew, informed the Commissioner and the Chief Secretary and then was called by the Commissioner. When he returned from the Commissioner's place at about 6.30 p.m. the situation had deteriorated very much and the only hope of the authorities lay in the early arrival of the military.

12. The factors leading to such a defective appreciation of the communal tension in the city and its flare up into ugly incidents, in fairness to the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police, might also be mentioned. Both these officers were new to the district and to the city. The District Magistrate took over on the 10th May, 1967 and the Superintendent of Police on the 15th of May, 1967. The District Magistrate did not even receive a copy of the charge note from his predecessor which could have posted him up with the situation in the city and the district. Why his predecessor did not leave such a note is not clear. It is possible that none of these two officers did have a complete idea of the topography of the city and its vulnerable points in case of communal trouble. The District Magistrate lacked experience of district administration. Excepting for the first year of his service as a Sub-Divisional Officer, he had been working in the Secretariat all through his service. The Superintendent of Police had been an Assistant Director at the Police Training College at Abu and had been out of touch with the district administration.

13. The intelligence system responsible for feeding the authorities with information about the feeling among the people, especially the feelings affecting law and order, is admittedly not satisfactory. The sources for such intelligence are the Special Branch, the local police and direct contacts between the officers and the people. The local police has much on its hands and has, therefore, little time for making contacts and collecting necessary information in this regard.

The Special Branch is not sufficiently manned. It has only one Sub-Inspector of Police, we understand, for the city of Ranchi. The Inspector General of Police has stated that not only the police intelligence department but also the strength of the armed force is much too inadequate. He also stated that the recommendations of the Bihar Police Commission made in 1961-62 for a large increase in the strength of the police have not been implemented for want of funds. The utility of the direct contacts with the people to obtain correct information, as used to be in the past, seems to have become much less, possibly due to the general attitude of the people towards the authority. People of different political parties prefer to approach either the members of the party in the government, if their party happened to be a constituent of the government, or to their representatives in the opposition. We have it on record that even during the disturbances when there were several Ministers already at Ranchi, members of a party rang up Patna and requested the Minister of their party to come up to Ranchi and take action, which these people considered necessary. The people associated with the Congress Party then in the opposition took no interest, apparently in the belief that their suggestions would not carry weight. It requires a very tactful officer to so inspire the people in his charge as to be able to collect trustworthy information from such of them as may be public-spirited and would feel like calling on their officers and informing them of what concerned the people. For the administration, however, it is of significance to keep upto the mark their own intelligence system both in the police department and in the special Branch.

14. The S.D.O. had remarked in his report dated the 22nd October, 1967 to the Deputy Commissioner :—

"I feel it my duty to say that our intelligence system in Ranchi has let us down not only on this occasion but on previous occasions also. Some time back a Communist Party (Marxist) had taken out a procession and slogans were raised and posters were also hung on the walls. The intelligence department had no information. If the administration is supposed to use the service of intelligence department there is need for rethinking as to how to make this intelligence system to be useful. This is the basic policy that if the administration is forewarned it is forearmed. What was done in absence of any specific information about the possibility of occurrence, can be said to be more than sufficient in the circumstances already stated above."

15. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, had been bitter about the intelligence department failing the authorities. The previous District Magistrate, Shri Dhanoa, also found the intelligence department defective. One of the points he made out was that the Special Branch appeared to be concerned with getting information about subversive activities and not with communal activities. Anyway, it is high time that communal activities also should prominently come within the purview of the Special Branch. He found information by the Special Branch to be not useful. It was only once, according to his recollection, that the information received from the

Special Branch forewarned him against an impending trouble. He has also referred to the reluctance of the intelligence machinery to report any contemplated moves among the group or the party in control of the government at that time due to the possibility of the reporter's identity being found out by the persons in power or group in that party.

### B—Hatia

16. No immediate police arrangements were made at Hatia to deal with any untoward situation arising as a result of the incidents at Ranchi. The authorities seem to have been under the impression that Hatia had been free from communal trouble and that the local incidents at Ranchi were not likely to affect the people of Hatia. It does not appear to be a very sound explanation. The Inspector General of Police stated :

"The idea of the Ranchi incidents having repercussions in Hatia did occur to me but I presumed that the arrangements made covered that area also. I did not specifically find out about it. There was no difficulty of force being available for deployment at Hatia."

17. General instructions were issued on behalf of the Government under the orders of the Chief Minister to all the District Magistrates in the State to keep watch on the situation and to take necessary precautionary and preventive measures. The Chief Minister phoned himself to all the District Magistrates to be cautious. When the reaction of the incidents at Ranchi could be expected to reach other districts, it would be more reasonable to expect it to reach Hatia, only a few miles from Ranchi. It is also not correct to say that there had been no communal incident in Hatia. On the mere false report about the poisoning of the tank, some Muslim shops were raided and some Muslims were beaten.

18. The Chief Secretary has deposed that—

"Hatia did not have the same communal history as Ranchi though there have been some incidents giving rise to communal feeling."

19. The Police Minister has stated that precautionary arrangements in Hatia were not considered as there had been no communal riots there before and as the abadi of Doranda and certain other abadis were in between Ranchi and Hatia.

20. The S.D.O. has deposed :—

"When riots broke out in Ranchi, we thought of arrangements at Hatia; as a protective measure, we sent one Magistrate with armed forces consisting of one Havildar and 10 Constables to Hatia, on 23rd, for patrol and normal duty. Considering the resources and the forces available to us and the situation at Ranchi, I considered this to be sufficient for Hatia."

21. It may be noted that this extra police force with a magistrate was sent there on the night between the 23rd and 24th August when a request for extra police force was received from Hatia.

22. The force sent appears to have been adequate, according to the information available to the district authorities about the condition at Hatia, though it must be said that the district authorities were not getting full information about the feelings and tension between the communities in the HEC colony, as is evident from the Intelligence Reports of the Intelligence Section of the HEC (Security Division). The availability of meagre information seems to be due to the fact that the HEC authorities and the police authorities at Hatia had to contact the district authorities at Ranchi on the telephone. Most of the district officers were on the move and it was difficult to contact them. Information had to be given to the Control Room, which had to be, in the circumstances, brief and not fully explanatory of the position. The district authorities sent further forces on the 24th evening when informed of the growing tension and apprehension of breach of peace. The local authorities thought of sending the military to Hatia on the night of the 24th August after some telephonic communication between the Chairman of the HEC and the Commissioner. The Commissioner told Brig. Manohar Singh at about 10 p.m. on the 24th August that as a result of the conversation with the Chairman he felt that there was some tension among the two communities at Hatia and asked the Brigadier if he could do some flag march or show of strength to the people of Hatia. The Brigadier was taken by surprise as up to that time he did not know of any tension or anything untoward happening in Hatia. He agreed, and organised a small force and directed 10 vehicles to be marched through the Hatia township the next morning.

23. On the 25th evening Shri A. K. Banerjee, Addl. Collector, and Sector Incharge of Hatia reached there with a Company of army. The arrangements thereafter seemed to have been adequate.

24. For evacuation of Muslims at Hatia on the 24th August, a few buses were utilised. It is possible, as suggested, that more vehicles could have been spared by the H.E.C. for the purpose and the evacuation could have been hastened, but there was a limit to the use of vehicles in view of the need for a police party to accompany it and not much police was available for the purpose at Hatia at the time. The steps taken to evacuate the people, therefore, appear, in the circumstances, to be the utmost that the police could do.

25. We have already said that the arrangements made in connection with the anti-Urdu procession on the 22nd August were inadequate to meet any contingency of communal disturbance taking place. We have also commented about the ineffectiveness of the two armed guards posted at Rattan Talkies and Urdu Library. We repeat that the magistrate with the armed guards at the Urdu Library left his post without any orders at about 7.45 p.m. The inaction of the armed guards at the Rattan Talkies at about 6.30 p.m. when the Muslims of Hindpiri side threw bombs can be explained only on account of the demoralisation of the magistrate and the police. The moment constable Rameshwar Singh shouted for help on being

attacked with a sword, if not at any earlier time, the magistrate present or the Sub-Inspector of the armed guards, on his own should have ordered firing at the assailants. Instead, what happened was that the Sub-Inspector alone advanced towards the constable, and he himself was incapacitated on being attacked with a bomb; the Havildar proceeded that side and got himself hurt in another bomb attack. Failure to fire at the right moment must have affected the future course of events in that locality.

26. It may be noted in this connection that the Hindpiri crowd when being pacified by the Police Minister Shri Ramanand Tiwari at about 4.30 p.m. threw brickbats at the Deputy Superintendent of Police who reached there with a small police force. Ordinarily, the crowd which dared to turn violent against the police force should have been dealt with firmly but the Dy. S.P. had to return with his force under the direction of the Police Minister. The incident must have led to further deterioration of the police morale and must have been a tacit encouragement to the crowd, indicating that the Minister was opposed to use of force against them even when they dared to use force against the police party in his own presence and during his attempts to hear their complaints and pacify them.

27. There had been failure of prompt communication to the local officers of the incident between the Muslims of Hindpiri and Konka Road and the processionists at Rattan Talkies. The incident there took place between 2.30 p.m. and 2.45 p.m. Information should have reached the officers at about the same time through telephone. The Magistrate at Rattan Talkies should have telephoned. He has deposed that he telephoned to the control room, but if it was fact, the control room was expected to pass on the information to the superior officers. Either the magistrate at the Rattan Talkies or the person receiving information at the control room failed in his duty. If the information of the disturbance had been conveyed to the superior officers, namely, the S.P., the S.D.O., and the D.M., at about 2.45 p.m. it is possible that things would not have gone so bad at the Azad High School and the officials might have had time to plan further arrangements in a somewhat peaceful atmosphere. The first information given to the S.P. was by the officer-in-charge who rang up from the hospital telephone at about 3.15 p.m. At about the same time the dispersing processionists had reached the Azad School and started the trouble there.

28. In fact there had been an omission on the part of the police and the S.P. to inform the D.M. and the S.D.O. of the taking out of the procession when they came to know of it at about 1.15 p.m. in view of the D.M. and the S.D.O. being under the impression, on account of the earlier information conveyed, that no procession would be taken out. The information about the actual taking out of the procession might have alerted them about the possibilities and might have led them to make some arrangement of their own to know about the situation in the city.

29. The District Magistrate learnt of the incident at about 4.30 p.m., proceeded to the Kotwali, requisitioned the military and was thereafter sent for by the Commissioner and by the time he

returned to the Kotwali from the Commissioner's House, it was 6.30 p.m. and the situation in the city had worsened. Calling the District Magistrate by the Commissioner in the circumstances was something unusual. The Commissioner must have had the information the District Magistrate could possibly convey to him about the situation. If the Commissioner had something to convey by way of guidance, it could have been done on the phone or the Commissioner could have himself come down to Kotwali. To withdraw a senior officer of the station from the actual place of control seems to us to be unusual. According to the District Magistrate's comments on the Commissioner's report, it appears that he was called by the Commissioner to have a discussion about his calling the military to the aid of civil authorities. This calling seems to have been made in the special circumstances existing at Ranchi that day. The Governor was at Ranchi, the Chief Minister was at Ranchi and the Chief Secretary was at Ranchi and we have already mentioned about the Police Minister's presence and of his proceeding to the places of incidents.

30. According to the District Magistrate's comments on the Commissioner's report, the Chief Secretary spoke to him on the telephone after 5 p.m. and on being told that the army had been called in, expressed his strong dissatisfaction at the calling of the army. At about 5.30 p.m. the Commissioner spoke to him on the telephone and conveyed the dissatisfaction of the Chief Secretary at the calling of the army and then asked him to go to his house for a personal discussion if he could manage it. He went to the Commissioner's place and explained to him the whole situation. The Commissioner agreed with him and told the Chief Secretary on the telephone about it. The calling of the army by the District Magistrate upset the top officials; but even they had to agree later that the calling of the army was the only possibility to control the situation. This explains noting in the Commissioner's letter to the Chief Secretary dated the 28th August, 1967, which states—

"You were present at Ranchi on the 22nd when the army was called in aid of civil authorities. This was done with your approval, and with the approval of the Police Minister, whom I contacted personally. The Deputy Commissioner had also recommended this, having been advised by the Superintendent of Police to do so. My own assessment was that there was no way to save Ranchi except by deploying the army. The mounting incidents of arson and stabbings and looting seemed to be creating unusual panic and consternation, and the police seemed helpless."

and also the note in the Commissioner's diary dated 22nd August, 1967, which states—

"I took the Police Minister aside, and advised him unhesitatingly to let me call in the army. Police Minister approved calling in the army."

31. Apparently there was difference of opinion about calling the military between the local officers and the higher authorities. Such differences with the local officers are not commendable and could have possibly cooled down the ardour of the District Magistrate in

dealing with the situation. We may incidentally mention here that the Commissioner has stated in his letter to the Chief Secretary dated the 16th October, 1967, that in view of the Deputy Commissioner's lack of experience in the field he had to take the initiative in organising the work during the first few days of the trouble.

32. The situation at the Azad High School was tackled by the S.P. and the S.D.O. through appeals to the persons throwing brickbats to desist from their action and by repeated chasing of the people who had collected on the roads. Thus, they did succeed for the time being in keeping the mob from attacking the boys at the Azad High School, but the mere pushing back of the crowd did not and could not lead to peaceful conditions in the area. The Police Minister arrived there after a second lathi charge and when the police and the S.D.O. were trying to get the gates of the Marwari Dharamshala opened. The gates were opened and the people assembled there complained against the alleged police atrocities against them. The Police Minister tried to pacify them by saying that he would look into their grievances and proceeded to the Azad High School and later arranged for the evacuation of the boys from the school to a safe locality by the police.

33. It is not possible to say that the situation at Azad School demanded firing or the use of tear-gas. The object of using tear-gas is to disperse a crowd. According to the statements of the S.P. and the S.D.O. the crowds were being pushed to a safe distance.

34. We have already discussed the confusion in the working of the police on account of its being placed by the Commissioner under the military in his requisition calling the military to the aid of civil authorities. Not only confusion but some sort of resentment arose in the police against their being placed under the military, as would appear from their referring people to the military when they approached them for certain help. It appears from the statements of the military witnesses in particular that they were not satisfied with what the police was doing. It is clear that the co-ordination and co-operation expected between the military and the police were probably not there. We have it from the statement of one military officer that when he was asked by the S.P. on the night of 22nd August that some of the force be left in different places in Hindpiri, he declined saying that that was not usually done and, further, when the vehicle in which the military officer was could not pass through a narrow street, the S.P. left him without telling him that he was going and proceeded in his jeep which could go through that street. This officer has further stated that he chided the 12 people at Hindpiri T.O.P. for their not taking any action against the crowd which was ultimately dispersed by him by taking recourse to firing.

35. Another officer has deposed that on the 22nd night when he was marching through Upper Bazar he noticed houses on both sides on fire, that slogans were being raised at about 100 yards from him and that the police platoon at the T.O.P. was simply watching and doing nothing. He has further deposed that he found some people stopping the fire brigade from working when they were trying to extinguish the fire on the Ratu Road and that the police was not

helping the fire brigade men against persons who were obstructing them in their work. This officer arrested about 100 people on the evening of the 23rd August and another 50 people on the 24th August. The Police Minister happened to arrive incidentally when the arrest of the 100 people took place on the 23rd.

36. Another officer has deposed that either on the 22nd or on 23rd August, he was told of a stabbing incident by a constable and on his questioning him why he did not arrest the person stabbing, his answer was that he might not be involved. He deposed that there had been a feeling amongst the police officers not to involve themselves for fear of judicial inquiry. He has also deposed of his releasing certain people arrested by the police—six persons were arrested by the police for trying to throw bombs and burning houses—as he himself did not find any bomb on a search from house to house.

37. On the other hand, a police officer has deposed that at about 9.30 p.m. on the 25th August he went to a house on the Lake Road on hearing shouts from that side and arrested 10 people who were hiding in a house. A military patrolling party also arrived there. Some weapons were also found in the house. A list was prepared by the military officer in charge who arrived there. He then returned to the Kotwali. He learnt on the 26th August that those arrested persons had been released by the military officer. He complained about it to the Police Minister.

38. We have already dealt with the incident in the Rajendra Medical College on the night of the 23rd August and commented on the inactivity of the magistrate and the armed guards at the time of the incident.

39. We have also to comment on the non-firing at the assailant boys by Police Sub-Inspector B. M. Lal who happened to be present in the Conference Hall of the college at the time and had even warned the students armed with iron bars and knives entering the Conference Hall to stop or they would be shot. According to him, the assailants fled but a few did enter the Conference Hall. He should have fired at whoever had entered the Hall and had not fled away. The explanation that he could not fire as the incident took place in a very short time is flimsy. The firing would not have taken any appreciable time when it is considered that a number of boys were injured in the incident and that one of them died.

40. There is good evidence on record that the students accused of taking part in the incident in the Rajendra Medical College were not arrested on the 24th August as the Police Minister told the police officers to await instructions from the government in that regard and that instructions to arrest them were conveyed to the police on the 25th August by the Police Minister on his return from Ranchi to Patna. The arrests were made on the night between the 25th and 26th August. Shri Tiwari, the Police Minister, however, denied having given such direction to the police and has deposed that he had directed the S.P. before leaving for Patna on the 25th August, to take strong action and arrest such boys as were accused for having taken

part in the incident in the Rajendra Medical College Hospital the night before.

41. The episode does not do credit to the Government or its policy with respect to the action to be taken against the students. It is surprising that such instructions could have been given in connection with such a serious unjustified incident on the 23rd August practically three months after the issue of the directions given by the State Government contained in the Addl. Chief Secretary's letter of the 24th April, 1967, as given below:—

"The police have their responsibilities to discharge certain statutory functions relating to the maintenance of order and prevention and investigation of crime. In the eyes of law an educational institution is not exempted from the discharge of these statutory functions. The offence of murder or rioting or arson committed inside an educational institution is punishable exactly in the same manner as one committed outside and it is the duty of the police to take all steps under the law to bring the offender to book and also prevent such crime."

and directing in clause (a) of para 2 of the letter that—

"In regard to instances of ordinary crime unconnected with any agitation or disturbances the police has a right and duty to go into the campus to investigate criminal offences and take necessary legal action to the extent required and authorised by law."

42. The word 'disturbance' in the aforesaid direction in the context seems to refer to the disturbances committed in the course of students' violent agitation connected with their real or supposed grievances and could not cover the incident of the 23rd August which had no connection with student agitation.

43. We have already referred to the interests shown by certain Ministers in the arrest of local persons on getting lists from people.

44. We have said sufficient about the interference of the higher authorities in dealing with the situation and would like to conclude by quoting a paragraph in the letter of the Commissioner dated the 28th August to the Chief Secretary wherein he states—

"As I had the occasion to mention to you, it will help me to a great extent if the district and the divisional authorities are permitted to function with independence. As I had the occasion to mention to you, independent planning and action are being cramped."

45. Direction or interference from the highest level in Government not only restricts the local officers from taking independent decisions on the problems confronting them but also deprives their superiors of the right to criticise the actions of the local officers if the results are not what they expected or the acts committed are not quite in conformity with the law.

## II. DEMORALISATION OF POLICE

46. There is surprisingly a very good consensus of views about the fact that great demoralisation had set in in the police and to some extent in the magistracy as well. This is a serious matter for the administration to ponder over as the administration of law and order rightly depends on the proper discharge of their functions by these two agencies, the magistracy and the police. One of the Ministers in the U.F. Government has deposed:—

“I did not take any police with me as my experience since Independence had been that people get agitated on seeing the police. No local leaders accompanied me.

The Police has got demoralised since Independence. It was probably because of the fact that notice was taken of complaints by people in general against them. During the British days the police was creating hatred against it by the people. Since Independence we have not done anything to bridge that gulf between the police and the public. People are no more afraid of police.”

47. Another Minister stated:—

“I thought that the fact of the formation of a party called Shosit Dal and the publication in the Searchlight of the news of toppling my Ministry, though patently wrong, might affect the morale of the services, and the morale of the police, which was already low. I had a suspicion that the police might not rise to the occasion, particularly in view of the setting up of the Commissions of Inquiry against police at several places including Ranchi.”

48. The Inspector General of Police had stated:—

“There is no doubt that the Police and the Magistracy were demoralised by August 22nd especially in regard to dealing with students. This is because of the appointment of judicial commissions of inquiry against the conduct of the officers in dealing with law and order situations, especially if firing takes place. Such Commissions have been appointed both by the Congress Government and also by the U.F. Government which came into power in March, 1967. These judicial commissions of inquiry were ordered after executive probes into these firings had justified the conduct of the officers. The officers felt that the inquiries are mostly ordered under pressure of the public and not so much on merits, or for political considerations. They further feel that they are at a great disadvantage in presenting their case before these commissions. The first difficulty is experienced in the reluctance of non-official witnesses to appear before such commissions while the opponents have witnesses forthcoming readily. The second is the difficulty of engaging good lawyers. This difficulty is being felt from the time of taking over of the U.F. Government. The previous Government allowed adequate amounts for the defence of the officers but the Law Minister of the U.F. Govern-

ment laid down that at Patna Rs. 250 can be given for a senior lawyer and Rs. 100 for a junior and at other places including Ranchi senior lawyer should be paid Rs. 125 and the junior Rs. 50 or 55. It is difficult to engage leading lawyers for these amounts. Another factor is much extra time has to be put in in preparing the cases to be presented before the Commission. This affects the normal work of the officers. Further officers suffer a lot of mental harassment throughout till the inquiry is completed."

49. The Chief Secretary stated in his deposition before the Commission:—

"I do not think a mere institution of a judicial inquiry against the Police would affect its morale unless adequate defence arrangements are not made for the officer concerned and unless the terms of reference of the inquiry are not fair.

—The withdrawal of the cases against the students including cases in connection with the abnormal educational agitations tended to dampen the morale of the Police and Magistracy."

50. Whatever be the attitude of the people towards the police prior to the formation of the United Front Government, certain steps taken by the U.F. Government immediately created an unenviable position for the police especially. The U.F. Government took over on the 5th of March, 1967. Within eight hours, as reported by the *Indian Nation*, dated 6th March, 1967, the new Bihar Cabinet held a special meeting on the evening of 5th March and ordered a judicial inquiry into the Patna police firings of January 5 and the student-police clash at Ranchi on January 3. The Bihar Cabinet also ordered immediate release of all political prisoners and students arrested during the previous year in connection with political agitations. It also ordered withdrawal of cases pending against them and cancellation of warrants of arrest.

51. On the 8th March, 1967, the *Indian Nation* published a news item that the Bihar Cabinet further requested the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to nominate a judge to hold inquiry into Ranchi incident on January 3, 1967 and that the terms of its reference were:

- (1) To inquire into and report on the facts and circumstances of the incidents which took place at Ranchi on January 3, 1967 resulting in the use of tear gas, lathi and force and entry into the Ranchi College premises by the police and police action inside the college premises, and
- (2) whether the action of the police was justified and if not, who were responsible.

52. On the 9th March, 1967, the *Indian Nation* published under the head line, "NO POLICE FIRING ON PEOPLE NOW: C.M." that Shri Sinha (Chief Minister) had said that during his regime there would be no police firing or lathi charge on students or any other sec-

tions of the people and that he would like to immolate himself than order police firing on the students.

53. What the Chief Minister of the U.F. Government deposed is that it was not correct that any speeches were made by him or by any responsible Minister to the effect that in no case should force be resorted to but that force must be used very rarely; and that what they had said was that on flimsy grounds firing or any other force was not to be used either against students or against any other person. No contradiction of this statement attributed to the Chief Minister in the *Indian Nation* of the 9th March, 1967 appears to have been issued. Anyway, what had been published was sufficient to an impression to the students particularly that no firing or lathi charge would be used against them. Such an impression may explain the number of incidents which took place in Ranchi between the 12th March and the 29th March. The Deputy Commissioner of Ranchi lost no time in writing to the Commissioner on 9/10th March, 1967, to obtain instruction from the government whether police force could be used as hitherto for restoring order and the extent to which such use of force would be permissible. In his letter the Deputy Commissioner had said that the first pronouncements and orders of the new government had generally pleased the students and that they felt quite jubilant over the appointment of a commission to enquire into the incidents and the use of force by the police at Ranchi on the 3rd January 1967. He also drew attention to the fact that the feelings between the students and the administration had got embittered and the feelings were particularly strong against the police, and also that the mood of policemen was somewhat sullen. He further said that the position at least in the university towns and other urban centres was that a District Magistrate could not look to the police to help him out in any trouble involving students.

54. No reply to this letter was received by the Deputy Commissioner till the 29th March, 1967 when he sent a wireless message to Patna in view of the trouble between the students and the taxi drivers, and in which message he expressed the police helplessness and solicited orders about the use of force or otherwise to deal with the students.

55. In a note on the incident of lawlessness at Ranchi since 1st March, 1967, forwarded to the Secretary to Government in the Political (Special) Department on the 30th March, 1967, for discussion with the Chief Minister on his visit to Ranchi on the 30th March, the Deputy Commissioner after narrating certain incidents between the students and the police said that demoralisation in the police was apparent, that the factor further complicating the situation was the persisting attitude from the past between the government and the police. He further said:—

"The ushering in of the new government in a strong anti-police sentiment and the ordering of judicial enquiries in a number of past actions of the police, as the very first acts of the new government, has unnerved the police."

He concluded:—

"If the police are to discharge the functions normally assigned to them after any reorientation in their outlook, tradition or training, orders to that effect be conveyed. Whatever role of the police is found acceptable in the situation, be declared to be so acceptable so that there were no misgivings in the mind of any section of the public on the one hand and the police on the other."

56. The Chief Minister along with other Cabinet Ministers visited Ranchi on the 30th March and addressing the students told them as to where they were wrong and what could happen if they persisted in such irresponsible acts, thus disabusing their minds of the notion that everywhere and at every time, as students they were free to do anything they liked. The public also felt relieved to learn that the government stood committed to ensure protection to their life and property and that whatever the feelings of the Government for the students be, they would not condone such acts of open lawlessness.

57. General instructions were issued by the Government on 31st March, 1967 to all Deputy Commissioners that the authorities had to shoulder the responsibility to act under the law.

58. In his letter to the Commissioner dated the 1st April, 1967, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, gave a detailed note about the incident of 29th March. He remarked in paragraph 22 of the letter:—

"In the present context, it produced a desire for evasion of the responsibility somehow. No officer or policeman would like to hear filthy abuses being hurled on him in presence of the force whom he had to command and the public whose confidence they have to enjoy. It was, therefore, natural for the Additional S.P. to ask for instructions from me first."

Further on he said:—

"It was not only at the time of going that he sought my instructions, the Sub-Divisional Officer when in danger of being surrounded by students mob, again sought instructions as to what they should do."

59. A similar feeling of lack of confidence in himself was shown by a magistrate on duty on the 22nd August, 1967. The S.D.O. has noted in his report dated 22nd October, 1967:—

"Casual enquiry has revealed that a magistrate felt demoralised and he wanted the presence of Senior Officer and magistrate to guide him regarding his action in that difficult hour. There is no denying the fact that a magistrate has to act with courage, initiative and drive to handle a difficult situation. He has to take a decision to save the life and properties of the people without caring for its consequences. At a time when enquiry was going on in Ranchi Town regarding lathi charge in January, 1967, the magis-

trate perhaps needed more courage and initiative to take decision at once."

60. In paragraph 24 of the aforesaid letter the Deputy Commissioner said:—

"Ranchi may have appeared peaceful in the past three years but the town has every thing which could lead to explosions of violence frequently. The town has suddenly expanded many fold. People from different parts of the province and the country having no relationship with each other have flocked here. The years 1961 to 1964 witnessed very unstable conditions in Ranchi. It was definitely due to a very tight law and order administration which kept the trouble suppressed always. It was natural, therefore, to expect some explosion when the pressure got slightly released either due to the transfer of particular officers or a change was there as brought by the recent elections. The police, no doubt, reached taxi stand when the miscreants were not actually damaging the taxis but the miscreants were there. They had run away into the side lanes. The police, however, did not chase them to make any arrest, as they did not feel strong enough to do so in view of the prevailing mood of the students. I do not know what would have happened, if they had been chased and arrested, but for our without doing so the students very impudently reassembled and virtually showed to the police, that they were not ready to tolerate their arrival even after hearing of any trouble involving students."

61. It was on the 24th of April, 1967, that instructions were issued by the government in connection with indiscipline and lawlessness among students. Reiterating that the responsibility of maintaining law and order rested primarily with the magistracy and the police meant for giving due protection to life and property, the government made it clear that nobody was immune from the action of the law of the land and that no section of the community, including students, could enjoy a privileged position in the eyes of law.

62. After suggesting certain steps to be taken in dealing with student troubles, it was said in paragraph 3 of the letter:

"This will not mean that the guardians of law and order can withdraw from the scene or give up their responsibility. If anything, their responsibility will be greater than before. On the subject of prevention and quelling of disturbances of the public peace, comprehensive instructions were issued in Chief Secretary Shri M. S. Rao's circular letter No. CR-27, dated the 21st June, 1958. Subject to what has been said in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, these instructions continue to hold good but Government would like to emphasise that the use of force should be the last resort when other methods as explained above have failed and the deputation of armed police should not be made except in an extremely serious situation when a large scale disorder is threatened or there is a very serious threat to life and property."

63. Another order issued on the same day from the government on the question of entry of police into university campuses and educational institutions after pointing out the legal position that no area is exempt from the operation of the law of the land, that no person or group of persons can be given a privileged position in the eyes of the law, gave directions and laid down certain procedures to be followed. It gave formal clarification of the police being free to use force against students or in any contingency where it is justified.

64. The effect of the view of the government against the use of firing or lathi force could not be washed out. A simple fact will amply make it clear and it is that in his letter dated the 28th August, 1967, the Commissioner of Chhotanagpur indirectly referred with satisfaction to the fact that the situation at Ranchi was controlled practically without opening fire or bloodshed and remarked:

"Considering that the government are generally averse to opening fire, this is a notable feature of the present operations."

65. The above discussion of the policy of the U.F. Government and its effect on the police can, to some extent, explain the ostensible inactivity of the police force during the riots. There has been a general complaint, which cannot be justified in all cases, that the police did not take any action against any miscreants who acted mischievously in their presence.

66. The Deputy Commissioner had stated that the combined effect of the announcement of the commission of inquiry about the incidents at Ranchi on 3rd January, 1967 and the statements made by responsible Ministers to the students that there would be no firing or undue use of force against them made the authorities uncertain about the measures to be adopted in meeting lawless situations, and that the clarifications made in the directions given by the State Government on the 24th April could not have removed the entire effect from the minds of the authorities created by the earlier speeches. He further said that previously enquiry commissions were ordered into the cases of firing but now an inquiry had been ordered into a case of lathi charge and hence the uncertainties were not removed. A witness said that the respect for the officers on the part of the public was reduced mainly on account of the judicial inquiry in connection with the police lathi charge in Ranchi. The officers were put very uncomfortable questions.

67. Another witness deposed that a senior police officer told him that they could resort to firing if the Police Minister ordered them and on being told that they had some duties and some power to order firing if the situation warranted, the officer said that that would lead to another inquiry and so, they would not resort to firing. This gave him the idea that the police were demoralised.

#### **Home Guards**

68. Home Guards are recruited in accordance with the provisions of the Bihar Home Guards Act, 1947 and the rules framed thereunder.

69. In the course of the Ranchi disturbances 3 Urban Home Guards assisted the police in evacuating stranded persons from affected areas on August 22, 1967. On August 23, 273 Urban Home Guards were mobilised. Out of these, 253 were employees of different government offices or public undertakings at Ranchi.

70. There have been complaints against the Home Guards. It is alleged that they abetted the looters and law breakers. Whatever be the truth in such allegations, there is good evidence about their being remiss in the discharge of their duties on occasions. Addl. Superintendent of Police heard some rumours on the 23rd August about some Home Guards shouting anti-Muslim slogans. He, however, could not locate the culprits. He did not remember to have received any specific complaints against the Home Guards searching houses or making arrests.

71. A magistrate deposed before the Commission that he did notice during patrolling with the military that whenever there was some noise or commotion, some of the Home Guards used to get afraid and used to run towards them.

72. Shri H. N. Kant, Magistrate, stated in his report dated 24th August about the Medical College incident, that when he asked the Sub-Inspector to divide the 30 Home Guards who had arrived into five units and to direct them to take up patrolling on the road for intensive patrolling, most of them were not available. Nonavailability of Home Guards on the occasion also appears to account for the statement of the Company Commander, Home Guards at Ranchi, who was with the static police party at R.M.C. that 18 Home Guards were deputed at the Rajindra Medical College.

73. The S.D.O. in his report dated 23rd October said that Urban Home Guards were mobilised for duty in Ranchi town on August 23 but it has been gathered that they also took part in rumour mongering.

74. It is gathered from the Secretary to the Government of Bihar, Political (Special) Department that Home Guards are not primarily meant for law and order duty—Government instructions in the matter being that in extreme urgency when there may be shortage of police force, they may be utilised for maintenance of law and order and that the Home Guards, when employed on such duty, are subject to the discipline and punishment for any misdemeanour.

75. As Home Guards carry on like ordinary citizens till called up for duty, they are not expected to be so disciplined as a regular police force. It may be better if they are not utilised on law and order duty specially during communal disturbances when the passions of persons belonging to different communities are liable to get excited and would affect the discharge of duties unless a person has been under rigorous discipline.

## PART V

### RECOMMENDATIONS

The root cause of the breaking out of serious disturbances as a result of any minor incident has been found to be the mistrust existing between the two communities since 1947 when the partition of the country took place. All efforts have to be made to remove this mistrust. What the efforts should be is for the political and social parties to evolve. Genuine improvement of the relation between the two countries—Pakistan and India—may go a long way in allaying the apprehensions born out of mistrust and ultimately in removing the mistrust. The Commission considers it to be useful if people of all the communities form a permanent non-official organisation for doing the necessary propaganda to allay the mistrust. The move should come from non-officials. The propaganda can be carried out through the press and platform and through other means of communication. It should be on a consistent regular basis for inculcating a feeling in the Hindus to consider the Muslims who have been residing in the country as good citizens and nationalists as they are, and in the Muslims the feeling that they are the citizens of this country and should show no sympathy or preference to Pakistan in matters of differences between Pakistan and India. It is the exhibition of some such sympathy or preference for Pakistan which is responsible for keeping the distrust alive, even though the persons expressing it may be only a small fraction of the Muslim population. So long as such activities even of a few are there, distrust is bound to exist.

2. It may be helpful if text books in schools contained matters relating to all religions and mythology, referring to all great men and religious leaders of all the communities with respect. Matters should be so presented as not to be a propaganda for any particular religious faith. Similarly, history books should lay particular stress on facts relating to the unifying and good acts of previous rulers and administrators and should refer to unfavourable acts only objectively. In other words, no such fact be presented in a manner as to create disharmony among different sections of the people. Of course, history has to present, in a comprehensive manner, facts as they took place. History of the national struggle against the British should have references to the contributions and sacrifices of the members of the various communities.

3. The press or the speeches from the platform should avoid any expressions which may tend to create ill-will between the various communities in the country.

4. Anyway, so long as the attitude of the two major communities in the country does not change from that of distrust to one of mutual trust, as existed prior to the partition, the danger of conflagration

out of any incident, of whatever nature, between any two members of the communities would continue and it is essential for the administration to remain geared up to meet such sudden situations.

5. Another aspect of the question of bringing about improvement in the relations between the communities is that the periodic occasions likely to give rise to communal tension and clashes hardly give sufficient time for the stabilisation of improved relations when once they start improving. It is, therefore, of great importance that the authorities should try to control the rising tension on such occasions and to make adequate arrangements for the occasions to pass off peacefully. A sufficiently long period free from tension is bound to have a salutary effect on the results of efforts for permanently improving communal relation.

6. On the administrative plane, the measures that may be taken for preventing and for dealing with such disturbances as in Ranchi and Hatia can be the following:—

#### I—State level

(i) Whenever any agitation in the State is likely to lead to communal disaffection and trouble, the State Government should not only warn the District Magistrates and the Superintendents of Police to be alert but should itself take steps to settle the matter leading to the agitation. The Ministers constituting the Government should not speak with different voices as happened to be the case in connection with the agitation about making Urdu the second official language of the State. Such statements are bound to intensify the agitation and used by the parties to the agitation in favour of their respective cases. The persons who can be taken to be the spokesmen of the government should always speak in public with one voice.

(ii) Once the trouble starts the State Ministers ought not to express their views about the causes of the disturbances and the way they had been dealt with. Such statements are bound to be based on statements made to them, statements which in the circumstances are bound to be coloured and exaggerated. Any comment on how the situation is being dealt with by the local officers is bound to affect the steps taken by the local administrators who have to perform a very difficult task during the disturbances. There should be a self-imposed ban on their making statements specially when State Ministers may not be speaking with one voice.

(iii) Thirdly, the State Ministers should not try to unduly influence the local officers in their dealing with a situation for the simple reason that even though elected, their knowledge of the local conditions is not expected to be as thorough as of the local officers. The State Ministers may suggest to the head of the department what appears to them to be the right way of dealing with the situation. It is for the head of the department then to guide his subordinate officers in the actual way of dealing with the situation they are confronted with.

(iv) The State Ministers should not, at least openly, make any statements which tend to undermine the respect for authority and

tend to demoralise the authorities. Nothing is more conducive to good administration than trust in the administration and the administrator. If that is lost, the administration is bound to suffer.

(v) Officers in service should not be transferred on grounds other than genuine exigencies of service. Transfers should not, as a rule, be made merely on verbal-cum-private complaints. Such complaints should be substantiated.

(vi) Postings of District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police to various stations should be according to the importance of the places and the comparative experience of the officers concerned. Such officers should not only be able to tackle the situation suitably but should also enjoy the confidence of their superiors in times of emergency.

(vii) Firm legal action be taken against the persons acting in a manner likely to create ill-will, hatred etc. between the communities. Such cases once sent to court should not be withdrawn for political reasons.

(viii) The procedure for calling up the military to the aid of civil authorities should be clarified to avoid any delay in the response of the army to the requisition, or to avoid any last moment argument between the two authorities; and should clearly lay down the respective duties and powers of the army and the police so that no actual confusion arises between the two executive agencies in dealing with the disturbances.

(ix) Augmentation of the State Police and the Central Reserve Police may reduce the possibility of calling on the military for coming to the aid of civil authorities.

(x) More importance be given to one of the functions of the Special Branch, namely, the function of gathering information about communal activities and tension.

(xi) Government may consider issuing of a notification directing that section 4 of the Arms Act shall apply to specified cities or areas susceptible to violence in general or communal tension and also consider notifying such arms as daggers, knives, spears, swords etc. which no person shall acquire, have in his possession or carry in those cities or areas without a licence.

## **II—District level**

(i) The District Magistrates and the Superintendents of Police and their subordinate staff should be fully conversant with the emergency scheme prepared for the area and the part which each of the subordinate officers will have to play once the enforcement of the emergency scheme is announced. This would be a guarantee for making proper arrangements in enforcing the scheme and would avoid the delay in getting deployment of magistrates and police once the disturbance starts. It may be useful to have some rehearsal of the emergency scheme occasionally.

(ii) To enforce the emergency scheme, the reserve police and magistrates at the disposal of the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police should be adequate. It appears that several recommendations from the Superintendent of Police about the establishment of extra police stations, redistribution of their jurisdiction and increase in the number of forces are pending for consideration with the State Government for a long time. These should be dealt with the promptness they demand. If the proposals are sound, they should be accepted. If not, they should be rejected. Holding in suspension such proposals for an inordinately long time does nobody any good.

(iii) There should be no hesitation in arresting goondas even on the mere possibility of a disturbance. The period of time between the imminence of a disturbance and its actual occurrence is bound to be too short and once the disturbance starts, the arrest of the goondas may be difficult, both for want of force and because of the likelihood of their going underground.

(iv) All measures of preventive action should be taken on the mere possibility of a communal disturbance in the present atmosphere. It is better to be forewarned and forearmed than to be optimistic and be proved wrong.

(v) Contradicting the rumours likely to inflame communal tension, which are bound to get afloat at the happening of the slightest incident is of prime importance. Rumours travel very fast and can be contradicted only on officers getting information about their currency. It is to be considered how to contradict them before they get circulated widely and what action can be taken against the persons spreading such rumours. The use of the radio may also be helpful in contradicting rumours and giving out correct facts of the situation. Ranchi has a radio station and it should be possible to arrange frequent broadcasts on some controlled wave length for this purpose.

The use of publicity vehicles for contradicting rumours in a large city like Ranchi has not been found very effective on account of the time-lag factor.

(vi) The pattern of the police and the military patrolling in vehicles has not been found to be very effective. When the vehicles pass a certain place, the people committing mischief or intending to commit mischief get off the road and conceal themselves. They come out just after the vehicles have passed, in full knowledge that no further patrol party would be coming along to stop them from their activities for a substantial period of time. Further, the vehicles cannot go through a number of lanes and by-lanes connecting the main streets and roads of Ranchi. The patrolling party should be so arranged that it would pass a certain spot within short intervals of time. The patrolling party can make surprise return visits to the spot. This can be one satisfactory way of checking incidents once disturbances have broken out.

(vii) Static pickets should also be so located and utilised in the troubulous areas as to be really able to control that area. The latest figures for pickets and patrolling parties in the draft revised emergency plan for the district show a marked increase over the previous figures.

(viii) Proper arrangements for the enforcement of 144 Cr.P.C. orders and curfew must be invariably made as failure to enforce these orders properly stultify them and makes people apt to ignore them.

(ix) In the August 1967 disturbances, no information reached the District Magistrate or the Sub-Divisional Officer about the taking out of the procession or its being brickbatted till 4-30 P.M. and 3.30 P.M. respectively. Walkie-Talkie sets should be provided to the police parties escorting processions so that immediate information from places where trouble has taken place can be communicated to the control room. Such sets can be provided also to the armed pickets. So long as such sets cannot be provided to the armed pickets, telephones may be provided at vulnerable places according to the emergency scheme.

(x) A city magistrate for Ranchi city should be appointed. The city and its suburbs are increasing rapidly and so are increasing the various problems for law and order. It is high time that a city magistrate was especially appointed to deal with the city area.

(xi) Some increase in the permanent magisterial staff of the district is also indicated. On the 22nd August we find a number of officers from the Administrative Training School drafted on duty. They had no experience and were just vested with magisterial powers to meet the requirements of law. Lack of experience and knowledge of the duties of a magistrate could not have made them really effective magistrates in the discharge of duties expected of them.

(xii) Hatia, where the industrial establishment of the H.E.C. is situated, deserves to be an independent sub-division. It is understood that the State Government has decided to create a sub-division there.

(xiii) The present police arrangement for the Hatia colony is far from satisfactory. Most of the area of the colony is within the jurisdiction of Sadar Police Station, about 8 to 10 miles away. One or two separate police stations for such a colony are necessary for the proper control of the area.

(xiv) Adequate armed reserve force should also be posted at Hatia.

(xv) The security personnel of the H.E.C. should also be invested with police powers in emergencies by the competent authorities. At present their powers are limited only to the protection of the plant.

(xvi) Improvement in the working of the intelligence system is necessary. The special branch may need an increase in manpower.

All possible avenues of getting information about developments of communal tensions should be utilised by the district officers. It be impressed on all government and public bodies that they should not hesitate to convey any such information to the authorities.

(xvii) The authorities should have more direct contact with the people. The District authorities should evolve some such means of contact with the people as would ensure their obtaining reliable information of the trends of activities in the city.

(xviii) Preventive action under Cr.P.C., Preventive Detention Act and other enactments should be taken at as early a stage as possible against possible mischief makers.

(xix) Services of well-known peace loving people be utilised to influence people to keep communal harmony and peace whenever there is apprehension of communal trouble. They should exert themselves during the period communal tensions are being built up rather than later when tensions had resulted in communal clashes.

(xx) Arrangements should be made, if possible, for a photographer to accompany processions taken out in connection with agitations on controversial matters so that photographs may be taken of any untoward incident happening during the procession. The photographs can then be used in detecting the culprits.

### **III—General**

(i) The political parties should change their attitude in approaching the people for their gain, especially at elections. They should not exploit communal or caste feelings for their purposes. No political, economic or cultural issues should be discussed or agitated from a purely communal angle. Communal harmony should be taken to be too sacred to be tampered with for mere political gain.

(ii) Similarly, communal polities should be kept out of labour unions, which should deal with matters purely connected with the welfare of labour.

(iii) A view has been expressed by several persons that communal parties should be banned. The proposal is fraught with difficulties, objective and subjective. The decision to declare a party communal and to ban it necessarily will have to be taken by the political party in power and the decision may not be fair. What type of communal organisation is to be banned would require careful consideration. Communal organisations merely constituted for the improvement of their communities may not be banned constitutionally. Communal organisations inciting ill-will or hatred against other communities could be considered as of a different category.

(iv) Wherever an industrial establishment is to be established anew, it would be worthwhile to include in the scheme for its establishment and attached colony, a provision for the establishment of a police station with the necessary police force for that area so that such make-shift arrangements as are in existence at Hatia be

avoided. It may also be possible in such a case that the cost of police establishment be borne, to some extent, by the industrial establishment or by the government sponsoring it.

*Measures suggested for being taken after the disturbances*

7. Collective fines and the posting of the punitive police in areas where large scale communal disturbances took place would be effective. It is true that person who had nothing to do with the disturbances may have to suffer but the collective responsibility of the entire society to remain peaceful and the failure of the people to discharge that responsibility justifies these two measures.

**Rehabilitation**

8. (i) All dependents of a person killed in riots should be paid adequate financial assistance.

(ii) Some compensation to victims for the loss suffered during the disturbances and for rehabilitation should be given.

9. We may not deal with some other suggestions made to us.

10. One of the suggestions is to organise some specified areas in some of the States on a cultural basis. The suggestion is that various Muslim pockets scattered all over India may be given the status of 'States' without disturbing the present population and that in these 'States' non-Muslims may also live and enjoy their rights as equal citizens. The suggestion, to our mind, instead of improving matters is bound to create more mistrust by confirming the existing mistrust between the communities as a result of the partition of the country.

11. The other two suggestions are that severe disciplinary action should be taken against the district and police authorities if they do not immediately take adequate and stern measures to quell the disturbances and that they should be transferred immediately on their failure to quell the disturbances in order to facilitate an inquiry against them. The suggestions emanate from an impression that no disturbance can take place in a town like Ranchi if only the district and the police authorities do not want it. Such a supposition seems to be wide of the mark. The authorities are not expected to, and do not create riots. It is their misfortune that they do take place and they have to deal with them according to the best of their ability. However, to lay down any such rules or direction as suggested would place a premium on the goondas and the mischievous people of the city. They can take advantage of any situation and create disturbances which may lead to the suggested action against the authorities. Of course, whenever such disturbances take place and there be complaints against the conduct of the local authorities, it is for the government to make inquiries about the complaints and if it is proved that some officer was guilty of dereliction of duty, to take action against him. Merely his failure to quell disturbances cannot be taken as a positive proof of the dereliction of duty on his part. Disturbances may not be quelled speedily even if the best possible arrangements are made.

12. Further, any immediate transfer of a public servant on the happening of a certain incident within his jurisdiction is bound to affect his prestige and to cast a slur on his efficiency, even though on inquiry he may be later absolved of any charge of failure in the discharge of his duties. Reference may be made here to the effect of Gen. Habibullah's leaving his post at the H.E.C. after the inquiry conducted by Mr. Justice Mukherji, which cleared him of complicity in the incident of arson at the H.E.C. plant. The suspicion of the people in general about his complicity, however, continued.

13. We do not consider these suggestions to be suitable for the prevention of communal disturbances or for their being effectively dealt with.

14. It would follow as a corollary from these suggestions that officers in whose jurisdiction communal disturbances do not take place or when they take place, are quickly quelled, are officers of higher calibre and should be rewarded in some form, be it by way of promotion or by way of being posted to the districts, which are considered better than others. It is for the administration to select officers for posting to a particular station which is considered important on the basis of the experience of the officer to be posted there. All officers cannot succeed in all posts and places, but to lay down any criterion like the one under discussion, has the potentiality of officers manipulating situations which may appear to give rise to apprehension of breach of the peace and then readily bringing the conditions to normalcy and thus gaining kudos for their action. After all, every officer is human and some of them may be tempted that way!

15. The general rule of keeping a record of an officer's service and taking action against him for his failure to do his duty and commanding him for his good work of the ordinary, should continue to be fully effective in getting the best out of a public servant.

16. Another suggestion is that maintenance of law and order be made a Central subject and that the State machinery for it should be more directly and more effectively under the control and supervision of the Central Government. This suggestion apart from other considerations, seems to be impracticable. The States have to be responsible for the maintenance of law and order.

17. The suggestion for provision of contiguous living quarters for all Muslims in the H.E.C., again, seems to be a suggestion which would tend to perpetuate the separation of the communities and mistrust between them and will not be conducive to harmonious relations.

18. The suggestion for recruitment of greater proportion of Muslims to the police force in the various States presumes that either Muslims are deliberately not recruited to the various forces or that there should be some posts in the various services to be reserved for

Muslims. The suggestion cannot be favoured. Recruitment to the services should be on the basis of merit and it is to be presumed that the recruiting authority recruits fairly. If there be any instance of the recruiting agency failing in its duty with respect to any particular individual, a grievance can be made of it and can be inquired into. So far as recruitment through public service commissions is concerned, selection must be deemed to be on merit. So far as selection by other agencies is concerned, no direction can be issued for their leaning in favour of Muslims to see that an adequate number of Muslims are recruited whenever recruitment is made to any particular service.

19. Recruitment in Bihar of Muslims to the police services seems to be fairly conducted. The Chief Secretary has rightly expressed the view that he did not consider it a proper approach to the question of recruitment of services, especially the police service, whether recruitment is adequate or otherwise in respect of any particular community. There were different modes of selection for different services. Thereafter he gave sample figures for recruitment to the ranks of Dy. S.Ps. and S.I.s. in different years. He said:—

"In 1964, four Dy. S.Ps. were appointed and all the four happened to be Hindus. 25 Sub-Inspectors were appointed in that year and out of them, 23 were Hindus and 2 were Muslims, that is, 8 per cent. In 1965, no Dy. S.P. was appointed but 25 Sub-Inspectors were appointed, out of whom 23 were Hindus and 3 were Muslims, i.e., 11·5 per cent. In 1966, five Dy. S.Ps. were appointed out of whom 2 were Muslims and 3 were Hindus, that is, giving 40 per cent. representation to Muslims. In that year 31 Sub-Inspectors were appointed out of whom 4 were Muslims, i.e., 12·9 per cent. In 1967, three Dy. S.Ps. were appointed and none of them was a Muslim; 28 Sub-Inspectors of Police were appointed and 2 were Muslims among them, i.e., 7·04 per cent.

There is no communal reservation.

Out of 7 D.I.Gs., three are Muslims."

20. The Inspector General of Police had expressed the opinion that the Muslims were reasonably represented in the Police of the State.

21. Another suggestion is that a Board for the Indian Muslim minority with effective powers to look after the welfare of the Muslims and able to secure the redressal of their grievances should be established at the Centre and in each of the States of the Union of India and that men of the highest integrity and well-established non-communal outlook alone should be selected to serve on these Boards. To us, this suggestion again would perpetuate the separatist attitude of the Muslims and would be of no help in bringing about harmonious relations between the two communities.

22. While we have expressed our non-approval of certain suggestions made to us, we are of opinion that a periodical review of the way provisions of Articles 15(1) and 16 of the Constitution and the enactments made thereunder have been actually worked may be useful to allay the fears evidenced by certain of these suggestions. Articles 15(1) and 16 provide *inter alia* about non-discrimination on grounds of religion and caste and about equality of opportunity in matters of employment. Individual cases of discrimination can be dealt with by courts but a general feeling about it can be dealt with more thoroughly and effectively by a periodical review.

RAGHUBAR DAYAL,

*Chairman.*

B. H. ZAIDI,

*Member.*

M. M. PHILIP,

*Member.*

NEW DELHI;

Dated 17th August, 1968.

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## ANNEXURE I

*List of persons and organisations who submitted affidavits/statements on the communal disturbances at Ranchi-Hatia (August 22-29, 1967)*

(Para 1.10 of Part I)

1. Shri Devi Dayal Bhagat,  
General Secretary,  
District Congress Committee  
Ranchi.
2. Shri Ganesh Singh  
former Senior Security Officer  
now Chief of Security Division,  
Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd.,  
Ranchi.
3. Shri M. Sohail Shamsi  
FFP, Finance & Accounts Division,  
Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd.,  
Dhurwa, Ranchi.
4. Shri M.B. Zaman,  
Executive Engineer (Design),  
HMBP, Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd.,  
Ranchi.
5. Shri Sohail Ahmad Khan,  
Ranna Road,  
Patna-4.
6. Syed Homaid Hasan,  
Sub-Accountant,  
Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd.,  
Ranchi.
7. (i) (Maulana) Faruqul Hussaini,  
General Secretary,  
Bihar State Jamiatul-Ulma-e-Hind, Baquargunj,  
Patna. Received through Jamiatul-Ulma-e-Hind.
- (ii) Maulvi Abdul Rashid,  
Vice-President,  
Ranchi District Jamiatul-Ulma-e-Hind,  
Baquargunj, Patna. Do.
8. Shri Haji Md. Faruque,  
Mohalla Manitila,  
Lower Hinoo, Ranchi. Do.
9. Shri Abdul Rahim,  
Abdul Rahim Lane,  
Konka, Ranchi. Do.]
10. Md. Habib,  
Lalkothi, Shastri Chowk,  
Ratu Road, Ranchi. Do.

11. Shri Barko Mian,  
Lac Factory,  
Ratu Road, Ranchi.
12. Shri Amiran,  
Lalkothi, Shastri Chowk,  
Ratu Road, Ranchi.
13. Shri Alimuddin,  
Harmoo Road,  
Ranchi.
14. Shri Amjad Mian,  
Harmoo Road,  
Ranchi.
15. Shri Ruplal Bhuniyan,  
Cremator,  
Masanghat, Harmoo Smasan,  
P.S. Sadar, Ranchi.
16. Shri Ram Draon,  
Rickshaw Puller,  
Harmoo, Ranchi.
17. Md. Nazamuddin,  
Qvazmi Ballu Mian Lane,  
P.S. Kotwali,  
Ranchi.
18. Shri Deoki Nandan Singh,  
Staff Correspondent of Statesman  
for Chhota Nagpur,  
Ranchi.
19. Shri Abdul Kafil,  
Final Year Student,  
Rajendra Medical College,  
Ranchi.
20. Shri Chandi Prasad,  
Secretary  
District Committee of  
Communist Party of India (M).,  
Ranchi.
21. Shri Lakshmi Narayan Singh,  
Ranchi.
22. Shri Q. M. Sayeed,  
Convenor,  
Enquiry Commission Coordination  
Committee, Bhawnrpokhar,  
Patna-4.
23. Shri Anisuddin Ahmed,  
Secretary,  
Markazi Muslim Relief Committee,  
Ranchi.
24. (i) Dr. H. R. Deshmukh, M.B.B.S.,  
242, Ramdaspet,  
Nagpur.  
(ii) Shri A.K. Lakhani,  
Dhantoli,  
Nagpur.
- Received through Jamiatul-Ulma-e-Hind.  
Do.  
Do.  
Do.  
Do.  
Do.  
Do.  
Do.  
Do.

25. Smt. Subhadra Joshi,  
Convener,  
Sampradayikta Virodhi Committee,  
15-B, Wasan Marg,  
Pusa Road, New Delhi.
26. Shri Hiranand Tiwari,  
Kantu, P.S. Sadar,  
Ranchi.
27. Shri Harnandan Singh,  
Bihar State Council of  
the Communist Party of India,  
Patna.
28. Shri S. S. Dhanoa,  
Registrar,  
Cooperative Societies &  
former Dy. Commissioner, Ranchi,  
(now Joint Director,  
National Academy of Administration,  
Mussoorie).

## ANNEXURE II

*Names of witnesses examined and dates on which examined*

(Para 1.11 and 2.1 of Part I)

(Para 2.4 of Part II)

<b>S.No.</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Name of witness</b>
1.	25th & 26th March, 1968	Shri Rameshwar Nath, Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.
2.	27th March, 1968	Shri S. P. Thakur, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Ranchi.
3.	27th & 28th March, 1968	Shri S. P. Sinha, Superintendent of Police, Ranchi.
4.	28th March, 1968	Shri U. Prasad, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ranchi City, Ranchi.
5.	28th & 29th March, 1968	Shri Shivjanam Singh, Sub-Inspector of Police, Officer-in-charge, Kotwali P.S., Ranchi.
6.	29th March, 1968	Shri L. Dayal, Secretary to the Govt. of Bihar, Political (Special) Department, Patna.
7.	Do.	Shri S. S. Dhanoa, former Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi & Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Bihar.
8.	Do	Dr. N. L. Mitra, Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi.
9.	30th March, 1968	Shri T. R. Gupta, ex-Chairman of H.E.C. Ltd., Ranchi, 1, Ballygunge, Park Road, Calcutta-19.
10.	Do.	Shri A. K. Choudhary, former Chief of Security Division, H.E.C. Ltd., (now Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, C.I.D., Patna).
11.	2nd April, 1968	Shri R. N. Thakur, Magistrate, Ranchi.
12.	2nd April, 1968	Shri Ramrup Singh, Magistrate, Ranchi.
13.	Do.	Shri J. Tripathy, Nazarat Deputy Collector, Ranchi.

1	2	3
14.	2nd April 1968	Shri U. C. Prasad, Deputy Magistrate, Ranchi.
15.	Do.	Shri M. Rahman, Deputy Magistrate, Ranchi.
16.	Do.	Shri H.H.K. Bright, Deputy Magistrate, Ranchi.
17.	3rd April, 1968	Shri D. S. Sinha, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Southern Range, Ranchi.
18.	Do.	Shri K. N. Sinha, Magistrate, Ranchi.
19.	Do.	Shri S. N. Jha, Magistrate, Ranchi.
20.	Do.	Shri Hem Narayan Kant, Magistrate, Ranchi.
21.	Do.	Shri B. Prasad, Sub-Deputy Collector, Ranchi.
22.	4th April, 1968	Shri B. P. Singh, Deputy Magistrate, Ranchi.
23.	Do.	Shri Ram Adhar Singh, Sub-Inspector of Police, Ranchi.
24.	Do.	Shri I. B. Tiwari, Inspector of Police, Ranchi.
25.	Do.	Shri S. M. Rahman, Inspector of Police, Ranchi.
26.	Do.	Shri Abdul Kafil, Final Year Student, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi.
27.	4th & 5th April 1968	Shri Syed Homaid Hassan, Sub-Accountant, H.E.C., Ranchi.
28.	5th April, 1968	Shri Chandi Prasad, Secretary, C.P.I.(M) District Committee, Ranchi.
29.	Do.	Shri Harnandan Singh, Secretary, Bihar State C.P.I.(M), Patna.
30.	5th & 18th April 1968	Shri Devi Dayal Bhagat, Secretary, Ranchi District Congress Committee, Ranchi.
31.	18th April, 1968	Shri Y. K. Sinha, Magistrate, Ranchi.
32.	Do.	Shri G. N. Dubey, Magistrate, Ranchi.

1	2	3
33.	18th April, 1968	Shri S. P. Sinha, Magistrate, Ranchi.
34.	Do.	Shri A. K. Sinha, Magistrate, Ranchi.
35.	Do.	Shri B. M. Lal, Sub-Inspector of Police, Ranchi.
36.	19th April, 1968	Shri G. S. Pathak, Assistant Sub-Inspector, Ranchi.
37.	Do.	Shri K. P. Sinha, Warden, Rajendra Medical College Hostel, Ranchi.
38.	Do.	Shri N. K. Verma, Deputy Collector, Patna.
39.	Do.	Shri Kashyap, Town Administrator, H.E.C. Ltd., Ranchi.
40.	Do.	Shri Deoki Nandan Singh, Staff Correspondent of the 'Statesman', for Chhotanagpur, Deputypara, Ranchi.
41.	Do.	Shri M. M. Munshi, Executive Engineer, H.E.C., Ltd., Ranchi.
42.	20th April, 1968	Shri N. Khelkho, Publicity Officer, Ranchi.
43.	Do.	Shri Durga Charan Ghosh, Commissioner's Compound, Ranchi.
44.	Do.	Md. Muslim Hoda, Hind Road, Upper Bazar, Ranchi, (at present Pathal Khudwa, Ranchi).
45.	Do.	Md. Ishar, Proprietor, Cotton and Cloth Shop attached to Jama Masjid, Upper Bazar, Ranchi. (at present at Hindpiri).
46.	22nd April, 1968	Shri A. K. Banerjee, Addl. Collector, Ranchi.
47.	Do.	Shri K. K. Prasad, Magistrate, Ranchi.
48.	Do.	Shri S. D. Pandey, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, Ranchi.
49.	22nd and 24th April, 1968	Shri Sakaldev Singh, Assistant Publicity Officer, Ranchi.
50.	22nd April, 1968	Shri Mahamaya Prasad-Sinha, MLA, former Chief Minister, Bihar, Patna.
51.	24th April, 1968	Shri Kameshwar Nath, Public Prosecutor, Market Road, Noroth, Ranchi.

I	2	3
52.	24th April, 1968	Shri S. Banerjee, Manager, Bank of India, Main Road, Ranchi.
53.	Do.	Shri B. K. Brahma, Old Commissioner's Compound, Ranchi.
54.	Do.	Shri Abdul Haque, Lac Factory, Ranchi.
55.	Do.	Shri Nurul Hoda, Hind Road, Upper Bazar, Ranchi. (at present Pathal Khudwa, Ranchi).
56.	Do.	Shri N. K. Samanto, Contractor, Burdwan Compound, Ranchi.
57.	Do.	Shri Abdul Rashid, 14, Church Road, Ranchi.
58.	25th April, 1968	Shri Gaya Prasad Chowdhary, Ratu Road, Ranchi.
59.	Do.	Shri Sitaram Sahu, Tamar, P. O. Tamar, Ranchi.
60.	Do.	Shri Jayanti Lal Ghosal, Crossing of Hindpiri, 2nd Street and Central Street, Ranchi.
61.	Do.	Shri Nando Kumar Modi, Municipal Commissioner, Upper Bazar, Ranchi.
62.	Do.	Shri Akhil Chandra Hazare, Refugee Colony, Kanta Toli, Ranchi.
63.	Do.	Shri Lalit Mohan Sarkar, C.P.I. (M) Office, Birsa Chowk, P. S. Hatia, Ranchi.
64.	Do.	Shri Trilok Chand Gaarg, C.P.I. (M) Office Birsa Chowk, P. S. Hatia, Ranchi.
65.	26th April, 1968	Shri Hiramoy Roy, C.P.I. (M) Office, Hatia P. S., Ranchi.
66.	Do.	Shri Biren Nath Roy, C.P.I. (M) Office, P. S. Hatia, Ranchi.
67.	26th and 30th April, 1968	Shri Abdal Rauf, C.P.I. (M) Office, P. S. Hatia, Ranchi.
68.	26th April, 1968	Brig. K. K. Kurian Vr. C., former Sub-Area Commander, Bihar and Orissa (Indep) Sub-Area, Dinapore Captt.

I	2	3
69.	27th April, 1968	Shri S. N. Akhoury, Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna
70.	Do.	Brig. Manohar Singh, Station Commander, Ranchi.
71.	Do.	Shri Harjinder Singh, Magistrate, Ranchi.
72.	Do.	Maulana Nizam Saheb, Main Road, Ranchi.
73.	Do.	Mohd. Sayeed Ahmad, Pahari Tola, Ranchi.
74.	29th April, 1968	Shri K. M. Ekbal, Advocate, Ranchi.
75.	Do.	Shri Ghulam Mohamad Abdulla, Muazzin of Jama Masjid, Ranchi.
76.	Do.	Shri Anisur Rahman, Gwala Toli, Hindpuri, Ranchi. (Student of Azad High School).
77.	Do.	Shri Abdul Gaffar, Head Master, Azad High School, Ranchi.
78.	30th April, 1968	Shri R. P. Sarangi, former Minister of State for Agriculture, Bihar, Patna.
79.	Do.	Shri Md. Shafique, Piyada Toli, Ranchi Fruit Shop, Ansari Market, Ranchi.
80.	Do.	Shri D. K. Sharma, General Secretary, H. E. C. Workers' Union, Hatia, Ranchi.
81.	Do.	Shri Amanat Ali, Purani Ranchi Handloom Shop, Ansari Market, Ranchi.
82.	Do.	Shri Abdul Sattar, Peskar to Sub-Judge, Civil Court, Ranchi.
83.	1st May, 1968	Md. Yasin, Pandra, Ranchi.
84.	Do.	Shri Rahmat Ansari, Tati Silway, Ranchi.
85.	Do.	Shri Anisuddin Ahmad, Secretary, Markazi Muslim Relief Committee, Ranchi.
86.	Do.	Shri Bashiralli. Naya Sarai, Ranchi.

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87.	1st May, 1968	Shri Bijoy Kumar Singh, Advocate, Ranchi.
88.	Do.	Shri Abdul Rahim, Sarat Babu Lane, Ranchi.
89.	Do.	Maulana Hafizul Hussain, Imam, Rangsaz Mosque, Ranchi.
90.	1st and 27th May, 1968	Shri B. P. Sinha, Advocate, Ranchi.
91.	2nd May, 1968	Shri N. P. Verghese, Fire Officer, H.E.C., Ranchi.
92.	Do.	Shri Srivastava, Executive Engineer, H.E.C., Ranchi.
93.	Do.	Maj. B. S. Sahrawat, 6 FD REGT.
94.	2nd and 3rd May, 1968	Capt. Mangatram.
95.	2nd May, 1968	Shri S. V. Sohoni, Chief Secretary, Bihar, Patna.
96.	3rd May, 1968	Shri T. Nath, Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.I.D., Bihar, Patna.
97.	Do.	Rev. Fr. C. V. Saupin, Principal, St. Xaviers Collage, Ranchi.
98.	Do.	Lt. P. N. Shahane, 33, Lt. REGT (PACK).
99.	27th May, 1968	Shri P. K. Ghosh M. P., Hindpiri, Ranchi.
100.	Do.	Shri M. Ghatak, Kishoreganj, Ranchi.
101.	28th May, 1968	Shri S. D. Joshi, General Manager, Foundry Forge Plant, H.E.C., Ranchi.
102.	Do.	Shri Praim Singh, Works Manager, Heavy Machine Building Plant, H.E.C., Ranchi.
103.	Do.	Dr. S. N. Jha, Medical Officer, H.E.C., Ranchi.
104.	Do.	Shri G. N. Ghosh, Chief of Personnel Division, H.E.C., Ranchi.
105.	Do.	Shri L. N. Mehrotra, former Pool Officer (Transport), now Deputy Controller, Transport, H.E.C., Ranchi.

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106.	28th May, 1968	Shri Ram Naval Goswamy, Driver, H.E.C., Ranchi.
107.	Do.	Shri Riaz Ahmad, Driver, H.E.C., Ranchi.
108.	Do.	Shri Mukhlal Singh, Driver, H.E.C., Ranchi.
109.	Do.	Shri Jiwan Khalkho Driver, H.E.C., Ranchi.
110.	29th May, 1968	Shri Ramanand Tewari, former Police Minister of Bihar, Patna.
111.	Do.	Lt. Col. P. S. Bakshi, 6, FD. REGT.
112.	Do.	Major S. R. Sharma, 6, FD. REGT.
113.	Do.	Capt. R. S. Waghmare, 6, FD. REGT.
114.	Do.	Shri R. N. P. Sinha, Magistrate, Ranchi.
115.	30th May, 1968	Dr. J. K. P. Sinha, Superintendent, R.M.C.H., Ranchi.
116.	Do.	Dr. R. S. Prasad, Demonstrator, Forensic Medicine, R. M. C., Ranchi.
117.	Do.	Col. R. B. Sule, Chief Medical Officer, H.E.C., Ranchi.
118.	Do.	Shri G. Prasad, <u>Deputy General Manager, Administration,</u> H. E. C., Ranchi.
119.	Do.	Shri P. K. Malachi, Senior Security Inspector, H. E. C., Ranchi.
120.	Do.	Dr. N. Prasad, Civil Surgeon and Superintendent, Sadar Hospital, Ranchi.
	Do.	Shri R. N. Thakur,                      Recalled Magistrate.
121.	Do.	Dr. S. N. Sinha, Civil Assistant Surgeon, Sadar Hospital, Ranchi.
122.	31st May, 1968	Shri Sahdeo Ram, former Addl. Superintendent of Police, Ranchi.
123.	Do.	Shri K. P. Sinha, Station House Officer, Kotwali P. S., Ranchi.



ANNEXURE III

*A. Documents exhibited in the course of oral evidence*

(Para. 1-12 of Part I)

Sl. No.	Exhibit No.	Name of the witness filing the exhibit	Date	Description.
1.	I	Shri Rameshwar Nath, Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.	25-3-68	D. No. 2614/C, dated 24th April, 1967 from Addl. Chief Secretary, Bihar, to all Deputy Commissioners etc., on indiscipline and lawlessness amongst students.
2.	II	Do.	Do.	Letter No. 2615/C, dated 24th April, 1967 from Addl. Chief Secretary, Bihar, to all Deputy Commissioners, etc., on entry of Police into University Campus.
3.	III	Do.	Do.	Letter No. 2674/C, dated 24th August, 1967 from Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, to the State Government.
4.	IV	Do.	Do.	Written request for Military help and handing over the operational control to the military.
5.	V	Do.	26-3-68	Letter No. 637/C, dated 9/10th March, 1967 from Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, to the Commissioner, Chotanagpur Division, regarding Police action against students.
6.	VI	Do.	Do.	Wireless Message No. 797/C, dated 29th March, 1967 from Deputy Commisioner, Ranchi, to Special Section, Patna, regarding incidents between students and taxi drivers.
7.	VII	Do.	Do.	D. O. No. 799/C, dated 30th March, 1967 from Shri S. S. Dhanoa, Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, to Shri M. K. Mukerji, Secretary, (Political Special) Department, Patna, enclosing a note on lawlessness on 1st March, 1967.

Sl. No.	Exhibit No.	Name of the witness filing the exhibit	Date	Description
8.	VIII	Shri Rameshwar Nath, Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.	26-3-68	Letter No. 827/C, dated 1st April, 1967 from Deputy Commissioner Ranchi, to Commissioner, Chotanagpur, regarding lawlessness amongst students on 29th March, 1967.
9.	IX	Do.	Do.	Public appeal in Urdu by Shri Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, Chief Minister, Bihar.
10.	X	Do.	Do.	Appeal in Hindi from Shri R. Nath, Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, regarding disturbances and rumours.
11.	XI	Do.	Do.	Hindi leaflet No. 1 by Public Relations Department, Ranchi on Don't's.
12.	XII	Do.	Do.	Hindi leaflet No. 2 by Public Relations Department, Ranchi, on Do's.
13.	XIII	Do.	Do.	Clarification in Hindi on Urdu as Second Language issued by Public Relations Department, Ranchi.
14.	XIV	Do.	Do.	Important notice No. 3 in Hindi regarding carrying of weapons by Industrial workers by Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.
15.	XV	Do.	Do.	Important notice No. 2 in Hindi by Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, regarding orders to Police to shoot at sight.
16.	XVI	Do.	Do.	Important notice in Hindi by Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, regarding Government order on arrest of persons in or outside the house shouting slogans 'Bajrang Bali ki Jai' and 'Allah-O-Akbar'.
17.	XVII	Do.	Do.	Leaflet in Hindi by Birsa Seva Dal, Ranchi warning Adivasis.
18.	XVIII	Do.	Do.	Appeal in English by Government of Bihar to the people.
19.	XIX	Do.	Do.	Appeal in Hindi by Chief Minister, Bihar.

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| 20. | <b>XX</b>     | Shri Rameshwari Nath, Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.              | 26-3-68 | Notice in Hindi by Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, regarding Division of Ranchi into Sectors.  |
| 21. | <b>XXI</b>    | Do.   | Do.     | Statement of incidents from 22nd August, 1967 to 29th August, 1967.   |
| 22. | <b>XXII</b>   | Do.   | Do.     | Copies of Reports of Additional District Magistrate and Magistrates in charge of army patrol about incident at Nausersa.  |
| 23. | <b>XXIII</b>  | Shri S. P. Thakur, Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Ranchi.       | 27-3-68 | Sub-Divisional Officer's Order Memo. No. 831/C, dated 22nd August, 1967 regarding deployment of Magistrates.  |
| 24. | <b>XXIV</b>   | Do.   | Do.     | Letter No. 929/C, dated 13th September, 1967, from Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Ranchi, to Deputy Commissioner, forwarding report dated 24th August, 1967 from Shri H. N. Kant. |
| 25. | <b>XXV</b>    | Do.   | Do.     | Report by Shri G. N. Dubey, Sub-Deputy Collector, Ranchi, dated 21st September, 1967.   |
| 26. | <b>XXVI</b>   | Do.   | Do.     | Letter No. 1074/C, dated 21st October, 1967, from the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, to Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi report on communal disturbances in Ranchi.                    |
| 27. | <b>XXVII</b>  | Shri Shivjanam Singh, Sub-Inspector of Police, Ranchi.          | 29-3-68 | FIR made by him regarding Azad High School incident.  |
| 28. | <b>XXVIII</b> | Shri Hem Narayan Kant, Magistrate, Ranchi.                      | 3-4-68  | His report dated 24th August, 1967 to the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.  |
| 29. | <b>XXIX</b>   | Shri B. P. Singh, Deputy Magistrate.                            | Do.     | Report about the work done by him for the period 22nd August, 1967 to 4th September, 1967.  |
| 30. | <b>XXX</b>    | Shri Abdul Kafil, Final Year Student, Rajendra Medical College. | 4-4-68  | Printed appeal of Muslim students of the Rajendra Medical College, addressed to the Chief Minister, Bihar.  |

Sl. No.	Exhibit No.	Name of the witness filing the exhibit	Date	Description
31.	XXXI	Shri Abdul Kafil, Final Year Student, Rajendra Medical College.	4-4-68	Resolution of Rajendra Medical College Muslim Students in Hindi.
32.	XXXII	Do.	Do.	Leaflet in Hindi by Vijay Ranjan, Bihar State Democratic Army and poster.
33.	XXXIII	Do.	Do.	Manuscript copy of letter dated 1st March, 1968 from Rizwanul Haque, Roll No. 82, 2nd Year Rajendra Medical College, addressed to the Principal regarding recovery of looted articles.
34.	XXXIV	Syed Homaid Hasan, Sub-Accountant, Heavy Engineering Corporation.	5-4-68	Documents listed in Statement I.
35.	XXXV	Shri Harnandan Singh, Secretary, Bihar State Council of CPI (M)	Do.	Letter dated 5th April, 1968, addressed to the Commission enclosing documents, newspapers, publications, etc., as listed in Statement II and a list of eye-witnesses.
36.	XXXVI	Shri Devi Dayal Bhagat, General Secretary, District Congress Committee, Ranchi.	Do.	Memorandum dated 6th September, 1967, from M. Ps. and M.L.As. of Bihar to the Prime Minister of India about the causes and courses of communal disturbances in Ranchi in August, 1967.
37.	XXVII	Shri N. Khelkho, Publicity Officer, Ranchi.	20-4-68	Leaflet in Hindi by Birsa Seva Dal, Ranchi warning Adivasis.
38.	XXXVIII	Do.	Do.	Appeal in Hindi from Shri R. Nath, Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, regarding disturbances and rumours.
39.	XXXIX	Do.	Do.	Important notice in Hindi by Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, regarding Government order on arrest of persons in or outside the house shouting slogans 'Bajrang Bali Ki Jai' and 'Allah-O-Akbar'.
40.	XL	Do.	Do.	Notice in Hindi by Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, regarding division of Ranchi into Sectors.

41. XLI	Shri N. Khelkho, Publicity Officer, 20-4-68 Ranchi.		Clarification in Hindi on Urdu as Second Language issued by Public Relations Department, Ranchi.
42. XLII	Do. . . . .	Do.	Important notice No. 2 in Hindi by Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, regarding orders to police to shoot at sight.
43. XLIII	Do. . . . .	Do.	Important notice No. 3 in Hindi regarding carrying of weapons by Industrial workers by Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi.
44. XLIV	Do. . . . .	Do.	Hindi leaflet No. 2 by Public Relations Department, Ranchi on Do's.
45. XLV	Do. . . . .	Do.	Hindi leaflet No. 1 by Public Relations Department, Ranchi on Don'ts.
46. XLVI	Do. . . . .	Do.	Appeal in English by Government of Bihar to the people.
47. XLVII	Do. . . . .	Do.	Appeal in Hindi by Chief Minister, Bihar.
48. XLVIII	Do. . . . .	Do.	Appeal in Hindi by Government of Bihar to the people.
49. XLIX	Do. . . . .	Do.	Public appeal in Urdu by Shri Mahamaya Prasad Sinha, Chief Minister, Bihar.
50. L	Shri A. K. Banerjee, Addl. Collector, Ranchi.	22-4-68	Sketch Plan of Dhurwa and Heavy Engineering Corporation area.
51. LI	Do. . . . .	Do.	Report of Shri A. K. Banerjee to the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi sent on 31-8-67 with Shri S. P. Sinha's (Magistrate's) Report.
52. LII	Shri S. N. Akhoury, Inspector General of Police, Bihar.	27-4-68	Report of Deputy Superintendent of Police Ranchi city, Ranchi.
53. LIII	Do.	27-4-68	12 Photographs.
54. LIV	Brig. Manohar Singh	Do.	Final Report sent to Sub-area Headquarters.
55. LV	Do.	Do.	District Magistrate's Written request asking for military aid.

Sl. No.	Exhibit No.	Name of the witness filing the exhibit	Date	Description
56.	LVI	Brig. Manohar Singh	27-4-68	Written request for military help and handing over the operational control to the military.
57.	LVII	Shri Abdul Gaffar, Head Master, Azad High School.	29-4-68	FIR in which is included a list of the injured boys etc.
58.	LVIII	Shri D. K. Sharma, Secretary, Hatia Project Workers Union, INTUC, Hatia.	30-4-68	His Statement.
59.	LIX	Shri Anisuddin Ahmed, Secretary, Markazi Muslim Relief Committee.	1-5-68	Newspaper cuttings and pamphlets as in Statement-III.
60.	LX	Shri N. P. Verghese, Fire Officer, Heavy Engineering Corporation.	2-5-68	His written statement.
61.	LXI	Rev. Fr. C. V. Saupin, Principal, St. Xavier's College, Ranchi.	3-5-68	Report of the relief work done by the Ranchi Central Relief Committee.
62.	XLII	Do.	Do.	Draft report on the work of rehabilitation not yet scrutinised by the Committee.
63.	XLIII	Lt. Shahane	Do.	Statement of work done, given to the military authorities.
64.	XLIV	Shri M. Ghatak, Advocate	27-5-68	His application to the Police Minister on 21-8-67.
65.	XLV	Shri Praim Singh, Works Manager, Heavy Machine Building Plant, Heavy Engineering Corporation, Ranchi.	28-5-68	Note sent to General Manager on what happened in the HMBP on 24-8-67 night and 25-8-67 morning.
66.	XLVI	Dr. J. K. P. Sinha, Superintendent, Rajendra Medical College Hospital, Ranchi.	30-5-68	Letter sent to Sub-Divisional Officer, Ranchi.

67. XLVII	Shri P. K. Malachi, Senior Security Inspector, Heavy Engineering Corporation, Ranchi.	30-5-68	Report about sharpening of steel pieces.
68. XLVIII	Shri R. N. Thakur, Magistrate	Do.	Report on the incident at Rattan Talkies submitted to Sub-Divisional Officer on 22-8-67.
69. XLIX	Do.	Do.	Report on the events of 22-8-67 at Rattan Talkies sent to Sub-Divisional Officer on 23-8-67.
70. LXX	Shri U. Prasad, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ranchi City, Ranchi.	31-5-68	His report on Ranchi disturbances.
71. LXXI	Shri Y. P. Verma, Deputy Collector Land Reforms.	4-6-68	Instructions issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner, Bihar, regarding grant of relief and rehabilitation to persons affected by riots.
72. LXXII	Do.	Do.	A statement of the Rehabilitation grants.

B.—List of documents mentioned in the course of oral evidence and supplied thereafter

S.No.	Exhibit No.	Name of the witness	Date of appearance	Description	Date of receipt by the Commission
73.	LXXIII	Shri L. Dayal, Secretary, Govt. of Bihar, Political (Special) Department.	29-3-68	Copies of entire correspondence between Shri S. S. Dhanoa and State Government.	1-5-68
74.	LXXIV	Shri A. K. Banerjee Addl. Collector, Ranchi.	22-4-68	Deployment of Police forces at his disposal from 25-8-67 to 29-8-67.	29-4-68
75.	LXXV	Do.	Do.	List giving details of dead bodies, dates and places of their recovery.	Do.
76.	LXXVI	Shri S. V. Sohoni, Chief Secretary, Bihar.	2-5-68	An analysis of the investigation of cases by the police.	5-7-68
77.	LXXVII	Do.	Do.	A note on steps taken and to be taken to prevent disturbances.	31-7-68
78.	LXXVIII	Shri T. Nath, Deputy Inspector General (CID).	3-5-68	Analysis of cases made by him	27-5-68
79.	LXXIX	Do.	Do.	Statement of sequence of events	Do.
80.	LXXX	Shri Praim Singh, Works Manager, Heavy Machine Building Plant, Heavy Engineering Corporation.	28-5-68	Note about number of workers booked and the number of absentees.	29-5-68
81.	LXXXI	Shri Y. P. Varma, Deputy Collector, Land Reforms.	4-6-68	A statement of the rehabilitation grants	6-6-68
82.	LXXXII	Do.	Do.	A statement showing breakup between Muslims and Hindus of the loans and grants separately.	Do.

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## STATEMENT I

### *List of documents*

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|----------------------|--|
| Annexure A . . . . . | • List of witnesses, with synopsis of evidence or testimony, which they have furnished through their FIRs/statements relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. (177 witnesses).   |
| Annexure B . . . . . | • List of witnesses who can testify to the role of the HEC Management, mentioning the nature of their testimony, before, during and after the killing in HEC.  |
| Annexure C . . . . . | • Supplementary points of importance bearing on the written statement.   |
| Annexure D . . . . . | • List of quarters damaged by mob violence or burnt by arson gangs.  |
| Annexure E . . . . . | • List of documents (79 in number) for presenting the background and also factual material relevant to the inquiry, with pamphlets inciting violence, press cuttings and list of exhibits. (Statement I-A).                            |
| Annexure F . . . . . | • List of important records, available with the officials concerned only, which, it is prayed may be called for by the Commission.   |
| Annexure G . . . . . | • Memorandum presented to the Home Minister, Shri Chavan, when he visited the HEC Refugee Camp opened for Muslim employees on August 29th, 1967.   |
| Annexure H . . . . . | • Memorandum presented to the Prime Minister of India, when she visited the HEC Refugee Camp on September 6th, 1967.   |
| Annexure J . . . . . | • Salient Aspects of the killing in Hatia—a preliminary assessment of the situation prepared for and presented to the Prime Minister of India, when she visited the Muslim Relief Camp in the Artisan's Hostel on September 6th, 1967. |
| Annexure K . . . . . | Reminder to the Prime Minister in regard to our Memoranda dated 6-9-67 and the one presented to the Honourable Home Minister, Govt. of India.  |

STATEMENT I-A

*List of documents*

<i>S.No.</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Remark</i>
1.	Copy of Mukherjee Commission's Report in respect of H.E.C. Fire.	
2.	Copy of an application of Mr. I. A. Chisthi, a victim of 1964 communal disturbances.	
3.	Copy of acquittal order by Sub-Divisional Officer, Ranchi in respect of Mr. Qutubuddin.	
4.	Copy of Superintending Engineer's order to allow Mr. Qutubuddin to resume his duty.	
5.	List of quarter-wise loss of properties.	
6 to 74A.	Statements/affidavits and FIRs of individuals	
75.	Suspension order of Ramayan Sharma Carpenter/HMBP.	
76.	Memorandum presented by delegation of Officers and staff of H.E.C. to the Prime Minister of India on 6th of September, 1967 against the Minister of Industrial and Development of India.	
77.	<i>Pamphlets</i>	
	(a) Pamphlet issued by Shri S. Upadhyaya, President of H.E.C. Employees Union showing therein various articles supplied to R.S.S. organisations from H.E.C. Stores in December, 1967.	
	(b) Pamphlet issued by the Nationalist Forum Jagannath Nagar, H.E.C., Ranchi.	
	(c) Pamphlet issued by Sangharsh Samiti H.E.C.	
	(d) Hindi Pamphlet brought out by Sangharsh Samiti H.E.C., demanding stoppage of arrest after the communal disturbances in H.E.C.	
78.	List of articles left behind by the miscreants.	
79.	List of Paper cuttings. (Statement I-B).	

**STATEMENT I-B**

*List of Newspapers /Paper cuttings*

<b>S.N o.</b>	<b>Name of Newspaper and date</b>	<b>Subject matter</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
1.	The Indian Nation, Patna September, 2, 1967.	Chavan Reports to Cabinet "Organised Hand" behind Ranchi Riots.	
2.	The New Republic, Ranchi September 20, 1967.	"Why does tension still linger in Hatia?"	
3.	The New Republic, Ranchi September 23, 1967.	"Sharma's serious allegations against H.E.C. Management".	
4.	The Sentinel, Ranchi September 23, 1967.	INTUC Leader Sharma alleges "Weapons were manufactured within HEC factory" Gupta held responsible for the tragedy.	
5.	The New Republic, Ranchi September 27, 1967.	"D. K. Sharma's statement contradicted". Asked to promote amity and not provoke tension.	
6.	The New Republic, Ranchi October 4, 1967.	(1) "The drama of Mr. T. R. Gupta's resignation". (2) "Some HEC people want Gupta to stay".	
7.	The New Republic, Ranchi October 11, 1967.	Staff reporter "New Republic" Characterised demand of "Muslim victims as "a source of discord".	
8.	The Statesman, Calcutta October 10, 1967	"HEC Muslims want separate colony aftermath of Riots".	
9.	The Statesman Feb. 21, 1968.	Home Minister Chavan announces in Parliament the intention of setting up of an Inquiry Commission to probe communal disturbances in Ranchi and of punishing "high officials" if proved that they abetted communal disturbances.	
10.	The Statesman, 31st March, 1968.	Shri Chavan Home Minister wants that persons guilty of murder, loot and arson should be punished and has instructed Chief Minister that these cases should be pursued.	

**STATEMENT II**

*List of Documents submitted by the State Council C.P.I. to the Commission of Inquiry  
for Communal Disturbances at Ranchi, Hatia*

**Camp Ranchi**

<i>S. No.</i>	<i>Documents</i>	<i>Particulars</i>
<b>I</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
1.	Indian Nation, dt. 31-10-67	Complaint against Shri R. P. Sarangi.
2.	Do. dt. 26-10-67	B. P. Mandal's Statement against Jan Sangh.
3.	Do. dt. 25-8-67	Statement of Nanaji Deshmukh, Secretary to Jan Sangh.
4.	Pradip dt. 26-10-67	Speech of Thakur Prasad, Communists and Muslims.
5.	Nawrastra dt. 8-II-67	Statement of Jan Sangh Leader against Batai Dari and Urdu.
6.	Pradip dt. 8-II-67	Statement of Sri Suresh Dutta Sharma, Jan Sangh Leader against Communists.
7.	Nawrastra dt. 8-II-67	Statement of Jan Sangh Leader, Suresh Dutta Sharma.
8.	Pradip dt. 7-II-67	Statement of Vijoy Kumar Mitra, Jan Sangh Minister.
9.	Aryavarta dt. 20-II-67	Statement of Jan Sangh Minister, Rudra Pratap Sarangi.
10.	Aryavarta dt. 20-10-67	Statement C.P.I. Minister of Bihar.
11.	Copy of Leaflet of Vijoy Ranjan	2 Sheets.
12.	Organiser dt. 19-II-67	At page 10.
13.	" dt. 10-9-67	At Page 1.
14.	" dt. 15-10-67	At. Page 3.
15.	"Ranchi Riots" (Factual Analysis of the tragic happenings in August, 1967).	"a booklet published by the "Sampradayikta Virodh Committee", Delhi, in "Saffron Conspiracy" Series No. 2. It contains C.P.I. memorandum to Prime Minister at page 11.

### STATEMENT III

*Newspaper cuttings and pamphlets furnished by Shri Anisuddin Ahmed*

1. Daily 'Sangam' Patna dated 31-7-67 of Sudhansu Babu against Urdu.
2. Daily 'Sangam' Patna dated 13-10-67 : Statement of Mahamaya Babu, Chief Minister, Bihar. No bomb was discovered in Ranchi. No Pakistan arms found.
3. Daily 'Sangam' Patna dated 3-10-67, regarding Ranchi riot by Comrade B. T. Randwe.
4. Daily 'Sangam' Patna dated 3-9-67. Reference of Daily 'Deshand' Patna and Hindi Weekly 'Yogi' Patna against Muslims.
5. Daily 'Sangam' Patna dated 21-9-67. Speech of Pandit Ram Narayan Shastri, Arya Samaj Leader against Muslims.
6. Daily 'Sangam' Patna dated 7-10-67. Reference of the editorial of 'Mother India' monthly against Muslims.
7. Daily 'Sangam' Patna dated 29-9-67. Speech of Jan Sangh leader in Girdih against Muslims.
8. Daily 'Sangam' Patna dated 20-7-67. Speech of Thakur Prasad Advocate against Urdu.
9. Handbill of Vijay Ranjan.
10. Handbill of Anand Marg.
11. Daily Indian Nation Patna 12-10-67. Charge against Shri R. P. Sarangi, Minister by Shri Inderdip Sinha, Revenue Minister, Bihar.
12. Daily Indian National Patna 28-11-67. Shri Ramanand Tewari, Police Minister Bihar warns the newspapers 'Organser' of Delhi, 'Panchjania' of Lucknow for false reports.
13. Daily Indian Nation, Patna, 12-12-67, about communal riot in Ranchi-Hatia. due to Jan Sangh.
14. Daily Indian Nation, Patna, 29-7-67 Anti-Urdu rally before Assembly.

#### ANNEXURE IV

*List of persons who were called to give oral evidence but who did not appear either due to their own fault or inability to serve the summons on them*

(Para 2-3 of Part I)

S. No.	Name and Address	Date on which called	Reason for non-appearance
1.	Maulana Faruqul Hussaini, General Secretary, Bihar, State Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e- Hind, Baqarganj, Patna.	4-4-68 and 2-5-68	Had been in hospital and had not been discharged till the conclusion of oral evidence.
2.	Dr. K. M. Akhauri, Popu- lar Pharmacy, Nistapur, Jamshedpur.	25-4-68 and 27-5-68	Summons served but did not appear.
3.	Shri Ahmed, s/o Jaffar Mian, Fruit Merchant, Daily Market, Ranchi.	29-4-68 and 28-5-68	Out of station.
4.	Shri Bhola Prasad Singh, Lohanipur, Patna—3.	29-4-68	No response.
5.	Shri Ibrahim Khan, s/o Md. Najit, Kanjra Mohalla, Ranchi.	30-4-68	Not traceable at address given.
6.	Shri Imam Khan, Gari Khana, Ranchi.	30-4-68	Do.
7.	Shri A. Rahman, s/o Imamuddin Pahari Tola, Ansari Market, Ranchi.	30-4-68	No such person available.
8.	Dr. Taiyb, Rajendra Medi- cal College, Ranchi.	1-5-68	Left Ranchi after comple- tion of studies. Reported to be at Vellore but ad- dress not available.
9.	Shri Sultan Ahmad Khan Rao, Assistant Engineer, Civil, H.E.C., Ranchi.	2-5-68	Did not appear due to per- sonal reasons but gave a written memorandum.
10.	Shri M. Krishnamurthy, General Manager, H.M.B.P., H.E.C., Ranchi.	28-5-68	Gone abroad.

**ANNEXURE V**

*Particulars of persons who sent memoranda/statements since the 25th March, 1968, when recording of oral evidence of witnesses at Ranchi commenced in respect of the communal disturbances at Ranchi-Hatia (August 22 to 29, 1967).*

(Para. 27 of Part I)

Sl. No.	Name and address of the person	Date of statement	Whether called for oral evidence and on what date
1	2	3	4
1.	Shri Purshottamdas Soni, Secretary, District Bharat Sevak Samaj, Ranchi.	3-4-68	No
2.	Shri H. B. Bhide, Office Secretary, Akhil Bharat Hindu Mahasabha, New Delhi.	4-4-68	No
3.	Md. Aminuddin, Mohalla Rangsaz Mosque, Church Road, Ranchi.	16-4-68	No
4.	Md. Yunus, Mohalla Rangsaz Mosque, P. S. Kotwali, Ranchi.	18-4-68	No
5.	Shri Sultan Ahmed Khan Rao, Assistant Engineer (Civil), H.E.C., Hatia.	30-4-68	Called but sent only a written statement.
6.	Dr. Biren Roy, Roy Kuthi, Ranchi	2-5-68	No
7.	Shri B. N. De, Assembly Mechanic, F.F.P., H.E.C., Hatia, Ranchi.	26-5-68	No
8.	Shri M. P. Gupta, General Secretary R.M.C. Students' Union, Ranchi.	3-6-68	Yes on 3-6-68.
9.	Shri Navrattan Singh, Secretary, Hatia H. E. C. Employees Union, No. 1048 Qr. No. 277, Dhurwa, Ranchi.	11-6-68	No

## ANNEXURE VI

*Handbill issued by the Jan Sangh in connection with the procession organised  
on 12-8-1967  
(Para 14 of Part II)*

जै भारत

भारतीय जन संघ

भारतीय जन संघ द्वारा बिहार में 'उर्दू' द्वितीय राज-भाषा होने के  
प्रस्ताव पर विशाल प्रदर्शन

वारी पार्क रांची के बगल वाले मैदान में दिनांक 12-8-67 संध्या 5 बजे  
विराट सभा का आयोजन

बन्धुओं,

आप सब तो जानते ही हैं कि भारतीय जन संघ आगामी दिनांक 12-8-67 (शनि-वार) श्री तुलसी जयन्ती के शुभावसर पर (उर्दू द्वितीय राज-भाषा) के विरोध में राज्य व्यापी विशाल प्रदर्शन तथा स्थान-स्थान, ग्राम-ग्राम और नगर-नगर में विराट जन सभा करने जा रहा है। अतः आप सभी बन्धुओं से निवेदन है कि दिनांक 12-8-67 की दिन के 1 बजे डोरणा तपीवन (तिवारी बैंचर के निकट) में एकत्रित हों। वहाँ से एक विशाल प्रदर्शन के रूप में हम सभी मेन रोड, रांची होते हुए अबदुल वारी पार्क के बगल वाले मैदान में होने वाले विराट सभा में भाग लेकर भारत माता को पुनः खंड खंड करने की प्रवृत्ति से तथा पाकिस्तान के इंजे में जाने से बचाये।

आप सब तो जानते ही हैं कि भारत को एक सूत्र में संगठित करने वाली भाषा अगर कोई है तो हिन्दी ही है। अतः इसकी प्रधानता तथा सरलता को जानकर हमारे देश के भिन्न भिन्न राजनीतिक दलों ने भी इस हिन्दी भाषा को भारत के राष्ट्र भाषा होने से अस्वीकार नहीं किया वरना मुक्त कठ से हिन्दी को संविधान में भारत के राष्ट्र भाषा का स्थान दिया।

भारतीय जन संघ ने भारतवर्ष के सभी भाषाओं को फलने तथा फूलने की केवल शूभ कामनायें ही नहीं अपितु इनके विकास तथा विस्तार में पूर्ण विश्वास करता है और इन्हें सफली-भूत बनाने की चेष्टा भी कर रहा है।

आज दुःख के साथ आप लोगों को सूचित करना पड़ता है कि जिस भाषा के बीज से हमारे देश का दो खंड आज से 20 वर्ष पहले हुआ था आज वही विवादास्पद प्रश्न कुछ नाकिस्तानी तथा राष्ट्र विरोधी तत्वों के साथ सांठ-गाठ होने के कारण खड़ा हो गया है और इसी का फल है कि बिहार विधान सभा में उर्दू द्वितीय राज-भाषा का एक गैर सरकारी प्रस्ताव एक कांग्रेसी सदस्य द्वारा उपस्थित किया गया है तथा कांग्रेस के तुष्टीकरण नीति के पुष्टिकरण में हमारे बिहार के कर्तिपय नेतागण भी बड़े उत्सुक दिख पड़ रहे हैं। किन्तु इसका भयंकर परिणाम जो देश के भीतर एकता भंग करने तथा साम्प्रदायिकता को बढ़ाने वाला होगा, नहीं आंक पा रहे हैं।

गत 1961 के जन गणना के आधार पर भारतवर्ष में जाति धर्म निविशेष उद्दूर्भ भाषियों की संख्या लगभग 7 प्रतिशत है और बिहार राज्य में केवल 5 प्रतिशत से भी कम है इसलिये विहार राज्य में केवल उद्दूर्भ द्वितीय राज-भाषा का रूप देने का विचार केवल दिवास्वप्न ही माना जायगा। किन्तु ऐसी स्थिति बिहार में इसलिये आई कि कुछ राजनीतिक दल अपना चुनाव उद्दूर्भ भाषा को द्वितीय राज-भाषा करने के ही आस्वाशन पर ही लड़े थे तथा पाकिस्तानी एवं राष्ट्र विरोधी तत्वों के आड़ में 95 प्रतिशत हिन्दी, मैथिली, भोजपुरी तथा मगधी भाषा-भाषियों के सिर पर उद्दूर्भ को बोझ देना चाहते हैं। इससे बिहार की केवल एकता पर ही नहीं बल्कि इस दैनिय राज्य की राज्यकोष पर भी बाधा पहुंचेगी? क्योंकि हर व्यक्ति तथा राज्य कर्मचारियों को हिन्दी के साथ-साथ उद्दूर्भ भी पढ़ना तथा लिखना पड़ेगा। ऐसा करने के लिये कर्मचारियों की भी संख्या बढ़ेगी और जनता पर करों का बोझ दिनोदिन बढ़ता जायगा।

स्वतंत्रता के बाद आज तक अंग्रेजी भाषा की बीमारी से हम मुक्त भी नहीं हो पाये हैं कि एक और दुखदाई उद्दूर्भ का कैन्सर रोग सामने आ खड़ा हुआ जिसके कारण देश में राष्ट्रीयता सुरक्षा एवं एकता पर भी इसका दुष्परिणाम पड़ेगा। इन सभी कास्पर्मों से राज्य-पुनर्संगठन आयोग के सभापति स्वर्गीय कल्याण श्रीनी ने, भारत में उद्दूर्भ द्वितीय राज्य भाषा नहीं हो सकती, अपना निर्णय दिया था।

अतः भारतीय जनसंघ भारत की सुरक्षा, सम्पन्नता तथा भारतीयों के बीच एकता स्थापित करने एवं साम्प्रदायिक विशाक्त वातावरण को रोकने के लिये, और भावी सन्तानों को उद्दूर्भ के बोझ से बचाने के लिये, जाति धर्म निविशेष सभी देश प्रेमियों को आवाहन करता है कि श.प सब उपर्युक्त विशाल प्रदर्शन तथा विराट सभा में अपना योग दान देकर बिहार राज्य में उद्दूर्भ द्वितीय राज भाषा के होने के प्रस्ताव पर विरोध करें।

जय भारत

भारतीय जन संघ  
रांची

चीप प्रेस, रांची-67.

## ANNEXURE VII

*Orders issued by the S.P., Ranchi, in connection with the maintenance of peace and communal harmony on 12-8-67*

(Para 1-5 of Part II)

Memo No. 3769/C

Office of the Supdt. of Police

*Ranchi, the 12th August, 1967.*

To

The Dy. S.P. City,  
Ranchi.

SUBJECT:—*Anti-Urdu Agitation.*

The undernoted deputation of the force is ordered to maintain peace and communal harmony during the proposed demonstration, procession, Public meetings scheduled to be held today from 1 P.M. in connection with Anti-Urdu Agitation of the Jan Sangh Party.

- (1) One officer and 7 lathi constables at Yunus Chouk.
- (2) One officer and 14 armed Constable; at Rattan talkies.
- (3) One officer and 7 lathi constables at Qudous Dispensary.
- (4) One officer and 14 armed constable; at Urdu Library.
- (5) One officer and 10 lathi constables at Taxi Stand.
- (6) Two mobile patrolling should also be introduced between Doranda and court compound.
- (7) Reserve—One platoon lathi and one section armed with half section tear gas at Kotwali police station with two vehicles.
- (8) The procession shall be escorted by three officers, 3 Havildars and 27 lathi constables.
- (9) Two officers and 20 constables near D.C.'s chamber in the court compound T.I. shall remain present there.

(Sd./.) S. P. SINGHI,

12-8-67,

S.P. Ranchi.

Copy to:-

R.S.M. Ranchi for providing necessary force to take post by 1 P.M. today positively.

T.I. Ranchi for information and necessary action.

S.D.O. Sadar for deputing three Magistrates to remain in-charge of armed forces.

D.G. Ranchi for information.

D.C.

I may be allowed to depute Shri U.C. Pd. today.

(Sd/-) S. P. THAKUR,

12-8-67.

S.D.O., Ranchi.

(Sd/-) B. NATH,

12-8-67.

Dy. Commissioner, Ranchi.

### ANNEXURE VIII

*Orders issued by the S.D.O., Ranchi in connection with the maintenance of peace and communal harmony on 12-8-67.*

(Para 15 of Part II)

Subdl. Office, Sadar, Ranchi

(Confidential Section)

#### ORDER

The Jansangh party has decided to take out a procession on 12-8-67 at 1 P.M. from Tewari Bechar Doranda to Court compound in connection with Anti-Urdu agitation. The following magistrates are deputed at the places noted against their names. Armed force has already been deputed by the Superintendent of Police, Ranchi.

- |                                   |                          |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| (1) Shri R. R. Singh, Magistrate  | Rattan talkies.          |
| (2) Shri K. N. Sinha, Magistrate  | Urdu Library, Main Road. |
| (3) Shri R.K.P. Sinha, Magistrate | Kotwali P.S.             |
| (4) Shri U.C. Prasad, Magistrate  | Mobile patrolling party. |

The officers are requested to reach their place of posting immediately. For mobile patrolling police jeep will be available at Kotwali P.S.

(Sd/-) S. P. THAKUR,  
Subdivisional Officer,  
Sadar, Ranchi.

Memo No. 799/C dated 12-8-67.

Copy forwarded to all officers concerned for information and necessary action.

(Sd/-) S. P. THAKUR  
Subdivisional Officer,  
Sadar, Ranchi.

Memo No. 799/C dated 12-8-67.

Copy forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, Superintendent of Police, Ranchi/Town Inspector of Police, Ranchi for information. The Deputy Commissioner is requested to vest powers u/s 144 Cr.P.C. to Sri R.K.P. Sinha and Sri U.C. Pd. Magistrate.

(Sd/-) S. P. THAKUR  
12-8-67.  
Subdivisional Officer,  
Sadar, Ranchi.

## ANNEXURE—IX

*Hindi Pamphlet entitled "Challenge to the Manhood of the New Generation" distributed by Shri Vijay Ranjan.  
(Para 1-8 of Part II)*

नई पीढ़ी के पौरुष को चुनौती  
भारत में एक और पाकिस्तान  
बनाने की बदमाशी और धूर्तता-  
पूर्ण साजिश

तब हम करें क्या ?

याद रखें

22 अगस्त, 1 बजे दिन, शहीद चौक जिला स्कूल के सामने

दोस्तों,

आज देश को, समाज को, आपकी संस्कृति और आपकी भाषा को, फिर आज आपके जोश से उबलते हुए रक्त की जरूरत है, जरूरत है इन्हें और हमारी गर्दनों की।

बिहार के लगभग 30 लाख "पाकिस्तान परस्तों" के वोट को सुरक्षित करने के लिये, बिहार सरकार ने यहाँ के 5 करोड़ 20 लाख लोगों की भावनाओं को ठोकर मारने की ठानी है। पटना से प्रकाशित उद्दू अखबार "संगम" के सम्पादक गुलाम सरदर, जिस पर पाकिस्तान के लिये जासूसी करने के आरोप में कई मुकदमें चले हैं, और शायद अभी भी चल रहे हैं, जैसे लोगों को खुश करने के लिये बीते आम चुनावों में उसके द्वारा दी गई "राजनैतिक मदद" के प्रतिदान के रूप में, यह "छात्रों और जनता की सरकार", छात्रों और जनता के अरमानों को कुचल कर, आज उद्दू को द्वितीय भाषा बनाने पर तुली हुई है। इसमें सम्मिलित कई पार्टियां, जिन्होंने चुनावों के पहले एक गुप्त घोषणा पत्र में हस्ताक्षर किया था, उद्दू को बिहार की द्वितीय भाषा बनाने का, आज अपने पाप को छिपाने के लिये बारम्बार संविधान की दुहाई देते हैं, जैसे कि भारत के संविधान को पढ़ने और समझने की छूट सिर्फ उन्हीं लोगों को है, दूसरे सारे लोग बेवकूफ़ हैं।

बिहार की आबादी साढ़े पांच करोड़ है। ये सारे के सारे लोग हिन्दी बोलते और समझते हैं। कुछ शहरों में रहने वाले पाक-परस्तों को छोड़कर, गांवों में रहने वाले मुसलमान भी स्थानीय भाषा ही बोलते हैं, उद्दू नहीं। तब किन कारणों से, किस डर से, यह सरकार कुछ पाक-फरोशों को खुश करने के लिये सबा पांच करोड़ लोगों के ऊपर उद्दू लादने की कोशिश कर रही है ?

यदि हम थोड़ी दूर तक सोचने की कोशिश करें तो कारण शोशे की भाँति झलक उठेगे ।  
ये कारण निम्नलिखित हैं :—

1. उर्दू भाषा को द्वितीय स्थान देने का निर्णय, भाषा सम्बन्धी कम और राजबैतिक ज्यादा है । सरकार में सम्मिलित पार्टीयां यह समझती हैं कि उर्दू को द्वितीय स्थान देने से वे विहार में मुसलमानों के 45 लाख वोट अपनी पार्टी के लिये सुरक्षित कर लेंगे । यह धारणा साम्यवादी दल, संयुक्त सोसलिस्ट पार्टी एवं जनक्रांति दल का है ।

2. भारत-चीन युद्ध के बाद, चीन और पाकिस्तान एक दूसरे के बहुत ही करीब आये और पाकिस्तान ने भारत में रहने वाले अपने 'एजेंटों' को हुक्म दिया कि वे ज्यादा से ज्यादा साम्यवादी दल में घुसें । 1965 की भारत-पाक लड़ाई के बाद तो पाक रेडियो ने खुले आम भारत स्थित पाकिस्तान परस्तों को धर्म के नाम पर यह निर्देश दिया कि वे साम्यवादियों को वोट द और ऐसी हालत पैदा कर दें कि केन्द्र या राज्यों में कहीं भी मजबूत सरकार नहीं बन सके, ताकि भारत पर चीन-पाकिस्तान के सम्मिलित हमले के समय भारत की जनता एक हो कर दुश्मनों का मुकाबला नहीं कर सके । यह किसी से भी छिपा नहीं है कि हाल में हुए आम चुनावों में साम्यवादियों को और उनके द्वारा समर्थित उम्मीदवारों को, पाकिस्तान परस्तों के 90% वोट मिले हैं । साथ ही इस सरकार में ऐसे लोगों की भी कमी नहीं है जो हर चीज के लिये चीन, पाकिस्तान-एवं-रूस का मुंह देखते हैं । उर्दू की आड़ में 'ये ऐसी ताकतें' को संभिट और मजबूत करना चाहते हैं और उनके देश-द्रोह की भावना को और भी सक्रिय बनाना चाहते हैं ।

3. सबसे बड़ी बात तो यह है कि 'उर्दू द्वितीय भाषा बनाई जाय' का नारा देकर और इसके लिये आग्रह कर, ये, राज्य के सवा पांच करोड़ लोगों की कोमलतम भावनाओं को उभारना चाहते हैं, उन्हें हिसा पर उतरने के लिये मजबूर करना चाहते हैं । इन लोगों का इरादा है पहले सारे राज्य को और बाद में सारे देश को बदलनी और गृह-युद्ध की आग में झोंक देना । चूंकि जब तक देश में शान्ति है, अमन-चैन है, बाहरी ताकतें हमारे देश के ऊपर हमला नहीं कर सकती हैं, और तब तक इन साम्यवादियों का इरादा सफल नहीं हो सकता है । इतिहास गवाह है कि जब जब हम पर हमले हुए हैं, हम गृह-युद्ध में फंसे रहे हैं और केन्द्र कमज़ोर रहा है । देश में मान सिंह और मीर जाफर ऐसे गद्दार हमेशा पदा होते रहे हैं और आज तो इनकी संस्था लाखों में है । क्या यह सच नहीं है कि अभी हाल में साम्यवादियों द्वारा आयोजित एक जलूस में रांची की सड़कों पर खुले आम ये नारे लगे हैं :—

"माश्रो-त्से-तुंग जिन्दाबाद, चाउ-एन-लाई जिन्दाबाद"

"लाल चीन जिन्दाबाद, पाकिस्तान जिन्दाबाद"

और साथ में यह भी—

"उर्दू विहार की द्वितीय भाषा हो के रहेगी," "उर्दू को हमारा लाल सलाम"

और कुछ लोग गा रहे थे—

“माआ-त्सेनुंग लह हे प्रणाम, आमरा कोरबो भारत के वियतनाम”

इन चीजों से यह साफ मालूम पड़ता है कि यह उद्दृ भाषा की उन्नति सम्बन्धी प्रश्न नहीं बल्कि एक बहुत ही चालाकी और धर्ता से भरी, साम्यवादियों के बल पर बनी, शासन की —प्राप्ति को नरक की भट्ठी में छोक देने की,—एक राजनीतिक चाल है। जरा सोचने की बात है कि इन दोनों वर्षों में ही साम्यवादियों को, जो अन्तर्राष्ट्रीयता की बात करते हैं, उद्दृ से, उसे द्वितीय भाषा बनाने से, इतना प्रेम करने हो गया? नहीं, यह उनका उद्दृ प्रेम नहीं है, बल्कि अपने “आकाशों” से प्राप्त वे निर्देश हैं, जिसके अनुसार वे इस सरकार को अपनी साजिशों का शिकार बना रहे हैं। शर्म की बात तो यह है कि यह सरकार भी साम्यवादियों का और गद्वार मुसलमानों की इन साजिशों का, शिकार हो कर रह गयी है और हमें जहर पीने को बाध्य कर रही है।

क्या हम यह जहर चुपचाप पी लेंगे? क्या साम्यवादियों और गद्वार मुसलमानों की साजिशों का मयाब हो जायेगी? क्या उद्दृ को हिन्दी की छाती पर मूँग दलने के लिये छोटी रानी का पद दे दिया जायेगा? क्या हमारी भाषा, हमारी संस्कृति, फिर से एक बार, आजाद भारत में भी कुचली जायेगी? क्या हमारी धरती, हमारे देश के फिर टृकड़े टृकड़े होंगे? क्या फिर से हम अपनी ही भूल से, “जिन्नावाद” पल्लवित और पुष्पित करेंगे? क्या हम अपने घरों में छिपे जहरीले सांपों को फिर से बिना सिर कुचले हुए छोड़ देंगे, ताकि मौका पाकर वे अपने जहर के दांत हमारी रक्त धमनियों में चुभों दें? और क्या हम सबों का यह सपना कि भारत एक प्रबल राष्ट्र हो, कभी पूरा नहीं होगा?

नहीं, और एक हजार बार नहीं। कभी भी नहीं।

“मेरे दोस्तों, महात्मा बुद्ध से लेकर पंडित नेहरू तक ने हमें जहर पीना ही सिखलाया। हम हमेशा अपमानित होते रहे किसी दूसरे को अपमानित किया नहीं हम पर हमले हुए, गुलाम बने, किसी पर हमला किया नहीं और इसीलिये ही आज हम एक भी राष्ट्र होकर रहते हैं इसीलिये गद्वारों मीर जाफरों को मौका मिला, चांदी के चन्द टृकड़ों या पद की लालसा के लिये, देश को कई बार गुलाम बना देने का,

लेकिन अब हम जहर पीने के लिये तयार नहीं हैं, साम्यवादियों और गद्वारों की साजिश अब कामयाब नहीं होगी। उद्दृ बिहार की द्वितीय भाषा नहीं बनेगी। हमारी भाषा, हमारी संस्कृति, अब फिर से कुचली नहीं जायेगी, हमारा देश अब टृकड़ों में विभक्त नहीं होगा। फिर इस भूमि पर कोई जिन्ना पैदा नहीं होने दिया जायेगा और जहरीले सांपों के जहर के दांत तोड़ दिये जायेंगे और फन कुचल दिया जायेगा।

इतिहास का पहिया अब दुश्मनों के हाथों नहीं बल्कि हमारे हाथ भगेगा। भारत में एक उत्तर राष्ट्रवाद का जन्म होगा जिसकी पवित्र ज्वाला में हमारे सारे पाप, हमारी सारी कुंठायें जल उठेंगी। सारे के सारे मीरजाफर और देशद्रोही पतंगों की भाँति इसमें भस्म हो जायेंगे। भारत देश हर भारतीय के लिये होगा और हर भारतीय भारत के लिये।

आइये, हम अपने सपनों को पूरा करने के लिये, उद्दू को द्वितीय भाषा बनाने से रोकने के लिये, गदारों की साजिशों को बेनकाब और नाकामयाब करने के लिये, 22 अगस्त को 1 बजे दिन में शहीद स्मारक जिला स्कूल के सामने इकट्ठा होकर लाखों-लाख की संख्या में शहर में धूमते हुए, 3 बजे दिन को डिपटी कमिशनर के आफिस के सामने प्रदर्शन करें और उन्हें आगाह करें कि :—

1. उद्दू को हम किसी भी शर्त पर बिहार की द्वितीय भाषा बनाने नहीं देंगे। सरकार ने यदि इस पर जिह्वा की तो बिहार में नरक की आग धधक उठेगी, जिसकी सारी जिम्मेदारी सरकार पर होगी।

2. जो लोग उद्दू को द्वितीय भाषा बनाने की साजिश रच रहे हैं, वे देश और समाज के प्रति गदार हैं, सरकार उन्हें गिरफ्तार करे।

3. गुलाम सरवर जसे लोगों को जो हिन्दुस्तान में पाकिस्तान बनाने का स्वप्न देख रहा है, और जो सरकार की आंखों का तारा बना हुआ है, उनकी उचित जगह (जेल) भेजा जाये। गदी की लालच छोड़कर बिहार रक्षा और देश रक्षा के लिये मजबूत कदम उठाये जायें।

4. जिन लोगों ने रांची की सड़कों पर चीन परस्त, पाकिस्तान परस्त और माओ-त्से-नुंग जिन्दाबाद के नारे लगाये हैं, उन्हें देशद्रोही करार किया जाये और गिरफ्तार किया जाये।

5. बिहार के पूर्णिया और सहरसा जिले में जो नक्सल बाड़ी और पाकिस्तान की सीमा से मिलते हैं पाकिस्तानियों और साम्यवादियों पर रोक लगाई जाये।

आपके अपेक्षित सहयोग के लिये बहुत बहुत धन्यवाद।

पाक परस्त मुर्दाबाद, भारत माता, हिन्दी भाषा जिन्दाबाद।

राष्ट्रीय एकता जिन्दाबाद, अखण्ड भारत जिन्दाबाद।

जय हिन्द

आपका भाई  
विजय रंजन  
रांची वि० छा० संघ के भू० पू०  
प्रधान मंत्री

एवं

अध्यक्ष, छोटानागपुर डिवीजन स्टूडेन्ट्स कांग्रेस,  
रांची।

**Challenge to the manhood of  
New Generation**

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The wicked and fraudulent plot to create  
yet another Pakistan within India

Then what should we do?

Remember 22nd day of August at 1 P.M. at  
Shaheed Chauk, opposite dist. school.

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**Friends,**

To-day the country, society, your culture and language require again your zealous and hot blood, they are in need of our neck.

To make sure about the 30 lac votes of 'Pro-Pakistanis' of Bihar, Bihar government had decided to hurt the feelings of 5 crore 20 lac people of the State. The government wanted to please Ghulam Sarwar, Editor of Urdu paper 'Sangam' (published from Patna, who has extended political help in last general elections, against whom many cases of spying for Pakistan were also levelled and perhaps still they are subjudice. In this barter the people's government (?) is crushing the hope of students and people to-day and is determined to impose Urdu as a second language in Bihar. Many parties are connected with this scheme who have signed a secret election manifesto before the elections and have promised to make Urdu as second language of Bihar. To-day they refer Constitution again and again so that their secret pact may be covered by it. They refer to the Constitution as if they are the only people who can read and understand it and all other people are fools.

Bihar is populated by 5·5 crore people. All these people speak Hindi and understand it ; leaving behind some Pro-Pakistanis in the cities all Muslims from villages speak the local languages and not Urdu. Then what are the causes and what is the fear under which government wants to please few Pro-Pakistanis by imposing Urdu upon 5·25 crores people.

If we try to think over it for a while the clear causes will come up, these are indicated below:

- (1) The decision is more political than relating to Urdu language to give it second place. The parties participating in the government understand that by pleading second place for Urdu they will capture 45 lac Muslim votes. This is the motive of the Communist Party, S.S.P. and Jan-Kranti Dal.
- (2) After Indo-Chinese war China and Pakistan came very near to each other and Pakistan has ordered all her agents living in India to enroll themselves in Communist Party in maximum numbers. After the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 Pakistan Radio openly pleaded in the name of religion to all Pakistan worshippers to vote for Communists and create such conditions that there should not be a stable government in Centre or in the States so that at the time of joint Pak-China attack on India she may not be able to face them unitedly. This is an open secret that communists and candidates sponsored by them polled 90% votes in last general elections from pro-Pakistani voters. Besides this there are people in the government who seek inspiration from Pakistan, China and Russia. In the name of Urdu they want to unite 'such forces' strongly and revive their motives for anti-national activities.

(3) The most important fact is that by raising a slogan to give a second language status to Urdu and to rule out such pressure for it they wish to induce the emotions of 5·25 crore people of the State and compell them to resort to violence. These people desire to create chaos and ultimately civil war, first in the State and then in the whole country. So long as the peace and tranquility is not disturbed in the country no foreign power can dare to attack India and also till that day the desire of communists will not be fulfilled. History is sufficient evidence whenever we were attacked we were involved in civil war and centre remained weak. Traitors like Man Singh and Mirjafar were born from time to time in this country and to-day their number is in lacs. Recently communists organised a demonstration on the roads of Ranchi and following slogans were openly repeated :—

Mao Tse Tung Zindabad ! Chou En-lai Zindabad !!  
Red China Zindabad ! Pakistan Zindabad !!

and also

Urdu will have to be second language of Bihar

Our red salutation to Urdu.

and some people were singing—

Oh : Mao Tse Tung accept our Salute  
To make our India Vietnam.

It is clearly understood that this is not the question of development of Urdu but a cunning and deceptive political art of the communists to capture the administration of the State. It is a matter to ponder over how these communists have developed such intense love for Urdu to make it second language in two three years time, they also talk about the inter nationalism. No, it is not their love for Urdu but these are the orders from their masters through which they are making this government the prey of their plot. Moreover it is a matter of shame that the government has been deceived by communists and Traitor Muslims and we are compelled to suppress anger and take poison.

Are we to drink this poison (unbearable anger) quietly ? Will the conspiracy of communists and Traitor Muslims materialize ? Will their scheme take shape and will Urdu be second language ? Will our language, our culture, once again in free India be crushed ? Will our land, our nation be again divided in pieces ? Will we let off these hidden venomous serpents without crushing their heads ? If they will be let off, as and when they will get opportunity they will not raise their heads again ? Will our dream to see India as a mighty nation not be fulfilled.

My friends ! We have learnt from Budha and Nehru to keep our anger calm and cool. We were always degraded but we never disrespected any one, our country was invaded and ruled but we never attacked any one. The traitors like Mirjafar for the greed of few silver coins involved in anti-national plots and get opportunity hence we became a coward nation and yielded to slavery many times. But now we will not sit idle, the communists and traitors plot will not succeed. Urdu will not be second language of Bihar. Our language and our culture will not be allowed to be crushed again. Now our country will not be divided in pieces. No more 'Jinnas' will be allowed to be born in this land again, and the venomous serpents' poisonous tooth will be pulled out and head will be crushed.

The steering wheel of history will not be allowed to revolve in the hands of enemies now we will move it accordingly. There will emerge a new strong sacred fire of nationalism in India under whose heat all out sin and foolishness will be burnt. All Mirjafars and traitors will also be consumed in this fire like a doll. The Indian Nation will be for every Indian and every Indian will be for the Nation.

Come up ! To fulfill our dream, to stop Urdu getting second place, to foil their plot come together on 22nd August at 1 p.m. at Shaheed Smarak (place), opposite district school, there we roll in lacs and demonstrate in the city and will reach at 3 p.m. before the Deputy Commissioner's Office. We will demand as under :—

- (1) We will not allow Urdu to be second language of Bihar under any condition. If government under its obstinacy do so there will be mass uprising and government will be responsible for the consequences.

- (2) Those who are plotting to set up Urdu as second language should be arrested and dealt with like traitors.
- (3) People like Ghulam Sarwar who is dreaming for another Pakistan within India and deceiving Government should be confined in Jail. Some strong steps should be taken for the safety of Bihar and the country as a whole and the greed for office of profit should be shed.
- (4) Those who marched on the roads of Ranchi and raised Pro-Pakistan, Pro-China and 'Mao Tse Tung Zindabad' slogans must be treated as traitors and be arrested.
- (5) There should be a ban on the activities of Pakistanis and communists in the districts of Purnea and Chhapra (Bihar) where they touch the borders with Naxalbari and Pakistan.

Many thanks for your co-operation.

Pro-Pakistanis Murdabad !

Mother India and Hindi Language Zindabad

National Union Zindabad, United India Zindabad.

JAI HIND

Your brother

Vijay Ranjan,

Ex-General Secretary  
Students Union.

President

Students Congress  
Chota Nagpur Division, Ranchi.

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Cheap Press Ranchi 67/15000.

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## **ANNEXURE X**

*Datedwise detailed figures of persons dead, persons injured, cases of arson and looting for the city of Ranchi.*

(Para. 3·13 of Part II)

2-9-67	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
3-9-67	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
4-9-67	...	...	...	...	...	I	I	...	...	...	...	...	...
5-9-67	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
	47(19)	10(4)	...	7	I	...	84	51	5	47	29	117	61

NOTE :—Figures within brackets in columns 2 and 3 indicate Nos. of dead bodies recovered on those dates, information about dates of occurrences being not available.

M — Muslim

H — Hindu

U. I. — Unidentified.

## **ANNEXURE XI**

*Detailed datewise figures of persons dead, persons injured, cases of arson and looting for area other than Ranchi town area and the H. E. C. area.*

(Para. 3·13 of Part II)

N. B.—Deaths shown in Hospital are included in General Death Column.

NOTE :—Figures within brackets in columns 2 and 3 indicate numbers of dead bodies recovered on those dates, information about dates of occurrence being not available.

M = Muslim.

H = Hindu.

U. I. = Unidentified.

ANNEXURE XII

*Datewise statement of persons dead, persons injured and of arson and looting cases in Hatia  
(Para 4.37 of Part II)*

Date	Deaths			Death in Hospital			Injured		Arson		Loots		Arrest		Cases in-stituted excepting curfew	
	M	H	U.I.	M	H	U.I.	M	H	Others	M	H	M	H	for violation of curfew	for other offences	
I	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
22-8-67	.	.	.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
23-8-67	.	.	.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
24-8-67	.	.	.	16	I	..	..	..	7	I	..	3	..	15	..	7
25-8-67	.	.	.	15	6(5)	..	..	..	4	..	..	2	..	22	..	37
26-8-67	.	.	.	27(22)	I(I)	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	I	6	..	II
27-8-67	.	.	.	4(4)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	I	..	I	..	4
28-8-67	.	.	.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	4
29-8-67	.	.	.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	25	4
30-8-67	.	.	.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	22	32
31-8-67	.	.	.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	58	23
I-9-67	.	.	.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	18
2-9-67	.	.	.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
3-9-67	.	.	.	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3

4-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
5-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
6-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
7-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
8-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	I	
9-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
10-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	8	
11-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	I	.	
12-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	I	
13-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
14-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	I	
15-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	I	
16-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
17-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	I	
18-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	2	
19-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
20-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	
21-9-67	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	5	
Total	.	65(29)	8(6)	.	.	.	.	II	I	.	9	I	44	.	.	.	152	133		

NOTE.—Figures within brackets in columns 2 and 3 indicate Nos. of dead bodies recovered on those dates, information about date of occurrences being not available.

M=Muslim,

H=Hindu,

**U.I.=Unidentified,**

### ANNEXURE XIII

*Places from where dead bodies were recovered in Hatia.*

(Para 4-38 of Part II)

Total No. of dead bodies	Date on which recovered	No. of bodies recovered	Places from where re- covered
1	2	3	4
1	24-8-1967	1	D.T. Colony.
13	25-8-1967	5	B/854/Sector II.
		1	S.T.D.T.Jn. Maidan.
		1	B/2629/Sector II.
		3	B/1662/Sector II.
		3	Jhopri in front of Qr. No. 1417/ 1422 Sector II.
25	26-8-1967	1	Open field between Sector II/III.
		6	Qr. No. B/513/Sector II.
		1	B/909/Sector II.
		7	D.T. 1606 Dhurwa.
		1	Plant Hospital Sector III Golchakar.
		1	Qr. No. 559/564/Sect. II.
		1	Plant Hospital.
		1	B/529
			534/Sector II Ditch.
		1	Bodies brought from outside and kept at Plant Hospital.
		5	Bodies brought from outside and kept at Plant Hospital Tiril Asram Maidan.

Total No. of dead bodies	Date on which recovered	No. of bodies recovered	Places from where recovered
1	2	3	4
14	27-8-1967	1 . . .	Hatia Railway Station.
		1 . . .	In front of Qr. No. B/1924 Sector II.
		1 . . .	Body brought from outside and kept at Plant Hospital.
		1 . . .	Body brought from outside and kept at Plant Hospital.
		1 . . .	Body brought from outside and kept at Plant Hospital
			Kamal Fitter F.F.P.
		3 . . .	In front of D.T. 1926 open place.
		4 . . .	Tiril open place.
		1 . . .	Brought from outside and kept at Plant Hospital.
		1 . . .	Brought from outside and kept at Plant Hospital
			Female child of Qr. No. 854-B/II.
8	28-8-1967	3 . . .	Near Dhurwa Tunku.
		1 . . .	Tiril Ashram skeleton.
		1 . . .	D.T. 2885 field.
		1 . . .	Nala near Sharma Road.
		1 . . .	Jagannathpur Village Maidan.
		1 . . .	Road near H.S. School.
1	29-8-1967	1 . . .	B-610/II.
3	1-9-1967	3 . . .	Skeleton Damside.

**ANNEXURE XIV**

*Deployment of the striking reserve and the company of BMP-5 and BMP-2*  
 (Para 5.1 of Part II)

(i) Disposition of striking reserve on 22-8-67

Hav.	Naik.	Constables	Place of duty	Hav.	Naik.	Constable
8	...	100 striking reserve	1. Magazine guard	...	1.	5
		35 expanded DAP	2. Sub. Div. Reserve, Simdega	1	...	8
			3. Sub Div. Reserve, Khunti	1	...	8
			4. Sub Div. Reserve, Gumla	1	...	8
			5. Land Acquisition	...	...	5
			6. Justice Guard	1	...	4
			7. Anti-Crime patrolling at An-gara/Karra/Arki/Murhu.	2	...	18
			8. Temp. deputation to traffic	...	...	10
			9. Ratu Armed patrolling	...	...	6
			10. Garrage duty for guarding exhibits.	...	...	3
			11. Anchal replacement	...	3	3
			12. Sick and admitted in hospital.	...	...	3
			13. P.I.R. Striking Res.	...	...	7
			14. Judicial Commissioner	...	...	25
			15. C.T.S.	...	...	5
			16. On parade	4	2	15
				10	5	135

160

(ii) Disposition of B.M.P. V "B" Company deputed to Ranchi for duty dated 22-8-67

Sub.	Jam.	Hav.	Naik	L.Nk.	Sepoy	Place of deputation	Sub.	Jam.	Hav.	Naik/	Lk.	Sepoy
I	I	6	3	3	84	1. Union Minister's meeting at Hatia . . . . .	I	I	...	I	15	
						2. D.I.G. Striking Reserve . . . . .			...	...	5	
						3. Raj Bhawan Guard . . . . .			...	...	9	
						4. Police line standby . . . . .		I	...	...	10	
						5. Coy Magazine guard at Doranda . . . . .			...	...	6	
						6. Barrack duty at Doranda . . . . .			...	...	1	
						7. Mess duty . . . . .			...	...	3	161
						8. On C.L. . . . .			...	...	9	
						9. On E.L. and returned to Patna . . . . .		2	...	...	...	
						10. Overstaying leave . . . . .			...	...	2	
						11. Hockey player at Patna . . . . .		I	...	...	2	
						12. C.M. bodyguard . . . . .		I	...	...	...	
						13. Driver . . . . .			...	...	2	
						14. Writer . . . . .			...	...	1	
						15. On parade at Doranda . . . . .	I	...	...	I	...	13
<hr/>												
Date 1967 21st												
I	I	6	3	3	84							

(iii) Disposition of B. M. P. II "A" Coy. deputed at Ranchi on 22-8-67.

Sub	Jam.	Hav.	Naik	L. Nk.	Sepoy	Place of deputation	Deployed.		Sub.	Jam.	Hav.	Naik	Lk.	Sepoy
I	I	6	3	3	90	1. Coy. Magazine guard	.	...	...	...	...	I	...	4
						2. Sadar Treasury	.	...	...	I	...	...	...	9
						3. Kotwali PS Standby	.	...	...	I	I	...	...	16
						4. Mess duty	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	3
						5. Barrack duty	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	3
						6. C. L.	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	6
						7. Writer	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	1
						8. E. L.	.	...	...	2	...	2	6	
						9. Overstaying from leave	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	2
						10. Vacancy	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	1
						11. Returned to H.Q.	.	I	...	...	...	...	...	8
						12. Minister escort	.	...	I	2	...	...	...	6
						13. Minister's house guard	.	...	...	...	I	I	...	8
						14. Aerodrome duty	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	8
						15. On parade at Doranda	.	...	...	...	...	...	...	9
									I	I	6	3	3	90

**ANNEXURE XV**

*Deployment of force on law and order duty on 22-8-1967*  
 (Para 5.1 of Part II)

Place of deputation	Force			Time
	Officers	C.O.s.	Men	
1. Rattan Talkies	1	1	4(A)	12.00 hrs.
2. Urdu Library	1	1	4(A)	12.00 hrs.
3. D.G. Chamber	1	1	8(L)	12.00 hrs.
4. Dr. Quddus Dispensary	1	1	10(L)	12.00 hrs.
5. Taxi Stand	1	1	10(L)	12.00 hrs.
6. Saheed Chowk	1	1	10(L)	12.00 hrs.
7. Congress Bhavan	0	1	10(L)	12.00 hrs.
8. Mobile Party	1	1	5(L)	12.00 hrs.
9. Mobile Party	1	1	5(L)	12.00 hrs.
10. Procession escort	2	2	28(L)	12.00 hrs.
11. H.S.L. Colony	3	0	3(L)	18.00 hrs.
12. C.M. Residence	1 0	1	10(L) 8(A)	06.00 hrs.
13. Hatia with Central Ministers	2	6	45(A)	06.00 hrs.
14. Hatia PS Permanent Reserve	...	1	5(A)	Permanent
15. Six parties mobile in Town	...	6	41(A)	23.00 hrs.
16. Five parties with Army	...	5	30(A)	24.00 hrs.
	19	35	284	

A = Armed,

L = Lathi.

**ANNEXURE XVI**

*Deputation of executive officers made by the District Magistrate between 22nd and 25th August 1967.*

(Para 5.10 of Part II)

<i>Name of Officers</i>	<i>Place of Deputation</i>
Sri R. R. Singh, Magistrate	Urdu Library.
Sri R. N. Thakur, Magistrate	Rattan Talkies.
<i>After disturbance</i>	
Sri R. R. Singh, Magistrate	Ratu Road with Military force.
Sri A. K. Sinha, SDC, ATS	Bariatu with armed force, carry on extensive patrolling to check trouble, if any, arising.
Sri K. K. Prasad, D.B.O. Namkum	Kanke Road, Upper Bazar, Rattan Talkies' Doranda for patrolling and also escort Chief Secretary and Commissioner.
Sri Yaswant Kumar Sinha, SDC, ATS	Patrolling on Church Road area with armed force.
Sri S. N. Prasaila, SDC, ATS	Patrolling in Ranchi town.
Sri B. Prasad, C.O. Namkum	Patrolling in Upper Bazar area with Military force.
Sri U. G. Prasad, Dy. Magistrate	Patrolling in Main Road Plaza area with Military force.
Sri N. K. Verma, Dy. Magistrate	Karbala Chowk with Military force and to assist the S.D.O. in general law and order matters.
Sri B. P. Singh, Dy. Magistrate	Patrolling in Hindpiri area with Military force.
Sri Harjindra Singh, SDC, ATS	Patrolling in Daily market to Welfare Centre Hall with Military force.
Sri R. N. Thakur, L.A.O. Ranchi	To H.E.C. to secure vehicles and Fire Brigade to be utilised on the emergency duty.
<i>Officers kept at Kotwali for rushing duty in case of emergency</i>	
1. Sri R. N. Thakur, S.D.C.	
2. Sri Ramnand Sahay, SDC, ATS.	
3. Sri K. N. Kumar, B.D.O. Kanke	

<i>Name of Officers</i>	<i>Place of Deputation</i>
4. Sri K.N. Sinha, S.D.C.	
5. Sri Indar Singh, B.D.O. Ratu	
6. Sri Y. P. Varma, D.C.L.R.	
7. Sri M. M. Dhar, Dy. Magistrate.	
8. Sri B. Mandar, Sp. Officer, I.A.D.P.	
9. Sri A. K. Banerjee, Addl. Collector.	

*Officers kept at Kotwali P.S. as Incharge, Kotwali Control Room.*

1. Sri Parsuram Singh, S.D.C., A.T.S.	
2. Sri B.M.P. Varma, S.D.C., ATS.	
3. Sri K. P. Misra, SDC, ATS.	
4. Sri M. Mahraj, SDC, ATS.	

*Officers deputed on phone duty to receive messages and transmit informations*

- 1. Sri R. N. P. Sinha, SDC, ATS.
- 2. Sri H. N. Kanth, SDC, ATS.

23-8-67

Sri R. N. P. Sinha, S.D.C., A.T.S..	Remained incharge of police force and carried patrolling throughout the main Ranchi town also deputed to village Pandra with Armed Police force.
Sri U. C. Prasad, Dy. Collector	Remained incharge of Kotwali Control Room and conducted night patrolling with armed police force in Harmu Rd. and Pahari areas.
Sri K. P. Mishra, SDC, ATS.	Patrolling with armed force around Ranchi lake.
Sri K. N. Sinha, S.D.C.	Remained incharge of static police force in Upper Bazar.
Sri Yaswant Kumar Sinha, SDC, ATS	Remained incharge of patrolling duty in Church Road areas.
Sri K. N. Thakur, B.D.O., Kanke	Done night patrolling with armed Police force from Firayalal Chowk to Lalpur Chowk areas.
Sri Sambhunath SDC, ATS	Remained incharge of armed police force and performed patrolling Lalpur Chowk areas.
Sri M. P. Jha, SDC, ATS	Night patrolling with police armed force in Harmu Road and Kishoregunj areas.

<i>Name of Officers</i>	<i>Place of Deputation</i>
Sri B. N. Sinha, SDC, ATS	Remained incharge of the armed force deputed in Doranda P.S.
Sri G. N. Dubey, SDC, ATS	Patrolled with armed police force in Bariatu areas.
Sri N. K. Sahay, SDC, ATS.	Remained incharge of Doranda P.S. Police armed force.
Sri J. Tripathy, Magistrate	Remained incharge of armed force at Ratan Talkies.
Sri M. Rahman, Dy. Magistrate	Patrolled with armed police force in Kanke Road areas.
Sri R. Singh, A.D.S.O. .	Performed night patrolling with police armed force in Kanke Road and Ratn Road.
Sri R. R. Singh, Magistrate	Deputed with Military Static Force at Ratn Road.
Sri A. K. Sinha, SDC, ATS	Performed patrolling with Military Force from Main Road upto Rly Xing.
Sri B. Prasad, Circle Officer	Patrolled in Hindpiri areas.
Sri B. P. Singh, Dy. Collector	Remained incharge of Static Military Force at R.M.C.H. Bariatu Girls Hostel and Nurses Hostel.
Sri A. K. Shrivastava, SDC, ATS	Deputy Doranda P.S. with armed force.
Sri Harjindra Singh, SDC, ATS	Remained incharge of military force and conducted patrolling from Firayalal Chowk to Taxi Stand.
Sri Ramanand Sahay, SDC, ATS	Remained at Kotwali as Kotwali Reserve and performed patrolling with Military Force from Taxi Stand to Rattan Talkie
Sri J. B. Hembrom, DWO Ranchi	Remained incharge of Military Force at Karbala Chowk.
Sri S. N. Jha, S.D.C. Ranchi	Remained in Kotwali as Reserve and further deputed to Hatia with armed force and to do extensive patrolling.
Sri H.H.K. Bright, ADDO	Conducted patrolling with Military force in Hindpiri area during day and Shaheed Chowk Upper Bazar, Ratn Road Bus Stand during night.
Sri D. Prasad, CPIO	Deputed to K. N. Roy's petrol pump with Military as static and also for patrolling from Firayalal Chowk to Rly. Xing.
Sri I. A. K. Verma, ADSO	Deputed for patrolling duty with Military force in Main Road, Upper Bazar, Hindpiri, Hatia and Dhurwa areas.

<i>Name of Officers</i>	<i>Place of Deputation</i>
Sri S. K. Prasad, Dy. Collector, ATS	Deputed with Military force to Plaza as static and also for patrolling from Firayal Chowk to Lalpur Chowk.
Sri D. P. Verma, Dy. Collector	Deputed to Kotwali P.S. as reserve. Also deputed to collect dead bodies from the bed of Harmu river. Also deputed to Bariautu areas to remain i/c of Armed Police force and patrolling the area.
Sri S. D. Pandey, Dy. Collector, ATS & Sri V. B. Saran, C.O. Kanke	Deputed to Kotwali as Reserve. Also deputed to issue curfew passes to needy persons. Further Sri Pandey deputed at the disposal of Commissioner, C. N. Divn. Sri V. B. Saran further deputed to evacuate families from Hindpiri to Ratu Road and also escorted stranded persons from bus stand to Doranda Hinoo etc.
Sri K. K. Prasad, B.D.O., Namkum	Deputed to Kotwali Reserve. Remained incharge of vehicles, issue of petrol coupons etc. and other management concerning vehicles and further deputed to Ratu Road for rescue work with armed force and also to evacuate distress families.
Shri R. N. Thakur, L.A.O.	Deputed to Kotwali P. S. Reserve.
<i>Officers deputed as Kotwali P. S. Reserve to be used for rushing forces as and when required in case of emergency.</i>	
1. Sri H. N. Kanth, Dy. Collector, A.T.S.	
2. Sri M. M. Gani, Dy. Collector.	
3. Sri R. R. Prasad, Senior Dy. Collector.	
4. Sri A. K. Chatterjee, IAS, Asstt. Magistrate.	
5. Sri A. K. Banerjee, Addl. Collector.	
6. Sri B. Mandar, Spl. Officer IADP.	
7. Sri R. N. Thakur, S.D.C. Ranchi.	
8. Sri B. M. P. Verma, SDC, ATS.	
9. Sri Y. P. Verma, DCLR Ranchi.	
10. Sri M. M. Dhar, Dy. Collector.	
11. Sri Indar Singh, B.D.O. Ratu.	
12. Sri S. N. Parsaila, SDC, ATS.	
13. Sri Bacha Prasad Singh, SDC, ATS.	
14. Sri R. Soren, DPO Ranchi.	
15. Sri S. K. Sher, Dy. Collector, Ranchi.	
16. Sri A. K. Srivastava, SDC, ATS.	

<i>Name of Officer</i>	<i>Place of Deputations</i>
17. Sri N. K. Verma, Dy. Collector. (and to assist S.D.O. in maintenance of law and order matters).	
<i>Officers deputed on Phone duty to receive messages and transmit information.</i>	
1. Sri Parsuram Singh, S.D.C., A.T.C.	
2. Sri M. Maharaj, SDC, ATS.	
3. Sri R. K. Sinha, SDC, ATS.	
4. Sri S. K. Chand Instructor ATS.	
5. Sri U. K. Karan, SDC, ATS.	

24-8-1967

Shri R. R. Singh, Magistrate	Ratu Road with Military Force.
Sri A. K. Sinha, S.D.C., ATS	Patrolling with Military Force from main Road upto Rly. Crossing.
Sri B. Prasad, C. O. Namkum	Saheed Chouk to daily market patrolling with Police Party.
Sri Parsuram Singh, SDC, ATS	Patrolling in Hindpuri area.
Sri R. N. P. Sinha, SDC, ATS	Hindpuri (Near Benimadho Press) with Military force, Static.
Sri U. C. Prasad, Dy. Collector	Hamru Road patrolling in the night.
Sri B. M. P. Verma, SDC ATS	Patrolling with Army in the town in day and also remained as Kotwali reserve in the night.
Sri H. N. Kanth, Dy. Collector, ATS	Remained as Magistrate Incharge, Static armed force, Bariatu.
Sri K. P. Misra, SDC ATS	Remained as Magistrate Incharge, Static force at Ratu Road, A.I.R.
Sri Indar Singh, B.D.O. Ratu	Remained incharge of static armed force at Payadatoli.
Sri B. P. Singh, Dy. Collector	Deputed to R.M.C.H. Girls' Hostel and Nurses Hostel with static Military force from the mid night of 23-8-67.
Sri K. N. Sinha, S.D.C.	Static Police force at Upper Bazar.
Sri Yaswant Kumar Sinha, SDC ATS	Patrolling with police force in Harmu Road.
Sri Harjinder Singh, SDC, ATS	Patrolling with Police force from Ratu Road crossing to Harmu village.
Sri Ramar and Sahay, SDC, ATS	Deputed to R.M.C.H. Bariatu to escort Muslim Girl Students from Hostel to Ratu Road Camp.

<i>Name of Officers</i>	<i>Place of Deputation</i>
Sri M. Mahraj, SDC, ATS	Patrolling in Hindpiri area.
Sri K. N. Kumar, B.D.O: Kanke	Night patrolling from Firayalal Chouk to Lalpur Chouk.
Sri S. N. Prasaila, S.D.C., ATS	Remained Incharge of static Military force at Garikhana.
Sri J. B. Hembram, Distt. Wel. Officer	Remained Incharge of static Military force at Karbala Chouk.
Sri Sambhunath, SDC, ATS	Hindpiri Police patrolling.
Sri M. P. Jha, SDC, ATS	Patrolling on Karbala Chouk.
Sri R. N. Sinha, S.D.C., ATS	Military on Rattan Talkies.
Sri H. H. K. Bright, Dy. Magt.	Military patrolling during day in Hindpiri area and night patrolling in Shaheed Chouk, Upper Bazar and Ratu Road Bus Stand.
Sri Bacha Pd. Singh, SDC, ATS	Police patrolling on Garikhana and Harmu Road.
Sri R. Soren, D.P.O. Ranchi	Kotwali Reserve and Police patrolling on Ratu Road and Ranchi Hill area.
Sri G. N. Dubey, SDC, ATS	Remained as Magistrate Incharge Military static force at Plaza.
Sri N. K. Sahay, SDC, ATS	Patrolled from Welfare Centre Hall to Rly. Crossing including Rly. Station.
Sri R. K. Sinh, S.D.C., ATS	Remained incharge of static Military force at Ratu Road A.I.R.
Sri J. Tripathy, Dy. Collector	Kotwali reserve and patrolled on Kanke road and R.M.C.H. Bariatu with Military force.
Sri M. Rahman, Dy. Collector	Kotwali reserve and patrolling duty with Military force in Ranchi town.
Sri D. P. Varma, Dy. Magt.	Remained incharge of static Military force at Plaza.
Sri S. N. Jha, S.D.C. Ranchi	Remained Incharge of armed force at Hatia.
Sri L. A. K. Varma S.D.C., Ranchi	Patrol'ed with Military force in Main Road Upper Bazar and Hindpiri area. Also remained at static Military force refugee camp at A.I.R. Ratu Road.
Sri R. Singh, SDC (ADSO)	Police patrolling on Kanke Road and Ratu Road.
Sri S. K. Prasad, SDC, ATS	Announcement of Curfew order with Military force. Done patrolling from Welfare Cente Hall to Rly. Crossing including Rly. Station.

*Place of Deputation*

Sri V. V. Saran, Circle Officer, Kanke Patrolling with Police and Military in Lalpur area. Escorted students of Medical College for meeting with D.C. and back. Performed patrolling on Kanke area.

1. Sri M. M. Raza, Dist. Coop. Officer }  
2. Sri U. C. Prasad, B.D.O. Ormanjhi } Bariatu with armed force.

Sri Samad Ali, SDC, ATS Deputed to Kanke Road with armed force for patrolling.

Sri J. C. Kujur, Dy. Dir. G. P. Evacuated Muslim families from Upper Bazar. Remained incharge of striking force at Kantatoli.

*Officers kept at Kotwal Reserve*

1. Shri A. K. Banerjee, Addl. Collector.
2. Shri B. Mandar, Spl. Officer, I.A.D.P.
3. Shri R. N. Thakur, L.A.O. Ranchi.
4. Shri M. M. Dhar, Dy. Magistrate.
5. Shri Y. P. Varma, D.C.L.R.
6. Shri Durga Prasad, Dy. Magistrate (C.P.I.O.).
7. Shri S. K. Shre, Dy. Collector.
8. Shri S. K. Chand, Prof. A.T.S.
9. Shri A. K. Srivastava, A.T.S.
10. Shri U. K. Karan, S.D.C., A.T.S.
11. Shri A. K. Chatterjee, I.A.S., Asstt. Magistrate.
12. Shri R. R. Pd., Dy. Magistrate.
13. Shri M. N. Gani, Dy. Magistrate.
14. Shri S. P. Sinha, W.L.R.O.
15. Shri H. P. Varma, N.S.E.O.
16. Shri Surendra Pd. Singh, S.D.C., A.T.S.
17. Shri R. B. Mahto, Dy. Collector, A.T.S.
18. Shri P. S. Varma, S.D.C., A.T.S.
19. Shri L. P. Sinha, S.D.C., A.T.S.
20. Shri K. K. Pd., B.D.O., Namkum.
21. Shri Jagdish Singh, C.I., Namkum

} Vehicle Arrangements.

*Arrangements made on 25-8-67 and 27-8-67*

*Sector I—Upper Bazar.*

Officer Incharge	Shri J. M. Lingdoh, Regional Dev. Officer. Sri R. B. Mahto, Dy. Collector, ATS. Sri L. P. Sinha, SDC, ATS. Sri S. P. Sinha, W.L.R.O. Sri H. P. Verma, N.S.E.O. Sri P. N. Verma, SDC, ATS.
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*Sector II—Lalpur.*

Officer Incharge	Sri S. K. Chowdhary, Vice Principal, ATS Sri Ramanand Sahay, SDC, ATS. Sri R. Singh, SDC (ADSO) Sri A. K. Shrivastava, SDC, ATS. Shri U. K. Karan, SDC, ATS. Sri S. B. Pandey, Dy. Collector, ATS
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*Sector III—Lower Bazar.*

Officer Incharge	Sri B. Mandar, Special Officer, I.A.D.P. Sri Yawant Kumar Sinha, SDC, ATS. Sri G. N. Dubey, SDC, ATS. Sri N. K. Sahay, SDC, ATS. Sri S. K. Sinha, Asstt. Director Statistics. Sri R. S. Srivastava, Dy. Registrar, CS Sri T. L. Sharma, Asstt. Director, Agri. Farm.
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*Sector IV—Rantatoli.*

Officer Incharge	Sri Durga Prasad, C.P.I.O. Sri B. Prasad, C.O. Namkum. Sri K. P. Mishra, SDC, ATS. Sri S. K. Prasad, SDC, ATS.
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*Sector V—Hindpiri.*

Officer Incharge	Sri Y. P. Verma, D.C.L.R., Ranchi. Sri M. M. Dhar, Dy. Collector. Sri Ambika Prasad Singh, J.S.S. Kanke. Sri J. P. Sinha, Distt. Youth Welfare Officer. Sri R. N. Prasad, Munsif Magistrate. Sri B. P. Dwedi, B.D.O. Chanco. Sri S. K. Jha, A.E.S. Chanco. Sri R. Y. Singh, Youth Welfare Officer.
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*Sector VI—Chutia.*

Officer Incharge	Sri A. Hoda, D.D.O. Sri Parsuram Singh, SDC, ATS. Sri A. Maharaj, SDC, ATS. Sri M. M. Raja, District Cooperative Officer. Sri K. N. Kumar, B.D.O. Kanke.
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*Sector VII—Doranda and Hinoo.**Officer Incharge*

Sri U. N. Sinha, Dy. Director, Food.  
 Sri H. H. K. Bright, Dy. Magistrate.  
 Sri Bacha Prasad Singh, SDC, ATS  
 Sri P. Jha, SDC, ATS  
 Sri K. N. Jha, SDC, ATS  
 Sri S. P. Singh, Asstt. Supdt. Commr.  
 Taxes.

*Sectors VIII and IX—Hatia and Dhurwa Sector.**Officer Incharge*

Sri A. K. Banerjee, Additional Collector.  
Sri B. N. P. Verma, SDC, ATS  
 Sri R. Soren, D.P.O., Ranchi.  
 Sri B. N. Jha, SDC Ranchi.  
 Sri J. C. Kujur, Dy. Director, G. P.  
 Sri Surendra Prasad Singh, SDC, ATS  
 Sri U. C. Prasad, Deputy Collector.  
 Sri J. J. Tiggia, A. H. S. Namkom.  
 Sri Markande Rai, SDC ATS.

*List of Officers of static points*

1. Sri J. B. Hembrom, S.W.O., Ranchi . . . . Karbala Chowk.
2. Sri S. K. Prasad, Munsif Magistrate . . . . Bariatu.
3. Sri B. P. Singh, Dy. Magistrate . . . . Bariatu.
4. Sri Inder Singh, B.D.O., Ratu . . . . Pyadetoli.
5. Sri Baidyanath Jha, SDC, ATS . . . . Firayalal Chowk.

*Officers deputed with Military*

1. Sri R. N. P. Singh, SDC, ATS . . . . Hindpiri.
2. Sri R. Y. Singh, Distt. S. & Y.W.O. . . . Hindpiri.
3. Sri D. P. Verma, SDC, ATS . . . . Plaza.
4. Sri S. D. Giri, Jr. Employment Officer . . . . Plaza.
5. Sri R. P. Singh, Distt. Saving Officer . . . . A. I. R. Ratu Road.
6. Sri H. N. Kanth, SDC, ATS . . . . Garikhana.
7. Sri S. N. Parsaila, SDC, ATS . . . . Garikhana.
8. Sri U. P. Singh, B.D.O., Ormanjhi . . . . Gandhi Nagar.
9. Sri D. H. P. Singh, Asstt. Commr. Taxes . . . . Gandhi Nagar.
10. Sri Md. Safi, C.E.S., Namkum . . . . C. M's residence.
11. Sri B. N. Jha, SDC, ATS . . . . Rattan Talkies.
12. Sri S. P. Gupta, C.E.S. Kanke . . . . Doranda Hospital.

*Officers in reserve*

1. Sri A. K. Chatterjee, Assistant Magistrate.
2. Sri R. R. Prasad, Sr. Dy. Collector.
3. Sri M. N. Ghani, Dy. Collector.
4. Sri S. K. Sher, Dy. Collector.
5. Sri R. N. Thakur, I.A.O.
6. Sri K. K. Prasad, B.D.O. Namkum (Vehicles and Control Room).
7. Sri B. Prasad, District Accounts Officer.
8. Sri Arjan Singh, District Statistical Officer.
9. Sri H. C. Verma, Poultry Marketing Inspector Namkum—Kotwali Reserve.
10. Sri M. Rahman, Dy. Magistrate, Kotwali Reserve.
11. Sri Dinbandhu Prasad, J.S.S. Namkum
12. Sri Hassan, C.S. Namkum
13. Sri K. N. Jha, SDC, ATS
14. Sri Manohar Lal, Supply Inspector . . . . . Deputed at Sri M. P. Sinha's residence, Ratu Road, Refugee Camp.
15. Sri D. N. Sinha, Supply Inspector . . . . . C. M.'s residence—Refugee Camp.
16. Sri N. C. Jha, Supply Inspector . . . . . To issue store issue order meant for refugees during emergency.

### ANNEXURE XVII

*Statement showing the number of Additional Officers and men of all categories deputed to Ranchi during the disturbances*

(Para. 5-10 of Part II)

Rank	District Officers resources	Div. Commis- sioners resources	Government resources	Total
1. D. M.	1	...	1	2
2. A. D. M.	2	4	2	9
3. S. D. Os.	1	...	2	3
4. Magistrates	37	30	...	67
5. A. T. S. Officers	Nil	38	...	38
6. Other Departmental Officers	38	...	...	38
7. Supervisors	96	...		96

#### *Police Officers*

Rank	District and Divisional resources	State resources	Total
D. I. G.	1	1	2
S. P.	2	3	5
D. S. P.	4	10	14
Inspectors	3	9	12
S. I. and A. S. I.	13	22	35

#### *Other Police Officers*

B. M. P.	676
District Police	100
Urban Home Guards	424
N.C.Os.	101
Subedars and Jamadars	16
Rural Home Guards	300
Fire Brigades	5 Units.
H. E. C.	3 Units.
State Fire Brigades	2 Units.

#### *Military personnel*

(a) Officers	21
(b) J. C. Os.	8
(c) Other Ranks	541

### ANNEXURE XVIII

*Deployment of Police Force from the 23rd to 25th August, 1967*

(Para. 5.13 of Part II)

*Deployment of Force on 23-8-1967*

<i>Place of deputation</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Time</i>
1. Daily Market . . . .	1-8	1100 Hrs.
2. P.H.E.D. Gonda . . . .	1-8	"
3. Ratu Road . . . .	0-4	"
4. Patrolling Party with DIG . .	1-4	"
5. Harmu Road . . . .	1-4	1130 Hrs.
6. Patrolling . . . .	1-8	"
7. Escort Party . . . .	1-4	1145 Hrs.
8. A. I. R. Ranchi . . . .	1-4	1150 Hrs..
9. Patrolling . . . .	1-9	1215 Hrs..
10. Hindpiri . . . .	1-8	"
11. Hindpiri . . . .	2-14	"
12. Doranda . . . .	1-4	1245 Hrs..
13. Town area . . . .	5-40	1300 Hrs..
14. Kishoreganj . . . .	1-4	"
15. Patrolling Party . . . .	3-28	"
16. Firayalal Chauk . . . .	1-4	"
17. Rattan Talkies . . . .	1-12	"
18. Aerodrome . . . .	1-6	"
19. Patrolling Party . . . .	4-22	"
20. Prisoner Escort . . . .	1-6	"
21. Yunus Chauk . . . .	1-4	"
22. Patrolling Doranda . . . .	1-4	"
23. Erku Road . . . .	1-4	1400 Hrs..
24. Town Patrolling . . . .	1-4	"
25. R. M. C. H. . . .	1-4	"
26. Town Patrolling . . . .	1-5	1445 Hrs..

<i>Place of deputation</i>	<i>Party</i>	<i>Time</i>
27. Town Patrolling . . . .	I-4	1445 Hrs.
28. Mahabir Chauk . . . .	I-4	"
29. Town Patrolling . . . .	I-4	"
30. Fire Brigade Party . . . .	I-4	"
31. Town Patrolling . . . .	I-4	"
32. Do. . . . .	I-4	"
33. Do. . . . .	I-4	"
34. Old Commr's Compound . . . .	I-4	"
35. Patrolling Party Town . . . .	I-4	"
36. Do. . . . .	I-4	"
37. Saheed Chouk and Daily Market . . . .	I-4	1600 Hrs.
38. D/M and Welfare Centre . . . .	I-4	"
39. Welfare Centre to Rly Ring . . . .	I-4	"
40. Rattan Talkies Konka Road . . . .	I-4	"
41. D. C.'s Chamber . . . . .	I-4	"
42. R. M. C. . . . .	2-9	1720 Hrs.
43. Town Patrolling . . . . .	I-4	"
44. Do. . . . .	I-4	"
45. Do. . . . .	I-4	"
46. Do. . . . .	I-4	"
47. Do. . . . .	I-4	"
48. Hindpiri . . . . .	I-4	1730 Hrs.
49. Town rushing . . . . .	I-4	"
50. Patrolling . . . . .	I-4	"
51. Patrolling . . . . .	I-4	1830 Hrs.
52. Patrolling . . . . .	I-4	"
53. Kanke Road . . . . .	I-4	"
54. Pandra . . . . .	I-6	2045 Hrs.
55. Nursing Home . . . . .	0-3	2145 Hrs.
56. Circuit House . . . . .	I-4	2200 Hrs.

*Deployment of Force on 24-8-1967*

<i>Place of deputation</i>	<i>Force</i>	<i>Time</i>
1. R. T. Bus Depot . . .	I-4	1330 Hrs.
2. Bahubazar . . .	I-4	1400 Hrs.
3. Karbala Chauk . . .	I-4	"
4. Dr. Quddus dispensary . . .	I-4	1425 Hrs.
5. Kantatoli . . .	I-4	1430 Hrs.
6. Laipur Chouk . . .	I-4	"
7. Dhukeshwari Stores . . .	I-4	1515 Hrs.
8. Pyadatoli . . .	I-4	"
9. Harmu Road . . .	I-4	"
10. Hazaribagh Escort . . .	3-12	"
11. Hatia . . .	I-3-24	1600 Hrs.
12. Plaza Cinema . . .	I-4	1730 Hrs.
13. Circuit House . . .	I-4	1820 Hrs.
14. Rescue Party . . .	I-4	2000 Hrs.
15. Ranchi Electric Supply . . .	O-4	2015 Hrs.
16. Mr. Ranchor Prasad . . .	O-5	"
17. Electric Supply . . .	I-3	"
18. Kokar Electric Supply . . .	I-3	2030 Hrs.
19. Doranda Patrolling . . .	O-5	"
20. Lanke R. S. . .	O-5	"
21. H. Col Palit . . .	I-4	"
22. Morabadi . . .	I-4	2300 Hrs.
23. Hazaribagh Escort . . .	2-8	2330 Hrs.
24. D. C. Patrolling Party . . .	O-4	"
25. S. P. do . . .	I-4	"
26. Ratu Road Patrolling . . .	O-5	"
27. Mr. Sultan Ahmad Adv. . .	I-4	"
28. Kanke P. S. . .	I-4	2400 Hrs.
29. Hatia P. S. . .	I-4	"

*Deployment of Force on 25-8-67*

<i>Place of deputation</i>	<i>Force</i>	<i>Time</i>
1. Burmah Shell Patrol Pump . . . . .	1—4	1015 Hrs.
2. Plaza Cinema . . . . .	0—5	1130 Hrs.
3. Refugge Colony . . . . .	1—4	1215 Hrs.
4. Hazaribagh Pr. Escort . . . . .	0—5	1315 Hrs.
5. Do . . . . .	1—4	1400 Hrs.
6. Police Minister's Escort . . . . .	1—3	1400 Hrs.
7. Old Commissioner's Camp . . . . .	0—3	1410 Hrs.
8. Gudri Chauk . . . . .	0—4	1430 Hrs.
9. Hatia P.S. . . . .	1—25	1445 Hrs.
10. Burdwan Compound . . . . .	0—4	1500 Hrs.
11. R.M.C.H. . . . .	0—3	1500 Hrs.
12. Hazaribagh Rd. Escort . . . . .	1—4	1600 Hrs.
13. With Fire Brigade . . . . .	1—4	1600 Hrs.
14. Kokar More . . . . .	0—5	1600 Hrs.
15. Mahabir Asthan . . . . .	0—5	1600 Hrs.
16. Doranda Bus Stand . . . . .	0—5	1800 Hrs.
17. Rly Crossing . . . . .	0—5	1830 Hrs.
18. Sadar Hospital . . . . .	1—3	1915 Hrs.
19. Women's College . . . . .	1—5	1930 Hrs.
20. Electric Supply . . . . .	0—8	1930 Hrs.
21. Women's College Hostel . . . . .	0—3	2030 Hrs..
22. Namkum P.S. . . . .	1—8	2045 Hrs.
23. Hatia P.S. . . . .	1—10	2100 Hrs.

<i>Place of deputation</i>	<i>Force</i>	<i>Time</i>
24. Petrol Depot . . . .	0—5	2100 Hrs.
25. Water Tank Hatia . . . .	1—4	2100 Hrs.
26. S. P. Hatia Patrolling . . . .	1—4	2100 Hrs.
27. Dam Site Hatia . . . .	1—4	2100 Hrs.
28. F.F.P. . . . .	0—5	2100 Hrs.
29. H.M.B.P. . . . .	0—5	2100 Hrs.
30. Rly Station . . . . .	1—4	2100 Hrs.
31. With Mike duty . . . . .	0—5	2100 Hrs.
32. Upper Bazar Top . . . . .	0—5	2100 Hrs.
33. Namkum . . . . .	0—5	2200 Hrs.
34. Minister's Guard . . . . .	0—5	2200 Hrs.

## ANNEXURE XIX

*Police force for the armed pickets, patrolling duty and rushing party.*

(Para. 5-14 of Part II)

<i>Sector Officers</i>	<i>Pickets</i>	<i>Patrols</i>	<i>Reserves</i>	<i>Rushing</i>	<i>Parties</i>
1. Upper bazar Top and Hill.	1. Pyadatoli . . . 2. Taxi Stand . . . 3. Ratu Road . . . 4. Bazar tanr . . . 5. Harmu cowk . . . 6. Purani Ranchi . . . 7. Birla Boarding . . .	1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4	1. Mahabir Asthan to Paska crossing. 2. Ratu Bus Stand to Harmu River. 3. Bazar Tanr. 4. Saheed Chowk to Rattan Talkies.	1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4	2-8 2-8
		7-28	4-18		
2. Lalpur TOP and Morabadi.	1. Plaza Cinema . . . 2. Lalpur Chowk . . . 3. Kokar . . .	1-4 1-4 1-4	1. Firayalal Chowk to Kokar . . . 2. Bazar Bus Dangratoli Chowk via Circular Road, upto Raj Bhavan	1-4 1-4	1-4 1-4
		3-12	2-8		
3. Lower Bazar	1. Karbala Cowk . . . 2. Gudri Chowk . . . 3. Mahbir Asthan . . .	1-4 1-4 1-4	1. Taxi Stand via Karbala Cowk to Bahubazar and Church Road. 2. Rattan Talkies via Karbala Chowk and Gudri chowk to Purulia Rd.	1-4 1-4	1-4 1-4
		3-12	2-8		

ANNEXURE XIX—contd.

Sector Officers	Pickets	Patrols	Reserves	Rushing	Parties
4. Kantatoli Chowk	1. Kantatoli Chowk 2. Refugee Colony	1-4 1-4  2-8	1. Dangratoli to Namkum	1-4	1-4 1-4
5. Kantatoli Chowk	1. Kantatoli Chowk 2. Refugee Colony	1-4 1-4  2-8	1. Dangratoli to Namkum	1-4	1-4 1-4
6. Hindpiri	1. Rupashree Cinema 2. Central Street CK 3. Gowalatoli 4. Tewary Tank St. 5. Urdu Library	1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4  5-20	1. Street 1 and 2 2. Street 3 and 4 3. Street 5,6 and 7 4. Kadru also to cover Kadru area of Sadar P. S.	1-4 1-4 1-4 1-4  4-16	2-8 2-8
7. Chutia	1. Bahubazar	1-4	1. Chutia area also cover Bus Depot.	1-4	1-4 1-4
8. Doranga and Hinoo.	1. Yunus Chowk to Bus stand near Office of the Chief Inspector of Factories.	1-4	1. Doranda Bazar 2. Birsa Chowk to Kusai colony	1-4 1-4	1-4 1-4
9. Dhurwa	1. Tiril 2. Hatia village	1-4 1-4  2-8	1. DT and St Qrs and Dam Site.	1-4	1-4 1-4 (At Hatia PS)

ro, Sector II HEC  
Colony.

1. Site V . . . . I-4
  2. Expert Hostel . . . . I-4
  3. Sector III . . . . I-4
- 3 - 12

I. Site V to Golchakar

I-4 I-4

II. Bariatu

1. Bariatu village . . . . I-4
  2. Bariatu Road near turning of Baragain village. . . . I-4
  3. Medical College Girls' Hostel . . . . I-4
- 3 - 12

I. Karamtoli chowk to Hazari-bagh Road.

I-4 I-4

TOTAL

32 - 128

20 - 80

13 - 52

11 - 44



## ANNEXURE XIX—contd.

## Control Room

1. Rushing parties . . . . .	4—16
2. Dead body parties (one each at Hatia & Kotwali P.S.)	2—8
3. With Fire Brigade . . . . .	5—9
4. Prisoner's Escort . . . . .	2—8
5. For evacuation at Hatia & Kotwali P.S. . . . .	2—16
6. Reserved . . . . .	3—30
7. Namkum . . . . .	1—8
8. Kanke . . . . .	5—12
<b>TOTAL</b> . . . . .	<b>19—107 (1—4 at Veterinary College)</b>

**ANNEXURE XX**

*Details of Persons evacuated at Ranchi during the disturbances*  
 (Para 5.20 of Part II)

Date	Place from which evacuation took at 6 A.M.	Place of evacuation	No. of people
23-8-67	From Ratu Rd. at 6 a.m.	C.H.	7
25-8-67	Arra Baram	Old C.M's Residence.	46
24-8-67 to 25-8-67	R.M.C.H.	Ex-Minister of Irrigation's bungalow.	70
26-8-67	Durria Making Centre, Harmu Road.	Do.	17
26-8-67	Madhukam	Do.	7
26-8-67	Excise Inspector & his family	Do.	6

**HATIA**

25-8-67 1208 persons were evacuated from Section II, III and other tenants to Artisan Hostel.

**NOTE. — C.H. = Circuit House.**

**ANNEXURE XXI**

*Figures of persons arrested for violation of curfew orders between 22nd and 27th August 1967  
and their release*

(Para 5.21 of Part II)

Date of arrest	Hindu	Muslim	Total	Date of release	Hindu	Muslim	Total
22-8-67 . .	4	61	65	28-8-67 . .	1	..	1
23-8-67 . .	220	244	464	29-8-67 . .	163	143	306
24-8-67 . .	94	236	330	30-8-67 . .	190	451	641
25-8-67 . .	26	20	46				
26-8-67 . .	3	32	35				
27-8-67 . .	7	1	8				
<b>TOTAL . .</b>	<b>354</b>	<b>594</b>	<b>948</b>	<b>TOTAL . .</b>	<b>354</b>	<b>594</b>	<b>948</b>

**ANNEXURE**

*Statement showing the houses*

(Para 5-23)

S.No.	Name & Address	Sabals	Knife	Farsa	Bhala	Sword	Lathi	Bow	Arrow	Pipes
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1.	Shri Mobiuddin of J. J. Rd. Upper Ba- zar, Ranchi . . .	...	...	...	2	2	...	...	4	6
2.	Shri A. Gani of Kan- tatoli . . .	...	...	2	2	1	5	...	...	..
3.	Shri A. Kasim Mistry of Kasai Mohalla . . .	...	...	5	6	2	9	...	...	..
4.	Shri Md. Hussain s/o Abdul Mian of Kanke Rd. . .	...	...	6	7	2	5	...	...	..
5.	Shri Jalil of Karbala Chowk.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	..
6.	In connection with Kot. P. S. case No. 154 dated 23-8-67.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	..
7.	Shri Md. Mustafa of Turkey Soap Karwala Tank . . .	...	...	...	20	...	25	...	...	..
8.	Shri A. Hafiz of Hind- piri . . .	...	...	...	6	3	21	...	...	..
9.	Shri Nazir Alam of Hindpiri . . .	...	...	...	5	4	10	...	...	..
10.	Shri Md. Samir of Tewary Tank . . .	...	...	5	2	3	9	2	10	..
11.	Shri Asfaque Ahmad of Hindpiri . . .	...	3	...	1	...	...	...	...	6
12.	Shri Amatu Haque of Hindpiri . . .	...	...	3	1	2	14	8	89	..
13.	Shri Mantu Mian of Kantatoli . . .	...	...	3	4	2	5	1	4	..
14.	Md. Hakim Khan, Bano Manjil . . .	...	...	5	3	3	6	1	2	..

**XXII**

*searched and recoveries made  
of Part II)*

Rods	Guns	Dagger	Bithi	Hesat	Gupti	Bomb	Autam	Date
12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
I	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	23-8-67
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Do.
...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	Do.
...	...	...	...	3	...	...	...	Do.
...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	Stolen prop- erty also re- covered.
...	...	...	...	1 big bombs 41 small bombs	...	...	...	23-8-67
5	...	7	7	1	...	...	...	24-8-67
5	1	2	...	3	...	...	...	24-8-67
...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	Do.
...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	Do.
...	...	3	...	...	2	...	...	Do.
...	...	...	...	Hand grenade	...	...	...	Do.
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Do.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
15.	Shri Hidul Rahman of Purani Ranchi	...	...	4	5	2	7	...	...	...	...
16.	Shri Nizamuddin Khan s/o Amir Khan of Hindpuri	...	...	5	6	3	5	...	...	...	...
17.	Shri Habib Gwala s/o Rahmat Gwala of Hindpuri	...	...	6	5	2	8	...	...	...	...
18.	Shri Raisuddin of Nazir Ali Lane	...	...	4	3	3	11	...	...	...	...
19.	Shri Banu Mian of Lake Road Ranchi	...	...	3	3	3	9	...	...	...	...
20.	Shri Khalil Mahboom of Upper Bazar (Pa- haritola) refer to case No. 208(9)/67 u/s 25A/Act and to Indian explosive.	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
21.	Shri Md. Hassan	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
22.	Shri Karavi Khan, Village Mahilpar of P.S. Angara refer to Angara PS case No. 7(9)67 /u/s 5 of ex- plosive substance Act	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
		3	51	81	36	149	12	109	12		

12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	Do.
...	...	...	...	3	...	...	...	Do.
...	...	...	...	2	...	...	...	Do.
...	...	3	...	3	...	...	...	25-8-67
...	...	...	...	...	...	1 Bomb 65 g MM 26-8-67 16-23 bore ammunition.		
...	...	2	...	...	1	Bomb on 28-8-67 Dagger 10 seer call of one explosive bomb expetty.		
...	...	...	...	...	...	Bomb some explodable substance refer to Kotwali case No. 271 (9) 67 u/s 456 explosive sub- stance Act read with 1220 I.P.C.		
...	...	...	...	...	Ex Gun powder		20-9-67	
11	1	21	7	...				

S.No.	Name and Address	Weapons received										Dated		
		Bhala	Farsa	Sword	Lathi	Bows	Arrows	Pipe	Rods	Gun	Dagger	Banethi	Saber	
1.	Sri Rattan Ram of Serajuddin Lane Upper Bazar	...	...	I	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	23-8-67
2.	Sri Ramdas Sao of Hindpuri	...	...	1	4	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	I	23-8-67
3.	Sri Jogendra Singh of Harmu	I	...	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	24-8-67
4.	Sri Bandhu Singh of Sukhdeo Nagar	...	I	...	I	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	24-8-67
5.	Sri Jagdish Mistri, of Purani Ranchi	...	I	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	24-8-67
6.	Sri Jaipal of Madhukam Ratu Road, Ranchi	...	...	I	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	24-8-67
7.	Shri Kallu Ram of Kokar	...	I	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	26-8-67

### ANNEXURE XXIII

*Deployment of forces from 26th to 29th August, 1967, at Hatia*

(Para 5:42 of Part II)

26-8-1967	Officer	Armed	Lathi
<hr/>			
<u>Sector II</u>			
<hr/>			
Site 5 Static . . . . .	I	I—4	TOP
Patrolling . . . . .	I	I—4	..
<hr/>			
<u>Sector III</u>			
<hr/>			
Static . . . . .	I	I—4	..
Patrolling . . . . .	I	I—4	..
<hr/>			
<i>Dhurwa</i>			
<hr/>			
Patrolling . . . . .	I	I—4	TOP
Collection of dead bodies . . . . .	I	I—4	..
Rushing party and collection of dead bodies . . . . .	I	I—4	..
Rescue Party . . . . .	I	I—4	..
Refugee Camp . . . . .	I	I—4	TOP
F.F.P. . . . .	..	I—4	..
H.M.B.P. . . . .	..	I—4	..
Experts Hostel . . . . .	..	I—4	..
C.P. No. 3 Static . . . . .	I	I—4	..
Escorting Party . . . . .	I	2—8	..
<hr/>			
Reserve of Thana for recording of statements and other work . . . . .	6	23-	..

**NOTE :—**Besides the above, Army Officers and men numbering about 50 were also deployed for law and order duties in H.E.C. Area with effect from 25th afternoon.

27-8-1967

Officer

Armed

Lathi

*Sector II—Dy. S.P. Incharge*

Site 4 Static . . . . .	I	I—4	TOP
Site 5 Static . . . . .	I	I—4	
Patrolling . . . . .	I	I—4	

*Sector III—Dy. S.P. Incharge*

Static near Nausera village . . . . .	I	I—4	
Static Water Tunki . . . . .	I	I—4	
Patrolling . . . . .	I	I—4	

*Dhurwa—Dy. S.P. Incharge*

Filtration on Plant . . . . .	..	I—4	
Check Post No. 3 . . . . .	I	I—4	
Patrolling . . . . .	I	I—4	
Striking Force . . . . .	I	I—4	
Rushing Party . . . . .	I	I—4	
Hd. Qrs. Patrolling . . . . .	I	I—4	
Experts Hostel . . . . .	I	I—4	
Refugee Camp . . . . .	I	I—4	
F.F.P. . . . .	..	I—4	
H.M.B.P. . . . .	..	I—4	
Hatia Village . . . . .	I	I—10	
Reserve Incharge Dy. S.P.	4	2—10	

17

109

**Note:**—Besides the above, Army Officers and men numbering about 30 were also deployed for law and order duties in H.E.C. area with effect from 25th afternoon.

28-8-1967.

Officer

Armd

## (A) Sector II

(i) Experts Hostel . . . . .	I-4	B.R.N. 7377 Dy. S. P. Sri Sukh. A.S.I. K. D. Narai.
(ii) Site V (E. Type) . . . . .	I-4	
(iii) Site IV . . . . .	I-4	
(iv) Patrolling . . . . .	I-4	

## (B) Sector III

1. Picket . . . . .	I-4	B.R.N. 5884.
2. Patrolling . . . . .	I-5	Dy. S. P. Sri L. N. Pathak.
3. Nausera Village . . . . .	I-4	S. I. Mahto.

## (C) Dhurwa

1. Infiltration Plant cum Dam Site . . . . .	I-4	B.R.N. 7573 D.S.P. Shri Ganesh Singh.
2. Patrolling . . . . .	I-4	A.S.I. R.B. Saran.
3. Sithio Check Post No. 3 . . . . .	I-4	A.S.I. Mujumdar.

## (D) Rushing Party

A.S.I. R. L. Lal . . . . .	I-4
A.S.I. N. N. Choudhary . . . . .	I-4

## (E) Dead Body Collection

A.S.I. Sri Banerjee . . . . .	I-4
(F) Arrest and Search . . . . .	

Reserve Officers  
D.S.P.—1, Incharge Hd. Qrs.  
Inspector—1, A.S.I. —2  
N. Cos.—3.

## (G) F. F. P. cum H. M. B. P.

Patrolling . . . . .	I-4
(H) Hatia . . . . .	I-10

## (I) Special Reserve with A.S.P.

I-4

## (J) Reserve . . . . .

2-8

	D.S.P.	S. I.	A.S.I.	N.C.Os.	Subedar	Men
Grand Total . . . . .	2	7	4	3	1	105

NOTE :—Besides the above, Army Officers and men numbering about 50 were also deployed for law and order duties in H.E.C. area with effect from 25th afternoon.

29-8-1967.

Office

Armed

## (A) Sector II.

(i) Experts Hostel	I-4	B.R.N. 7377 Dy. S. P. Sri Sukh A.S.I. K. D. Naraia.
(ii) Site V (E. Type)	I-4	
(iii) Site IV	I-4	
(iv) Patrolling	I-4	

## (B) Sector III

1. Picket	I-4	B.R.N. 5884.
2. Patrolling	I-5	Dy. S. P. Sri L. N. Pathak.
3. Nausera Village		S. I. Mahto.

## (C) Dhurwa

1. Infiltration Plant <i>cum</i> Dam Site	I-4	B.R.N. 7573 D.S.P. Sri Ganesh Singh.
2. Patrolling		A.S.I. R. B. Saran.
3. Sithio Cheet Post No. 3		A.S.I. Mujumdar.

## (D) Rushing Party

A.S.I. R. L. Lal	I-4
A.S.I. N. N. Choudhary	I-4

## (E) Dead Body Collection

A.S.I. Sri Banerjee	I-4
---------------------	-----

## (F) Arrest and search

S. I. Sri B. P. Verma	I-4	Reserve Officers D. S. P. —1, Incharge Hd. Qrs. Inspector—1, A.S.I.—2 N. Cos.—3
-----------------------	-----	---

(G) F. F. P. *cum* H. M. B. P.

Patrolling	I-4
------------	-----

## (H) Hatia

I-10

## (I) Special Reserve with A.S.P.

I-4

## (J) Reserve

2-8

Subedar	1
Asstt. Sepoy	1
Sick Reserve	2

D.S.P.	S. I.	A.S.I.	N.Cos.	Subedar	Men
Grand Total	2	7	4	3	105

NOTE :—Besides the above, Army Officers and men numbering about 50 were also deployed for law and order duties in H.E.C. area with effect from 25th afternoon

## ANNEXURE XXIV

*Instructions issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner, Bihar, in connection with the relief, and rehabilitation of persons affected by the disturbances.*

(Para 5-44 of Part II)

No. BRR-8/67-3284RR  
Government of Bihar

Revenue (R&R Section) Department

From

Shri B. S. Mukherjee,  
Rehabilitation Commissioner, Bihar.

To

The Commissioner,  
Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi.

*Dated Patna, the 1st September, 1967.*

**SUB:—Relief and Rehabilitation of persons affected by the August, 1967 disturbances in the district of Ranchi.**

SIR,

I am directed to address you on the subject noted above and to communicate the following instructions of Government in suppression of all previous orders:—

**I. Evacuation, Reception and Dispersal.** —Arrangements had to be made in a hurry to evacuate persons affected or likely to be affected by the disturbances and expenditure incurred. Similarly, expenditure will also have to be incurred on cost of transport, etc., for sending back the families to their homes for which expenditure up to Rs. 25/- per family may be incurred by Gazetted Officers in charge of camps. Cases requiring sanction of higher amounts up to Rs. 100/- would require the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner. Exceptional cases requiring more than Rs. 100/- per family should be referred to the Rehabilitation Commissioner.

**II. Feeding etc. in Evacuee Camps.** —All inmates of evacuation camps may be given ration at the rate of 12 ozs. cereal, 2 ozs. of gram, 3 ozs. of Dal, 4 ozs. of vegetables together with necessary oil, salt, spices, etc. This is the scale per adult. For children it would be half. Milk, fresh or powdered, as may be available, may also be supplied to children up to 5 years. The limit of daily expenditure should not exceed Rs. 2/- per adult (of and above 8 years of age) and Rs. 1.50 paise per child.

For other essentials, such as soap, oil, cloth, etc., a cash grant of upto Rs. 25/- per family may be made by the Gazetted Officer in charge of the Camp depending upon the circumstances, and the requirements of the individual cases.

**III. Contingencies** —Contingent expenditure as per actuals may also be incurred on rent of buildings, provisions of light, water supply, sanitary arrangements, medicines, purchases of utensils for camps, burial charges, etc.

**IV. Ad hoc grant while leaving camp.**—At the time of leaving the camps, the evacuees may be given three days rations by the Gazetted Officer in charge of the camp. In cases of indigent persons or other hard cases, this may be increased to 7 days' ration. Besides that, Rs. 20/- in cash may be given to those families whose houses have been affected and Rs. 10/- per family to others. This is besides the expenditure on transport as per item I above and is intended to be purely temporary help pending the payment of Rehabilitation and House repair grants.

**V. Rehabilitation grant.**—Government cannot accept responsibility for compensating the affected persons for the loss incurred during the disturbances. At the same time Govt. feel that persons who have been so affected should be given sufficient cash to set up their homes and buy such essential as utensils, clothes, cots, etc., depending upon the strength of the family and the attendant circumstances as, for example, whether they were able to remove their movables before evacuation. Expenditure at the following rates may be incurred by the officers designated below up to the extent indicated against each :—

S.D.O. . . . .	Upto Rs. 250/- per family.
D.C. . . . .	Upto Rs. 500/- per family.
R.C. . . . .	Upto Rs. 1000/- per family.

Government also feel that persons who have been affected by the disturbances should be enabled to restart their professions with the least possible delay. For this purpose the affected persons concerned may be divided into following categories:—

(a) *Landless labourers*.—The rehabilitation grant in cash mentioned in V above together with grants for repairs to their houses as in VI below should be adequate in their cases.

(b) *Agriculturists (i.e.,) those who have lands*.—They should be enabled to cultivate their lands during the current Kharif season and given all necessary assistance in the matter. This work should be given high priority and should be completed latest by the 30th September, 1967. If they have lost their cattle, seeds, implements, etc. they should be given liberal loans upto Rs. 1,000/- per family. The general provisions of the Loans Manual shall apply to these cases. The B.D.O. may sanction loans up to Rs. 500/- in each case, the Subdivisional Officer up to Rs. 750/- and the Deputy Commissioner up to Rs. 1,000/-. In exceptional cases where the cultivator has suffered heavy loss and is not in a position to take loan, Rs. 250/- per family may be given as grant and balance up Rs. 750/- as loan.

All such cases where it is proposed to give grants should however be referred to the Deputy Commissioner for approval.

Proposal for sanctioning higher amounts as grants should be referred to the Rehabilitation Commissioner.

(c) *Artisans*.—Similarly, artisans who have lost their implements, will need Government assistance to start work again. What has been stated in (b) above about loans upto Rs. 1,000 and, in exceptional cases, grant upto Rs. 250/- would apply in their cases also.

(d) *Shopkeepers*.—It is possible that the entire capital of a shopkeeper has been destroyed or burnt and he needs assistance to set up shop again. In such cases, loan upto Rs. 5,000 may be sanctioned. The following Officers will be competent to grant loans to artisans and shopkeepers to the extent indicated against each :—

S.D.O. . . . .	Upto Rs. 1,000 per family.
D.C. . . . .	Upto Rs. 2,000 ,,
R.C. . . . .	Upto Rs. 5,000 ,,

Loans sanctioned under (a), (b), (c) and (d) above will carry an interest at the rate of 5½% per annum and will be recoverable in 10 years in easy annual instalments.

**VI. House Repair Grants.**—Government attach very great importance to the voluntary efforts of co-villagers in rendering help by labour and material to repair or rebuild the damaged houses as it is only then that the Evacuees will get a real sense of security. Arrangements should be made for supply at convenient centres of building material such as bamboos, Ballas, wood, etc., at reasonable rates, which would be required for repairing the houses. If the persons concerned would like to repair their houses themselves cash grant according to the requirements may be sanctioned upto Rs. 500 by the Sub-divisional Officer, Rs. 1,000 by the Deputy Commissioner and Rs. 5,000 by the Rehabilitation Commissioner. Places of worship, which may have been damaged during the disturbances should also be repaired and treated as a 'House'.

In those cases where the evacuee is not in a position to undertake the repairs himself or would like the house to be repaired by Government agency before he returns home, the repairs may be got done by the Block Development Officer or such officers who may be competent to undertake such work.

Construction of houses which were totally destroyed and repairs to houses damaged partially must be completed by the 30th October, 1967. Government attach the greatest importance to this date line and will expect all concerned officers to do their best to see that the houses are completely ready for occupation before the 30th October, 1967.

2. A separate letter is being issued indicating Heads of Account under which expenditure relating to relief and rehabilitation of persons affected by the recent disturbances has to be debited. Allotment of funds is also being made separately.

Yours faithfully,

(Sd.) B. S. MUKHERJEE,  
1-9-67,

*Rehabilitation Commissioner, Bihar.*

**ANNEXURE XXV**

*Details of loans advanced upto 31-5-68 to riot sufferers at Ranchi*

(Para. 5-46 of Part II)

No. of applicants			Amount involved		
Muslims	Hindus	Total	Muslims	Hindus	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6
36	31	87	92,500.00	54,300.00	1,46,800.00

No. of applicants to whom loans disbursed			Amount involved		
Muslims	Hindus	Total	Muslims	Hindus	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6
44	22	66	65,500.00	34,500.00	1,00,000.00

Cases pending for want of allotment of funds—21.

ANNEXURE XXVI

*Statement showing Community-wise break-up of Rehabilitation Grants upto 31-5-1968.*

(Para. 5.48 of Part II)

(Para. 5.54 of Part II)

S. No.	Categories	Cases			Amount paid		
		Hindu	Muslim	Total	Hindu	Muslim	Total
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Shopkeepers	.	46	85	131	9,750	22,625	32,375
2. Artisans	.	11	41	52	3,350	7,750	11,100
3. Rehabilitation Grant	.	54	757	811	21,295	3,10,084	3,31,379
4. Miscellaneous Relief	.	...	19	19	...	5,540	5,540
5. House Repairing Grant	.	10	81	91	12,250	34,850	47,100
6. Education Grant	.	53	228	281	5,245	55,805	61,050
7. Azad High School	.	...	1	1	...	10,000	10,000
		174	1,212	1,386	51,890	4,46,654	4,98,544

### ANNEXURE XXVII

*Provisions supplied free of cost by H.E.C. to the evacuees camps at Artisans Hostel  
(350 families)*

(Para. 5-58 of Part II)

Daily consumption of food was worked out and supplied from the very date of evacuees  
as follows :—

Rice	.	.	.	350 Kgs.
Dal	.	.	.	100 "
Onion	.	.	.	200 "
Potato	.	.	.	125 "
Mustard Oil	.	.	.	20 "
Biscuits	.	.	.	50 "
Loaves	.	.	.	400 "
Milk	.	.	.	120 "
Sugar	.	.	.	25 "
Salt	.	.	.	20 "
Spices	.	.	.	15 "
Tea	.	.	.	5 "
Coal	.	.	.	15 Mds.